Vol. 36, no. 2: Full Issue by International Law & Policy, Denver Journal
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 
Volume 36 
Number 2 Spring Article 6 
April 2020 
Vol. 36, no. 2: Full Issue 
Denver Journal International Law & Policy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp 
Recommended Citation 
36 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at 
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-
commons@du.edu. 
Denver Journal
of International Law and Policy
VOLUME 36 NUMBER 2 Spring-2008
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ARTICLES
THE ADJUDICATION OF GENOCIDE:
GACACA AND THE ROAD TO
RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA ............... Maya Sosnov 125
BEYOND UNCITRAL: ALTERNATIVES TO
UNIVERSALITY IN TRANSNATIONAL
INSOLVENCY ........................ Alexander M. Kipnis 155
VEILED IMPUNITY: IRAN'S USE OF
NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS ................ Keith A. Petty 191
INTERNATIONAL LAW FIGHTS TERRORISM
IN THE MUSLIM WORLD: A MIDDLE
EASTERN PERSPECTIVE ........... Mohamed R. Hassanien 221

THE ADJUDICATION OF GENOCIDE:
GACACA AND THE ROAD TO RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA
MAYA SOSNOV 1
INTRODUCTION
In 1994, Rwanda suffered one of the worst genocides in history. During 100
days of killing, 800,000 people died.2 More people died in three months than in
over four years of conflict in Yugoslavia; moreover, the speed of killing was five
times faster than the Nazi execution of the Final Solution.3 Unlike the killings that
occurred during the Holocaust, Rwandans engaged in "a populist genocide," in
which many members of society, including children, participated in killing their
neighbors with common farm tools (the most popular was the machete). 4 While
not all Hutus engaged in killing and not all victims were Tutsi, Hums executed the
vast majority of the killings and Tutsis were largely the target of their aggression. 5
Fourteen years after the genocide, Rwanda is still struggling with how to
rebuild the country and handle the mass atrocities that occurred. During the first
four years following the genocide, four types of courts developed to prosecute
genocidaires: 6 the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, foreign courts
exercising universal jurisdiction, domestic criminal courts, and a domestic military
tribunal. Regrettably, none of these courts has been able to resolve the enormous
problems related to adjudicating genocide suspects. In 2001, the government
created gacaca, a fifth system for prosecuting genocidaires, to solve the problems it
saw in the other courts. Gacaca is highly lauded by the government and many
outside observers as the solution to Rwanda's genocide. A researcher, who studied
two gacaca pilot programs for five months, noted that "[t]he official discourse is so
1. Maya Sosnov received her J.D. from the University of Pennsylvania Law School. She is
currently clerking for the Honorable Anita B. Brody of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. The author would like to thank Philip Keitel and Leonard Sosnov for their
valuable comments and suggestions.
2. HOwARD BALL, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE: THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY
EXPERIENCE 156 (University Press of Kansas 1999).
3. Id. at 164, 166.
4. Erin Daly, Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 34
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 355,361-63 (2002).
5. Id. at 365.
6. A term generally used to refer to perpetrators of Rwanda's genocide. See, e.g., YVES
BEIGBEDER, JUDGING CRIMINAL LEADERS: THE SLOW EROSION OF IMPUNITY 102 (Martinus Nijhoff
2002).
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passionate about gacaca and its anticipated outcome that the system is almost
granted a mythical status." 7
Unfortunately, gacaca cannot fully operate as either a court or a customary
dispute resolution mechanism because of its twin goals: retribution and
reconciliation. Moreover, Rwanda's limited resources and the astounding number
of suspects require enormous revisions to gacaca. This paper explores why
Rwanda implemented gacaca, the reasons for gacaca's failure and possible
solutions for moving forward. Part I presents an overview of the history of ethnic
tension in Rwanda, the events leading up to genocide, and the genocide itself. Part
II examines the four courts created before gacaca to adjudicate genocide, their
failures in the eyes of the Rwandan government and international observers, and
the government's creation of gacaca. Part III explores the goals of the Rwandan
gacaca model, and whether they are attainable or desirable. Part IV examines
gacaca courts' failure to implement criminal procedure protections. Part V
suggests revisions to the current adjudication of genocide suspects, including an
alternative model of gacaca. Additionally, this section highlights the importance
of addressing Rwandans' economic struggles, as a necessary element of
reconciliation. Part VI concludes the article.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF RWANDA
Disagreement among Rwandans on critical aspects of the nation's history
continues to be a major impediment to reconciliation. The Organization of African
Unity remarks that "there are hardly any important aspects of the story that are not
complex and controversial; it is almost impossible to write on the subject without
inadvertently oversimplifying something or angering someone."8 One of the most
controversial issues is the origin of ethnic groups in Rwanda. 9  Before the
genocide, the ethnic make-up of Rwanda was 85% Hutu, 14% Tutsi, and 1%
Twa.10 Although these ethnicities were clearly defined, it is unclear how they
developed." Since the end of genocide, the government has promoted a version of
history in which Tutsi and Hutu peacefully co-existed before colonialism. 12 The
government's official website claims that "[w]hile the relationship between the
king and the rest of the population was unequal, the relationship between the
ordinary Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa1 3 was one of mutual benefit mainly through
7. Arthur Molenaar, Gacaca: Grassroots Justice After Genocide. The Key to Reconciliation in
Rwanda?, 77 AFR. STUD. CENTER RES. REP. 1, 68 (2005), available at
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/dspace/bitstream/1887/4645/1/ASC- 1236144-071 .pdf.
8. Daly, supra note 4, at 358 (quoting AFRICAN UNION, RWANDA: THE PREVENTABLE GENOCIDE
- INTERNATIONAL PANEL OF EMINENT PERSONALITIES 2.1 (2000), available at http://www.africa-
union.org/Officialdocuments/reports/Report-rowanda-genocide.pdf).
9. Id. at 359.
10. BALL, supra note 2, at 156.
11. Daly, supra note 4, at 359-60.
12. Id. at 359.
13. Bahutu, Batutsi, and Batwa are the terms traditionally used by Rwandans to identify the ethnic
groups within their country. These terms, when adopted by the West, became Hutu, Tutsi and Twa and
refer to the same ethnic groups. See, e.g., WOMEN FOR WOMEN INTERNATIONAL, RWANDA FACTSHEET
(2005), http://www.womenforwomen.org/downloads/country-factsheet-rwanda-sunday.pdf.
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the exchange of their labour. The relationship was symbiotic."' 14 However, many
Hutus believe that Tutsi herders were foreigners to Rwanda who considered
themselves superior to the Hutu pastoralists and took control of the region between
the eleventh and fifteenth century. 5  The failure of the Tutsi-controlled
government to address the Hutu version of history further highlights the significant
ideological split between Tutsis and Hums. Hutus and Tutsis view themselves as
different ethnic groups, even though they share the same language (Kinyarwanda),
culture, clan names, customs, taboos, and have intermarried for centuries. 16 The
government has avoided confronting these conflicting beliefs between ethnic
groups and has banned the use of ethnic categories because it is afraid of inflaming
ethnic tensions. 17 However, the government's lack of healthy outlets in society for
Rwandans to face these differences and resolve them has forced these tensions to
erupt in courtrooms and gacaca. Since 1994, no history lessons have been taught
in Rwandan schools because no consensus exists on the past, and government
publications refuse to include an ethnic breakdown of society.'
8
Whether or not the ethnic divisions began in pre-colonial times, they were
exploited during colonialism. Colonists considered Tutsis to be the missing link
between blacks and whites because many Tutsi were lighter skinned, thinner, and
taller than the Hums.19 As a result, Tutsis were placed in positions of authority
over Hums. In 1935, Belgian colonists introduced ethnic identity cards ("tribal
cards") to Rwandans.2 ° Ironically, these cards provided the lists of Tutsis to be
targeted for killing during the genocide.2' Prior to the introduction of identity
cards, Hutus could become Tutsis with the acquisition of cattle; however, ethnic
identity cards ended this practice. 22 For the majority of the colonial period, up
until 1959, Tutsis dominated local government and the educational arena.23  In
1959, Hutus forcibly took power following the death of the Tutsi monarch, killing
Tutsis and forcing many others into exile.24 By 1962, when Belgium granted
independence to Rwanda, Hutus controlled the government and more than 200,000
Tutsis were in exile.25
Since independence, there have been several power struggles between Hutus
and Tutsis, including a series of massacres that occurred in 1963, 1964, 1973,
14. Official Website of the Republic of Rwanda: History, http://www.gov.rw/ (last visited Feb. 27,
2007).
15. Daly, supra note 4, at 360.
16. BALL, supra note 2, at 156; Jessica Raper, The Gacaca Experiment: Rwanda's Restorative
Dispute Resolution Response to the 1994 Genocide, 5 PEPP. DiSP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 8 (2005).
17. Marian Hodgkin, Reconciliation in Rwanda: Education, History and the State, 60(1) J. INT'L
AFF. 199, 202, 207 (2006).
18. Eugenia Zorbas, Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 1 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 41, 48
(2004).
19. Raper, supra note 16, at 6-7.
20. Id. at 7, 9.
21. Id. at 10.
22. Id. at 9-10.
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1990, 1992, and 1993.26 In August 1993, Hutus and Tutsis signed the Arusha
Peace Accord and appeared to reach a power sharing agreement. 27  The United
Nations (UN) Security Council sent 2,500 UN troops to Rwanda to monitor the
treaty. 8 Although peace seemed near to the outside world, as early as January
1994, Major General Romeo Dallaire, UN commander in Rwanda, notified the UN
that the Hutu government planned to exterminate the Tutsis.29 On April 6, 1994,
the airplane of President Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, was shot down and
genocide began within the hour. 30 Rather than increasing the number of soldiers,
as requested by Major General Dallaire, the UN withdrew troops, leaving 270 UN
soldiers in Rwanda under a mandate only to "monitor" the situation. 3' Over the
next three months 800,000 people died in the genocide.
3 2
II. A RWANDAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE FOUR COURTS ESTABLISHED TO ADJUDICATE
GENOCIDE
A. The International Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda (ICTR)
Shortly after the genocide, the Rwandan govermnent requested the help of the
UN to form an international tribunal to prosecute genocide suspects because there
were hardly any lawyers or judges in the country.33 In November 1994, the UN
Security Council created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).34
The UN based its authority to create the ICTR on Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
35
The ICTR has the power to "prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan
citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighboring
states.",36  The jurisdiction of the ICTR extends to individuals 37 suspected of
committing genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Article 3
26. Raper, supra note 16, at 13.
27. BALL, supra note 2, at 162.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 163.
30. Id. President Habyarimana's plane was shot down by two ground-to-air-missiles. There are
two competing theories of responsibility for the plane crash. One version is that radicals within
Habyarimana's regime shot the president's plane down because they were unhappy with a peace
agreement that would give rebels a stake in the government. Id. Alternatively, others claim that Paul
Kagame and other Tutsi rebels shot the president's plane down because they knew that the power
sharing agreement that called for multiparty elections would not place Tutsis in power since they were
only fifteen percent of the population. In November 2006, this theory was supported by French Judge
Jean Louis Bruguiere who accused Paul Kagame of participating in the assassination of Habyarimana.
Stephen Kinzer, The France-Rwanda Affaire, Los ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 18, 2006, at Bus. Sec.,
available at 2006 WLNR 21960974; The Heat Turns on Kagame, THIS DAY (Nigeria), Nov. 26, 2006,
available at 2006 WLNR 20647387.
31. BALL, supra note 2, at 163-64.
32. Id. at 155-56.
33. Id. at 171, 183. The dearth of lawyers and judges is attributable to the deaths of many of these
practitioners and the destruction of their offices and supplies during the genocide.
34. BEIGBEDER, supra note 6, at 104.
35. JOHN R.W.D. JONES, THE PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA 465 (2d ed. 2000).
36. Id. at 474 (quoting Article I of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda).
37. The ICTR doesn't have jurisdiction over groups or organizations. See id. at 500.
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common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.38 Although the
Rwandan government initially supported formation of the international tribunal,
Rwanda was the only member of the UN Security Council to vote against the
ICTR.39
There are several reasons why Rwanda voted against the ICTR. One of its
main objections was the ICTR's lack of a death penalty.40 The Rwandan
government feared that the masterminds of the genocide would receive prison
terms, while subordinates and lower-ranked perpetrators, found guilty in national
court, would receive the death penalty.4 ' Second, the government was not in favor
of the limited temporal jurisdiction of the tribunal to handle incidents that occurred
between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994.42 The Rwandan government
was unhappy with the ICTR's time frame because genocide planning began in
1990.43 Third, the government wanted the ICTR to have the power to prosecute
groups and organizations responsible for promulgating the genocide, rather than its
limited ability to prosecute only "natural persons."4  Lastly, the government felt
strongly that the ICTR should be located within Rwanda, rather than in Arusha,
Tanzania.
In April 1998, Rwanda issued a formal position paper to the UN entitled The
Position of the Government of the Republic of Rwanda on the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 4 The government criticized the ICTR for
poor organization, personnel problems, lack of a prosecutorial and investigation
strategy, poor conduct in investigations (failure to investigate some of the areas
where the worst atrocities were committed), and poor prosecutorial conduct.47 In
conclusion, the Rwandan government requested implementation of the following
recommendations: (1) an independent prosecutor for Rwanda; 4s (2) moving the
ICTR to Kigali, Rwanda; (3) strengthening the power of the prosecutorial staff; (4)
hiring more qualified staff; and (5) improving cooperation between the ICTR and
38. BEIGBEDER, supra note 6, at 105.
39. Id. at 104.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. BALL, supra note 2, at 171-72.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 172.
45. Timothy Longman, The Domestic Impact of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
in INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIALS: MAKING A DIFFERENCE? PROCEEDINGS OF AN
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE HELD AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SCHOOL OF LAW, AUSTIN, TEXAS:
NOvEMBER 6-7, 2003 33, 35
(Steven R. Ratner and James L. Bischoff eds., 2004).
46. BALL, supra note 2, at 172.
47. Id. at 172-73.
48. Before September 15, 2003, the ICTR and the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
(ICTY) shared a prosecutor. See Press Release, ICTR, The New Prosecutor of the ICTR Mr. Jallow
Takes Up His Mandate (Oct. 6, 2003) available at http://www.pict-
pcti.org/news-archive/03/03Oct/ICTR_100603.htm.
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the Rwandan government.49 The UN Security Council did not comply with any of
these requests.5 °
Many Rwandans remain unaware of the ICTR because of its distance from
Rwanda and its limited impact on everyday citizens,51 but for those Rwandans who
are familiar with the tribunal, the relationship between the ICTR and Rwanda
remains strained. Martin Ngoga, Rwanda's Deputy Attorney General and
representative to the ICTR for four years, echoes a common belief of many
Rwandans that "[t]he tribunal was not created to get justice, but to nurse the guilt
of the international community."5 2 Additionally, Rwandans have come to see the
ICTR as a drain on international resources that could be better used within the
country.
53
By September 2004, the ICTR had resolved only twenty-three cases, even
though investigations had begun ten years earlier.54 Over two years later, in
December 2006, the ICTR had convicted twenty-six people and acquitted five
people. It was estimated that the ICTR would spend over 1 billion dollars
prosecuting approximately forty genocidaires in the period from 1995 through
2007.56 However, by the end of 2007, only 35 accused had been tried.57
In addition to the limited number of people prosecuted, the UN has planned
for the ICTR to complete its mandate by the end of 2008. This completion
strategy has led the ICTR to begin the process of transferring some of its cases to
the national courts of several countries, including Rwanda. 9 This decision is
49. BALL, supra note 2, at 173.
50. Id.
51. Mark A. Drumbl, Law and Atrocity: Settling Accounts in Rwanda, 31 OHio N.U. L. REv. 41,
47 (2005).
52. Dele Olojede, A People's Court, NEWSDAY, May 4, 2004,
http://www.pulitzer.org/year/2005/international-reporting/works/olojede7.html.
53. Gerald Gahima, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Justice, stated that if Rwanda had 1/20 of
the money given to the ICTR, many of Rwanda's problems would be solved. See BEIGBEDER, supra
note 6, at 104.
54. Raper, supra note 16, at 27.
55. Andrew England, FT Report-Rwanda: Putting Faith in the Young. Reconciliation: The Next
Generation Need to Be Brought Up As Agents of Peace, FINANCIAL TIMEs (London), at 5, Dec. 5, 2006.
56. Id.
57. Hirondelle News Agency, ICTR Review- Tough Year Ahead for ICTR as Completion Strategy
Approaches, HIRONDELLE PRESS AGENCY, Dec. 31, 2007,
http://www.hirondelle.org/arusha.nsf/English?OpenFrameSet
58. Id.
59. Id. Several human rights groups oppose the transfer of ICTR cases to Rwanda, even though
Rwanda has abolished the death penalty, which was one of the initial objections people had to
adjudicating cases in Rwanda. Amnesty International urged the ICTR not to transfer cases to Rwanda
until it has demonstrated that: (1) "the Rwandan justice system can operate impartially by investigating
and prosecuting crimes by all sides;" (2) "the Rwanda justice system will conduct trials in accordance
with international fair trial standards;" (3) "trials of any person transferred to Rwanda [will] be
observed by independent experts to ensure that they are fair;" (4) "persons transferred to Rwanda for
trial are not at risk of torture or subjected to other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment;" and (5)
"[v]ictims and witnesses [will] receive protection and support." Amnesty Int'l, Rwanda: Suspects Must
Not be Transferred to Rwandan Courts for Trial Until it is Demonstrated that Trials will Comply with
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somewhat surprising because the UN created the ICTR based on the premise that
an international tribunal outside of Rwanda was the best method for adjudicating
the worst perpetrators of genocide. 60  Additionally, this decision possesses an
element of irony because, when the ICTR began, the Rwandan government's
request to prosecute these cases in Rwanda was denied.
The majority of Rwandans are dissatisfied with the tribunal because it is slow
and expensive, it provides perpetrators of genocide more rights and amenities than
victims (i.e. comfortable living space and anti-retroviral drugs for HIV infection),
and it remains removed and out of reach for local Rwandans.6'
B. Domestic Criminal Courts
In response to the ICTR's limited temporal and subject matter jurisdiction, as
well as to the slow speed of the ICTR, Rwanda passed Organic Law No. 08/96 of
August 30, 1996 on the Organization of Prosecution for Offences Constituting the
Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since October 1,
1990. The law enables Rwanda's criminal courts to prosecute all individuals who
committed genocide, crimes against humanity, or crimes associated with them.62
Unlike the ICTR, people may be prosecuted in domestic courts for crimes
committed between October 1, 1990 and 1994.63 Organic Law No. 08/96, before
its amendment in 2004 (due to the introduction of a new gacaca law), classified
suspects into four categories: (1) leaders and organizers of the genocide, notorious
murderers, and those who committed sexual torture; (2) all others responsible for
"intentional homicide or of serious assault against the person causing death"; (3)
persons who committed serious assaults, but did not kill anyone; and (4) persons
who committed property damage.64 Ironically, the ICTR limits the power of the
national court because it possesses superseding jurisdiction.65 This limitation may
prevent Rwanda from trying some Category 1 suspects because a person
prosecuted by the ICTR may not be tried before a national court for the same
violations of international law. 66 Although the domestic court answers several
critiques the Rwandan government had of the ICTR, the biggest obstacle to the
national court system has been the slow speed of trials. The Rwandan government
acknowledges that:
International Standards of Justice, Al Index AFR 47/013/2007, Nov. 2, 2007.
60. Jason Strain and Elizabeth Keyes, Accountability in the Aftermath of Rwanda's Genocide, in
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 87, 98-99 (Jane
Stromseth ed., 2003).
61. Drumbl, supra note 51, at 46-48.
62. Organic Law No. 08/96 on the Organization of Prosecution for Offences constituting the
Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since October 1, 1990,, Aug. 30, 1996, art.
1, available at http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/rwanda.htm.
63. Id.
64. Id. at Art. II.
65. JONES, supra note 35, at 502 (referencing Article 8 Concurrent Jurisdiction of the Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda).
66. Id. at 504 (quoting Article 9 Non-bis-in-idem of the Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda).
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[T]he sheer bulk of genocide suspects and cases due for trial has placed
severe strain on Rwanda's criminal justice system which is already
crippled by poor infrastructure and the death of professionals during the
genocide. Rwanda's prisons are heavily congested, and the cost of
feeding and clothing prisoners is a drain on the economy.
67
Additionally, the government estimates that it would take 200 years, at the
present rate, to prosecute everyone in the traditional court system.68 As of January
2002, only 1,989 suspects had been brought to trial, 69 and a year and a half later, in
August 2003, only 6,500 people had been tried.70 Considering that over 135,000
suspects had been detained in prisons, these numbers were very low. 71  This
prosecutorial lethargy was attributable to the judicial system's devastation during
genocide, including the departure or death of most lawyers, judges, and judicial
personnel and the destruction of offices, supplies and transportation. 72 Moreover,
the slow speed of the criminal courts had created horribly overcrowded prisons.73
Prior to 1994, detention facilities had a limited capacity to hold only 18,000
people.74 Since the end of genocide, new prisons have been built, and old ones
expanded, but they have only increased prison holding capacity to 51,000 people.75
In a country greatly depleted of financial resources and in need of massive physical
rebuilding, the imprisonment of such a large percentage of the population is a
tremendous burden economically, socially, and psychologically.
In addition to Rwandans' displeasure with the domestic courts' speed of
adjudication, a number of citizens dislike the courts' due process procedures
because they render much important evidence inadmissible.76 Moreover, some
Rwandans view the requirement that victims testify, subjecting themselves to
cross-examination, as harmful because it forces victims to relive their traumas.77
Particularly disconcerting is the distrust among Hutus of the Tutsi-controlled legal
system, which hinders the development of a reliable record of the past and harms
67. Daly, supra note 4, at 369.
68. Official Website of the Republic of Rwanda, supra note 14; but see, e.g., Drumbl, supra note
51, at 45; Zorbas, supra note 18, at 36. These sources more conservatively estimate that it would take
more than a century to prosecute all suspects in the traditional court system.
69. BEIGBEDER, supra note 6, at 115.
70. Drumbl, supra note 51, at 45.
71. BALL, supra note 2, at 183.
72. Id. In 2000, there were only sixty lawyers in private practice in Rwanda and few wanted to
represent genocide suspects. Even if there were enough lawyers to represent everyone, the country
could not afford to pay for their representation. REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, REPLY TO AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL'S REPORT: RWANDA: THE TROUBLED COURSE OF JUSTICE (2000)
http://www.gov.rw/govemment/06 1100news.ai.htm. (last visited March 20, 2008) [hereinafter




76. Drumbl, supra note 51, at 51-52.
77. Id.
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the reconciliation process.78 For the above reasons, many Rwandans and
international observers are displeased with the domestic courts.
C. The Military Tribunal of Rwanda
Although Organic Law No. 08/96 appears to apply to all Rwandans, "the
Military Tribunal tries in the first instance all offences committed by all Military
personnel irrespective of their rank."7 9 The tribunal also possesses "powers to try
Military personnel accused of the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity
committed in Rwanda between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994, that place
them in the first category irrespective of their ranks." °80  Therefore, military
personnel benefit because the government protects them from prosecution in both
the criminal courts and gacaca.
Members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 81 receive preferential
treatment because "the RPF is the party in power, [hence] its armed forces are
considered military personnel retroactively, whereas the armed forces and militia
of the Habyarimana regimes are considered genocidaires."82 As a result of their
privileged status, even though the RPF engaged in the killing of an estimated
twenty-five thousand to forty-five thousand Hutu civilians during and after the
genocide, hardly any RPF members have been prosecuted.8 3 As of late 2002, the
military court had tried only twenty cases of "vengeance killings" in which an RPF
member was accused of participating in Hutu revenge killings.84 More shocking
was the fact that the chief military prosecutor had no more open files on the 1994
war crimes by November 2002.85 While the Rwandan government, which is
primarily controlled by Tutsis, has no problem with these distinctions, 86 other
Rwandans believe "[t]his furthers the notion of victor's justice as those in the RPF,
78. Maya Goldstein-Bolocan, Rwandan Gacaca: An Experiment in Transitional Justice, 2004 J.
DisP. RESOL. 355, 375 (2005).
79. Organic Law No. 07/2004, Determining the Organisation, Functioning and Jurisdiction of
Courts, April 25, 2004, art. 138, available at http://www.kituochakatiba.co.ug/jurisdictionofcourts.htm.
80. Id.; see also Constitution of the republic of Rwanda, arts. 154-55 (June 4, 2003), available in
French at http://www.grandslacs.net/doc/2729.pdf (stating that the military tribunal has jurisdiction
over crimes committed by members of the military).
81. The Rwandan Patriotic Front is a group of Tutsi exiles that formed on October 1, 1990 to
combat the Hutu controlled government of President Habyarimana. E.g., Marie Beatrice Umutesi, Is
Reconciliation Between Hutus and Tutsis Possible?, 60 J. INT'L AFF. 157, 157 (2006).
82. Alana Erin Tiemessen, After Arusha: Gacaca Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 8 AFR. STUD.
Q. 57, 70 Fall 2004.
83. Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional
Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REv. 1, 59-60 (2006).
84. Id. at 60.
85. Id.
86. The RPF has not only alienated itself from the Hutu population of Rwanda, but also from
many Tutsis. This is because many of the RPF who grew up as Tutsi exiles in foreign countries learned
to speak English rather than French, which has caused a strained relationship with Rwanda's
Francophone Tutsi population. Some of the complaints Tutsis have voiced since the genocide are: (1)
the reintegration of suspected genocidaires into government and the military; (2) the government's
public display of bones and corpses to memorialize the genocide; and (3) the lack of reparations for
survivors. Id. at 37.
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as Tutsis, will not stand trial against accusations from primarily Hutu
communities."8 7
D. Foreign Tribunals of Universal Jurisdiction
A handful of Rwandans have been tried in Switzerland and Belgium based
upon the implementation of universal jurisdiction. 8 In 1999, Switzerland tried a
former Rwandan mayor and found him guilty of grave breaches of the Geneva
Convention. 9 It became the first nation to employ its domestic courts to judge a
case where neither the perpetrator nor the victims were citizens of the nation and
where the crime occurred outside the country's borders. 90 Following Switzerland,
Belgium convicted four Rwandans of violations of the Geneva Convention. 9'
However, in 2003, Belgium amended its universal jurisdiction law, severely
limiting its reach, but preserving one Rwandan case that had already begun. 92 In
2005, that case led to the trial of two Rwandan businessmen implicated in mass
murder. 93 Although these trials have gained international attention, their impact in
Rwanda has been extremely limited because they affect only a handful of
Rwandans living in exile in the countries that choose to prosecute.
94
III. THE GACACA COURTS
A. Historical Development of Gacaca
Given the problems with the ICTR and the national courts, on October 17,
1998, the Rwandan president, in conjunction with officials and citizens,
established a commission to expedite justice and increase public participation in
the process. 95  On June 8, 1999, the Commission published a proposal for
gacaca.96 Legislation enacting gacaca passed on January 26, 2001 . Gacaca, in
Kinyarwandan (the local language), means "the grassy lawn," and it refers to a
traditional dispute resolution mechanism used by communities in Rwanda. 9' The
government turned to gacaca as an alternative to the traditional courts because of
citizens' familiarity with the system and its ability to engage all Rwandans in the
87. Tiemessen, supra note 82 at 70.
88. William A. Schabas, National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute Genocide, the 'Crime of
Crimes,' I J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 39, 47 (2003) [hereinafter Schabas, National Courts].
89. Id.
90. Human Rights Watch, Rwanda: Belgian Genocide Trial, Apr. 12, 2001,
http://hrw.org/press/2001/04/rwanda-trial.htm. [hereinafter Human Rights Watch, Rwanda].
91. Schabas, National Courts, supra note 88.
92. Human Rights Watch, Belgium: Universal Jurisdiction Law Repealed, Aug. 1, 2003,
http://hrw.org/English/docs/2003/08/01/ belgiu6280.htm [hereinafter Human Rights Watch, Belgium].
93. Associated Press, Two on Trial for Rwanda Genocide, THE GUARDIAN (London), May 10,
2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/may/10/rwanda.
94. See Human Rights Watch, Rwanda, supra note 90.
95. Raper, supra note 16, at 33.
96. Id. at 33-34.
97. Id. at 34.
98. Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 78, at 355 n. 1.
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process of accounting for a genocide that involved mass societal participation. 99
National implementation of gacaca began in 2006.00
Rwanda designed gacaca to work in combination with the national criminal
courts by enabling gacaca to handle crimes committed between October 1, 1990
and December 31, 1994, and by adopting the same four categories of genocide
suspects as contained in Organic Law 08/96.101 Category 1 suspects (leaders and
organizers of the genocide, notorious murderers, and those who committed sexual
torture) continued to face prosecution in the criminal courts, while suspects in
Categories 2, 3, and 4 were within gacaca's jurisdiction. 1
02
In October 2001, over 260,000 judges were elected from the community103 to
preside over 10,000 gacaca jurisdictions.I0 4 Beginning in 2002, a two year pilot
phase of gacaca commenced, in which only 751 jurisdictions operated. 0 5 At the
end of the pilot phase, in June 2004, the law's complexity and system inefficiency
led lawmakers to revise gacaca.10 6  The current gacaca law contains only three
categories of suspects: Category 1 remains the same; Category 2 combines all
perpetrators and accomplices of murder and other violent crimes; and Category 3
applies to those suspected of property offenses. 10 7  The law establishes a three-
tiered court system: the Cell handles Category 3 crimes, the Sector handles
Category 2 crimes, and the Gacaca Court of Appeal handles appeals from those
sentenced in absentia or sentenced by the Sector.'0 8 Furthermore, the law reduces
the number of judges required at the Cell level from nineteen to fifteen, and lowers
the overall number of judges required from 260,000 to 170,000.109 Despite the
99. National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, Context or Historical Background of Gacaca
Courts,http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/En/Generaties.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2008) [hereinafter
Historical Background].
100. Godwin Agaba, Gacaca Courts to Change Structure, THE NEW TIMES (Kigali), Jan. 7, 2007,
available at http://www.rwandagateway.org/article.php3?id-article=3978.
101. See Organic Law, No. 40/2000, Setting Up Gacaca Jurisdictions and Organizing Prosecutions
for Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Between
October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994, Jan. 26, 2001, arts. 3 & 51, available at www.inkiko-
gacaca.gov.rw/pdf/Law.pdf.
102. Id. at arts. 2, 39-42. Originally gacaca had four jurisdictions, arranged hierarchically like the
court system, to handle the various levels of suspects: the Cell handled Category 4 crimes; the Sector
handled Category 3 crimes; the District handled Category 2 crimes; and the Province handled appeals of
sentences from the District and sentences rendered in absence of the accused.
103. BEIGBEDER, supra note 6, at 115.
104. Sarah L. Wells, Gender, Sexual Violence and Prospects for Justice at the Gacaca Courts in
Rwanda, 14 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 167, 174 (2005).
105. Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 78, at 380.
106. Id. at 378.
107. See Organic Law, No. 16/2004, Establishing the Organisation, Competence and Functioning
of Gacaca Courts Charged with Prosecuting and Trying the Perpetrators of the Crime of Genocide and
Other Crimes Against Humanity, Committed Between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994, June
19, 2004, art. 51, available at www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/pdf/newlawl.pdf [hereinafter, Organic Law,
No. 16/2004].
108. See id. at arts. 41-43.
109. See id. at art. 13; William A. Schabas, Genocide Trials and Gacaca Courts, 3 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 879, 894 (2005) [hereinafter Schabas, Genocide Trials].
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2004 reduction in the number of judges necessary for gacaca, low judicial
participation has led the Executive Secretary of the National Service of Gacaca
Jurisdictions (NSGC), Domitille Mukantanganzwa, to propose a law in parliament
to further reduce the number of judges required by almost half.110
Notwithstanding the major changes NSGC has made to gacaca law, many
Rwandans remain skeptical of gacaca's ability to provide an effective method to
adjudicate genocide suspects.
B. The Objectives of Gacaca
The government instituted gacaca to achieve the following five objectives: (1)
"[t]o reveal the truth about what has happened;" (2) "[t]o speed up the genocide
trials;" (3) "[t]o eradicate the culture of impunity;" (4) "[t]o reconcile the
Rwandans and reinforce their unity;" and (5) "[tlo prove that Rwandan society has
the capacity to settle its own problems through a system of justice based on the
Rwandan custom."" 1
From the government's perspective, these goals are fundamental to effective
adjudication of genocide suspects. The government continues to champion gacaca
as a success,"2 even though gacaca has hardly achieved the five objectives it
purports to address. Rather than generating solutions, gacaca has created more
problems for Rwandan society to solve, which forces people to question whether
the government is addressing the right goals with gacaca and whether the
objectives it has established can be achieved through the current gacaca system.
1. To Reveal the Truth About What Has Happened
The official Rwandan government website states that "justice can become true
only if the truth about events is established." '13  The government asserts that
gacaca will forward the process of uncovering the truth by providing eyewitnesses
the opportunity to speak about the genocide and by developing lists of individuals
in each community who were genocide victims or participants. 114 Unlike
traditional criminal trials, in which the goal is to prosecute an individual for the
crimes he committed against the state and where the focus of the trial remains on
the defendant, gacaca focuses on the effect of the suspect's actions on the
community and invites testimony from every person affected by the crime.
Moreover, each local community has its own gacaca tribunal, increasing the
chances of societal participation in the justice process by enabling convenient
access to hearings.
While there is real potential for gacaca to provide a more complete picture of
what transpired during genocide, the search for truth is rife with obstacles. One of
the most lauded aspects of gacaca is the plea bargaining system. The system
110. Agaba, supra note 100.
111. National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, The Objectives of the Gacaca Courts,
http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/En/EnObjectives.htm (last visited April 20, 2008) [hereinafter
Objectives].
112. See, e.g., Official Website of the Republic of Rwanda, supra note 14.
113. Objectives, supra note 111.
114. Id.
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provides for a 50% reduction in prison time for Category 2 suspects who confess
during gacaca.l15 Additionally, if a person confesses prior to his gacaca hearing,
his sentence may be reduced by up to two thirds.' 1 6 A valid confession requires a
suspect to provide a detailed description of the committed offenses, reveal all
accomplices in the crime, and publicly apologize for the offense. 117
Although public confessions could lead to uncovering the truth, the majority
of confessions made in pilot programs have not provided full disclosure of
people's participation in the genocide." 8 Requiring suspects who confess to
incriminate their accomplices pressures some suspects into falsely accusing
others."19 However, the most common problem is that almost all confessors admit
to only one or two minor crimes and blame third parties for the more serious
crimes.120 This is done to avoid harsher sentences, placement in Category 1, and
adjudication in the criminal courts. 121 Even those who admit to murder minimize
their involvement in the genocide. 122 Gabriel Gabiro, a Rwandan journalist, states,
"I've never heard anybody confessing to more than one murder. You'd think
nobody in Rwanda killed twice."' 123  It is estimated that between 250,000 and
500,000 women were raped during the genocide; 124 however, out of 1,881
confessions made in the province of Ginkogoro, no one confessed to rape, a
Category 1 crime. 125
Similar to the disincentives suspects possess for complete confession,
witnesses face pressure not to disclose what they have seen. Rather than
encouraging observers of genocide to come forward and testify, gacaca has
silenced many of them because they too face criminal liability for failing to render
assistance to genocide victims. 126  Several survivors believe that people talked
more openly about the genocide prior to gacaca, when they did not fear jail time. 1
27
In addition to rapists refusing to confess and witnesses refusing to come
forward, the victims of rape are highly unlikely to testify. 128 A 2002 study, by the
Rwandan Unity and Reconciliation Commission, found that 60% of sexual abuse
survivors forecasted that women would testify much less than men because of the
115. Organic Law No. 16/2004, supra note 107, at art. 73.
116. Ali Mao, Traditional Justice, NEW VISION (UGANDA), Dec. 9, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR
21382971.
117. Organic Law No. 16/2004, supra note 107, at art. 54.
118. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 72-73.
119. Zorbas, supra note 18, at 36-37.
120. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 140.
121. Id.
122. See Stephan Fais, Open Court, 165 TIME EUROPE 12, Mar. 21, 2005, available at
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1037615,00.html.
123. Id.
124. Wells, supra note 104, at 182.
125. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 115.
126. Waldorf, supra note 83, at 81. The 2001 gacaca provision, which provided immunity to
bystanders from criminal liability, was deleted in the 2004 gacaca law.
127. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 74.
128. Wells, supra note 104, at 187.
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intimate nature of the crime. 129 According to Gaudelive Mukasavais, a Rwandan
social worker:
At first women who were raped used to testify, but nowadays they don't
want to because nothing happened after their testimony. No one helped
them. That's why it is difficult to tell these women that they should tell
it to their neighbors during Gacaca, neighbors who have no training and
who cannot help them with their trauma. We tell them to testify but
most are not willing.
130
While many survivors worry that if they tell the truth they might suffer
violence, ostracism or counter-allegations that they committed crimes, the risks of
testifying for rape survivors are much higher. 131 In Rwanda, rape victims fear they
will become ineligible to marry and will face ostracism from their families and
husbands. 132 Frequently, parents refuse to allow young girls to testify because of a
commonly held belief that discussing sexual abuse will only worsen ethnic tension
and harm the reconciliation process. 
133
Victims are also reluctant to testify because they fear for their own safety. 34
To reduce the fears associated with testifying, gacaca judges possess the ability to
imprison anyone who threatens or pressures a witness not to testify. 135 In March
2004, fourteen people were sentenced to death and three to life imprisonment for
killing survivors expected to testify in gacaca. 136 However, this has not stopped
the threatening or killing of survivors and witnesses. Between July and December
2006, there were at least 16 killings and 24 attempted killings of witnesses.'
37
Several of the murdered individuals were executed with machete, 138 the same farm
tool used to carry out the genocide.
The biggest challenge to obtaining the truth is getting both sides to participate
and believe in gacaca. While a Johns Hopkins survey found that 87% of the
population was willing to provide evidence in gacaca,139 this statistic is unreliable
129. Id.
130. Internews Rwanda, Child of Rape: Child of Genocide, Apr. 2005, available at
http://www.intemews.org.rw/articles7.htm#child.
131. Wells, supra note 104, at 186-88.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 78, at 391.
135. See Organic Law, No. 16/2004, supra note 107, at art. 30. These prison sentences can range
from three months to two years.
136. Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 78, at 392.
137. Karen McVeigh, Spate of Killings Obstructs Rwanda's Quest for Justice, THE OBSERVER,
Dec. 3, 2006, at 41, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/dec/03/rwanda.karenmcveigh.
One particularly gruesome story is of Martin Havugivaremye who testified in front of gacaca. When
Mr. Havugivaremye was attacked with machetes he called out for help, but no one in his village would
assist him because he had given the names of killers in gacaca. These murders have also been
perpetrated against gacaca judges.
138. Id.
139. SIMON GASIBIREGE AND STELLA BABALOLA, PERCEPTIONS ABOUT GACACA LAW IN
RWANDA: EVIDENCE FROM A MULTI-METHOD STUDY 14 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Sch. of Pub. Health,
Ctr. for Commc'n Programs, 2001).
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because although people's words support gacaca, their actions do not. 
140 In two
pilot programs studied, only genocide survivors accused people of committing
crimes, with one exception. 14 1 Initially, Hutus in both communities remained
silent during gacaca hearings. 142 However, in Gatovu, as gacaca progressed, the
Hutu population began defending the accused, fighting with survivors and calling
them liars. 143 In Vumwe, Hutus stopped going to assemblies and by the end of the
observation, only 10% of the community attended hearings. 144 Throughout fifteen
cases, only seventeen people in the community testified, other than the
defendants. 145
The government's control over gacaca further obstructs the process of
uncovering a truthful version of the genocide because the government forwards its
own version of truth and ignores voices in the community. 146  Because the
majority of the government is run by the RPF (the group of Tutsis responsible for
ending genocide), massacres performed by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA)
(the military wing of the RPF) are not addressed in gacaca, even though gacaca
law enables adjudication of crimes against humanity. 147 As a result, many Hutus
and outside observers believe gacaca is a form of victor's justice, portraying all
Hutus as perpetrators of genocide and all Tutsis as faultless victims. 14 This one-
sided version of the genocide is only capable of providing half-truths.
Another obstacle to discovering the truth is many villagers' fundamental lack
of trust in gacaca, which has led some of them to abuse the gacaca system by using
the pretence of genocide accusations to settle land disputes and family feuds.
149
"By failing to provide an adequate forum for hearing property disputes, the
government may have unwittingly encouraged people to try to resolve those
disputes through false accusations of genocide in gacaca."' 50  Even without
purposeful deception, many survivor accounts are inaccurate because survivors
were hiding or fleeing and did not witness the event in question, or because they no
longer have a clear memory of the event due to the trauma they suffered during
genocide. 151
While gacaca has expanded the opportunities for truth and healing by
enabling survivors to share their stories and by requiring suspects to give
confessions to detail their crimes, it has had limited success. Gacaca is unable to
140. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 73-74.
141. Id. at 105.
142. Id. at 105-06.
143. Id. at 106.
144. Id. at 103.
145. Id. at 106.
146. See Tiemessen, supra note 82, at 58.
147. Id. at 69-70.
148. See id. at 67-69.
149. Paul Willis, No Lawyers but Rwanda's Village Courts Could Pass Death Sentence, SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH (UK), Apr. 9, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 5967489. In the Ginkongoro province, a
man was falsely accused of rape during gacaca because he owed the alleged victim's family money.
150. Waldorf, supra note 83, at 72.
151. Id. at 71.
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produce truthful accounts of the past because both suspects and victims are
reluctant to invest in the system.
2. To Speed Up the Genocide Trials
When gacaca began, the government guaranteed that gacaca would speed up
the adjudication of genocide suspects because, rather than having only twelve
specialized courts, the country would have 11,000 gacaca jurisdictions to handle
genocide crimes. 152 However, during the first six years of gacaca, it appeared that
it was no better equipped than the criminal courts to quicken the pace of
adjudication.
Although gacaca passed into law in January 2001, elections for gacaca judges
did not begin until October of 2001.153 The first pilot program began in June of
2002 with twelve gacaca jurisdictions. 154 By November, 2003, there were only
750 pilot programs, 155 even though the government's plan would eventually lead
to the creation of 12,100 gacaca courts. 156  On March 10, 2005, the first pilot
gacaca programs finally moved from the investigative stage (involving collection
of data and categorization of crimes) to the trial stage. 157 The first four months of
trials from March 10, 2005 to June 30, 2005 produced only 1,950 judgments. 58
Finally, in mid-July 2006, gacaca courts were extended to the whole country.15 9
At the end of October 2006, it appeared that it would take many years to
conclude gacaca because the National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions (NSGC)
estimated that there were 766,489 genocide suspects whose cases had not been
adjudicated. 160  However, on December 19, 2006, the Rwandan Minister of
Justice, Mr. Tharcisse Karugarama, declared that the gacaca tribunals would
conclude by the end of 2007.161 This appeared to be an unrealistic goal because at
the beginning of 2007, approximately 40,000 accused had been tried in gacaca
courts. 162 Additionally, the mandatory weekly gacaca meetings were placing an
152. The Republic of Rwanda, supra note 14.
153. Jacques Fierens, Gacaca Courts: Between Fantasy and Reality, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 896,
914 (2005).
154. Schabas, Genocide Trials, supra note 109, at 894.
155. Id. at 893-94.
156. England, supra note 55.
157. See Gacaca. Prime Minister Testifies, INTERNEWS: RWANDA ARTICLES, Apr. 2005,
http://www.intemews.org.rw/articles7.htm#prime.
158. Hirondelle News Agency, Rwanda/Gacaca- Over 2000 Cases Completed by Gacaca Courts,
HIRONDELLE PRESS AGENCY, Sept. 7, 2005,
http://www.hirondelle.org/arusha.nsf/LookupUriEnglish/8B6CF68B52AFF9F443257075
0 0 2 1 D6A8?O
penDocument.
159. Agaba, supra note 100.
160, Id. Of these suspects, 72,539 of them were placed in Category I and were to receive criminal
trials; whereas, the 397,103 suspects in Category 2 and the 296,847 in Category 3 were to receive
gacaca hearings.
161. Hirondelle News Agency, Rwanda: RwandalGacaca- Conclusion of Gacaca Trials Next Year
(Rwandan Minister of Justice), HIRONDELLE PRESS AGENCY, Dec. 20, 2006,
http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/
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economic strain on both community members 163 and judges 164 and it appeared that
gacaca courts could not sustain their current pace of adjudication. Furthermore,
rather than decreasing the number of genocide suspects, gacaca resulted in a huge
increase in suspects. 1
65
Despite the factual data from 2006 that pointed to an end date for gacaca
many years into the future, on November 19, 2007, the President of Rwanda, Paul
Kagame, announced that gacaca would conclude at the end of 2007.166
Miraculously, according to the National Service of Gacaca Courts (SNJG), more
than 800,000 suspects had been tried in gacaca courts by the end of 2007.167 The
remarkable speed with which the gacaca courts operated in 2007 is almost
unbelievable. Gacaca proceedings remain poorly documented, leaving it difficult
to ascertain how so many cases were resolved in such a short amount of time.
However, it is clear that this radically quickened pace of adjudication raises
concerns regarding whether the courts exercised procedural fairness and engaged
in sufficient community participation.
Regardless of the President's statement that gacaca would conclude at the end
of 2007, gacaca continues in 2008.168 According to Domitille Mukantanganzwa,
approximately 15% of Category 3 suspects and 3% of Category 2 suspects are still
awaiting hearings by the gacaca courts. 169 Additionally, it is possible that gacaca
courts will begin trying Category 1 genocide suspects. 170 Currently, the Rwandan
government's plan is to devote 2008 to completing gacaca.171
Although gacaca began very slowly, the Rwandan government kept its
promise to speed up the genocide trials. While the Rwandan government may see
this as a triumph, it is difficult to imagine that a country with a population of
163. Hirondelle News Agency, Stunned by Growing Numbers of Genocide Suspects, Rwanda
Revisits Categorisation, HIRONDELLE PRESS AGENCY, Sept. 7, 2005, http://tj-
forum.org/archives/Gacaca%20numbers,%200ct%2005.html [hereinafter Hirondelle, Rwanda Revisits
Categorisation].
164. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 102. Judges receive no compensation for their participation in
gacaca, which has led to the common sentiment, aptly expressed by one judge that, "[i]f you didn't eat,
you cannot come to gacaca, but you must go and find some money or food. Should my children or me
die because of gacaa?... They don't give us anything[.]"
165. Hirondelle News Agency, Rwanda/Gacaca: Approximately a Million People Have Appeared
Before Gacaca Courts, HIRONDELLE PRESS AGENCY, Dec. 12, 2007, available at
http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/1357/461/. The Rwandan government now estimates
that around one million people participated in the genocide and require gacaca hearings. This greatly
increased number of suspects is the result of gacaca's confession system which requires all genocidaires
to name their accomplices. See Schabas, Genocide Trials, supra note 109, at 881.
166. President Paul Kagame, Address at the ACP-EU Parliamentary Assembly in Kigali (Nov. 19,
2007), available at http://www.acp-eu.gov.rw/index.php?iro=news&obj=39&details=235.
167. Hirondelle News Agency, Rwanda: Controversial Assessment of the Gacaca Courts,
HiRONDELLE PRESS AGENCY,Jan. 3, 2008, http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/1394/309/.
168. See id.
169. Hirondelle News Agency, Rwanda: Gacaca Trials Could Also Try First Category Defendants,
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approximately 9 million people 172 was able to fairly adjudicate over 700,000
genocide suspects in one year173 when only 40,000 had been tried in the previous
six years.174 The decision to adjudicate so many suspects in such a short amount
of time may ultimately prove to be an unwise choice.
3. To Eradicate the Culture of Impunity
Many Rwandans believe that a culture of impunity exists in Rwanda because
perpetrators of prior massacres in the country received impunity. 175 Some
Rwandans believe that if this culture of impunity did not exist, the 1994 genocide
would not have occurred. 17 6 The government claims to support an end to the
culture of impunity:
In their cells, the citizens will play an important role in the
reconstruction of the facts and in the accusation of those who
perpetrated them. None of those who took part in them will escape
punishment. Thus, people will understand that the infringement implies
the punishment for the criminal without exception. 177
Rwanda has been successful at punishing Hutu genocidaires because the
country has refused to grant amnesty to most suspects and gacaca provides prison
sentences for any genocide participant who committed a more severe crime than
property damage. However, the government has not truly ended impunity because
of its refusal to try RPA soldiers responsible for committing crimes against
humanity. Additionally, crimes that the government acknowledges RPA soldiers
have committed are tried behind closed doors in front of a military tribunal run by
their peers. 17 Without publicly addressing the crimes committed by both sides,
gacaca is little more than victor's justice.
4. To Reconcile the Rwandans and Reinforce Their Unity
The government believes that gacaca will unify the nation by producing
truth. 179 As the government explains, once "the truth will be known, there will be
no more suspicion, the author will be punished, justice will be done to the victim
and to the innocent prisoner who will be reintegrated into Rwandan society."'"8
Unfortunately, gacaca is unable to produce a completely truthful version of the
genocide; and successful reconciliation will require much more than the truth.
172. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND NOTE: RWANDA, June
2007, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2861.htm [hereinafter Background Note: R.wanda].
173. Hirondelle, Rwanda Revisits Categorization supra note 163.
174. Hirondelle, Conclusion of Gacaca Trials supra note 161.
175. Stephanie Wolters, The Gacaca Process: Eradicating the culture of impunity in Rwanda?
INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES, Aug. 5, 2005, 12, available at
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2005/iss-rwa-05aug.pdf.
176. Id.
177. Objectives, supra note 111.
178. See Tiemessen, supra note 82, at 61-68.
179. Objectives, supra note 111.
180. Id.
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There is much scholarly debate over defining reconciliation. To require
"apology and forgiveness and the willingness to embark on a new relationship
based on acceptance and trust"''8 as part of reconciliation, may automatically
prevent its achievement because in a society that has experienced such mass
atrocity, these goals may be unachievable. Professor Louis Kreisberg provides a
more practical definition of reconciliation, one that Rwandans can realistically
achieve: "Reconciliation refers to the process by which parties that have
experienced an oppressive relationship or destructive conflict with each other
move to attain or to restore a relationship that they believe to be minimally
acceptable."'' 8 2  Kreisberg's definition of reconciliation accurately reflects most
Rwandans' view of reconciliation, as "the way to overcome a history of conflict
and to rebuild better social relations in which people cooperate, share meals, and
drink beer together."' 8 3 For Rwandans to cooperate, to share food and drink, and
to forward national reconstruction, they must achieve "minimally acceptable"
social relations. 184
Sadly, reconciliation remains a distant hope. In pilot studies, gacaca created
more divisiveness than communal bonds.' 85 Many survivors perceive confessions
by genocide suspects as insincere,' 8 6 promoting resentment between Hutus and
Tutsis rather than reconciliation. As Klaas de Jonge, a monitor of gacaca for Penal
Reform International, stated, "[t]he accused think because they ask for forgiveness,
they are entitled to forgiveness. You hear these people confessing as if they are
describing a movie. There's absolutely no compassion."'' 8 7 Although genocide
suspects are the ones on trial, many survivors feel that the community is judging
them. As explained by one survivor, "the population dislikes you and says that
you accuse people of their family. When I encounter them on the road, they ignore
me.... Even when I want to buy beer for other people, they will refuse because
they are afraid that I will poison them."' 88  While many survivors experience
community ostracism, many perpetrators are afraid of community responses to
their actions during genocide.
An increasing problem, not documented until 2005, has been a string of
suicides and suicide attempts by genocide suspects.1 89 Between March and the end
181. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 32 (quoting Wendy Lambourne, Justice and Reconciliation:
Postconflict Peacebuilding in Cambodia and Rwanda, in RECONCILIATION, JUSTICE AND
COEXISTENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 322 (Mohammed Abu-Nimer ed., 2001)).
182. Id. at 31 (quoting Louis Kreisberg, "Changing Forms of Coexistence", in RECONCILIATION,
JUSTICE AND COEXISTENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE, 47-64, 48 (Mohammed Abu-Nimer ed., 2001)).
183. Id. at 33.
184. In traditional gacaca, drinking of beer together was an aspect of reconciliation, in which the
losing party was required to provide beer to the community. Waldorf, supra note 83, at 49.
185. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 91.
186. Waldorf, supra note 83, at 73.
187. Id. (quoting Interview with Klaas de Jonge, Penal Reform International, in Kigali, Rwanda
(Sept. 2002)).
188. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 134.
189. Craig Timberg, Suicides Slow Search for Justice, Closure in Rwanda, THE WASHINGTON
POST, Feb. 17, 2006. Front, available at 2006 WLNR 2911892. Some means by which genocide
suspects have killed or attempted to kill themselves include hanging oneself, ingestion of pesticide, and
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of December, 2005, sixty-nine suspects killed themselves and forty-four others
attempted suicide. 190 Some genocide survivors view the suicides as dashing their
hopes for closure. 191 Benoit Kaboyi, executive director of Ibuka, the largest
association of genocide survivors, expresses a commonly held sentiment of
survivors, that "[n]o person has the right to punish themselves.... They
[perpetrators] have to suffer for what they have done."'192 Citizens' anger toward
suspects, who killed themselves, rather than truthfully accounting for their
participation in the genocide, is a further impediment to reconciliation.
Reconciliation is a long process that may take decades or generations to
achieve. However, it has been fourteen years since the genocide, and post-gacaca
Rwanda still lacks signs that the country is moving toward unity. Rwandans must
recognize the following if they want successful reconciliation: (1) different people
have very different understandings of reconciliation; (2) reconciliation only occurs
if the two parties can openly discuss their differences and accept the reconciliation
process; and (3) reconciliation cannot be achieved until a society has peace and
personal security.' 93 Unfortunately, none of these factors have been properly
addressed by the Rwandan government.
Due to the government's top-down implementation of gacaca, members of
society had no influence over the goals of gacaca or discussions concerning
reconciliation and its significance to different groups within Rwanda.
Reconciliation has been difficult to achieve because there is no mutually held
understanding of what it means. When Rwandans were asked to define elements
of reconciliation, their answers varied widely, from confession and forgiveness, the
release of innocent prisoners, justice and uncovering the truth, to holding both
Tutsis and Hutus responsible for their crimes. 
194
Another obstacle to reconciliation is gacaca's failure to produce full
disclosure of the truth. Inability to fully and openly discuss the genocide prevents
reconciliation because Hutus and Tutsis remain skeptical of each other.
Furthermore, Rwandans do not fully accept the gacaca process because their
participation is mandated by the state and they face criminal sanctions if they
refuse to comply. 195  Gacaca lacks credibility because it is not an accurate
representation of traditional gacaca and many Rwandans perceive it to be a foreign
system thrust upon their communities. 196 Additionally, many Hutus do not accept
the reconciliation process because it is government controlled, which has resulted
in a failure to address Tutsi crimes. 
197




193. Molenaar, supra note 7.
194. Id. at 29.
195. See Id.; Organic Law No. 16/2004, supra note 107, at art. 29.
196. Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 78, at 392. For a discussion of the difference between
traditional and modem gacaca, see infra pp. 28-30.
197. Id. at 390.
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Furthermore, although the genocide is over, many people do not feel
personally secure. Continued violations of human rights in prisons, and the anger
of many Hutus toward the government's imprisonment of them and/or their family
without trial (or even charges for some)' 98 makes the Rwandan majority unwilling
to trust the reconciliation process. These Hutus fear that gacaca's retributive
emphasis will result in more prison time for them or their loved ones.
Lastly, there is little incentive for Rwandans to invest in the designated
reconciliation process. Although gacaca promises to provide victims with
financial compensation from the accused, 199 no compensation has been
provided.2 °0 While the government's plea bargaining system requires perpetrators
who confess to perform community service, it has not created adequate measures
to monitor people's performance of this service.20 ' When 1,676 people were asked
what they perceived the major current problems were in Rwanda, 81.9% of them
identified poverty/economic hardship as a main concern.20 2 Without providing
victims with material benefits through compensation or community service, there
exists little reason to invest in gacaca. Reconciliation remains possible for
Rwandans; however, it is unattainable under the current gacaca system.
5. To Prove That Rwandan Society Has the Capacity to Settle Its Own
Problems Through a System Based on the Rwandan Custom
Allegedly, gacaca reflects the historical dispute resolution mechanism
employed for centuries in Rwanda. However, other than a shared name, modem
gacaca barely resembles traditional gacaca. Traditionally, Rwandans used gacaca
to resolve minor disputes, such as land/property disputes and petty thefts.20 3
Gacaca had no written rules and was conducted on an ad hoc basis when disputes
arose.20 4  Reconciliation was the primary focus of gacaca; therefore, sentences
were purely compensatory 20 5 and could not be imposed without acceptance by
both parties.20 6 The system inflicted penalties on the entire family of the accused
because gacaca was based on an assumption of collective responsibility.2 7
Customarily, elder male heads of family acted as arbitrators and women were
excluded from the process. 20 8 Gacaca shunned the use of law to resolve conflicts
and deemed confessions to be a form of provocation. 20 9 Voluntary participation by
198. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 71.
199. Organic Law No. 16/2004, supra note 107, art. 95.
200. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 47.
201. Pemille Ironside, Rwandan Gacaca: Seeking Alternative Means to Justice, Peace and
Reconciliation, 15 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 31, 55 (2002).
202. GASIBIREGE AND BABALOLA, supra note 139, at 7.
203. Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 78, at 376-77.
204. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 13.
205. Id. at 14.
206. Jennifer G. Riddell, Addressing Crimes Against International Law: Rwanda's Gacaca in
Practice 48 (2005) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, University of Aberdeen) (available at
http://www.restorativejustice.org/resources/docs/ridelljennifer).
207. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 14.
208. Fierens, supra note 153, at 913; Molenaar, supra note 7, at 12.
209. Fierens, supra note 153, at 913.
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members of society was crucial to gacaca and to resolving local disputes based on
the best interests of the community.210
The only key feature of modem gacaca that remains similar to traditional
211gacaca is a highly accessible system, based on community participation.
Otherwise, the modem gacaca framework barely resembles its namesake. All
people over twenty-one years of age, regardless of their gender, can now serve as
judges and participate in the gacaca process.212 Modem gacaca is a legal
institution that meets at regularly scheduled intervals, no longer provides
flexibility, and does not allow individual communities the independence to select
their method of implementing dispute resolution.213 Rather than using social
pressure to convince members of society to participate in the process, modem
gacaca relies on the coercive power of the state.2 14 Punishment is legislated by the
state, not based on compromise between the parties involved.21 5 Additionally,
gacaca now focuses on retribution and judges possess the ability to imprison
individuals.2 16 Furthermore, while traditional gacaca disdained confessions,
modem gacaca promotes plea bargaining as an effective tool for discovering the
truth.
217
One of the government's central justifications for gacaca is that it empowers
communities to adjudicate crimes perpetrated by community members against their
neighbors.2 1 8However, the make-up of the communities that existed during
genocide has greatly changed. One reason for the change has been the influx of
approximately 750,000 Tutsi exiles into Rwanda after the genocide and the exodus
of many Hutus. 219  Additionally, Rwanda's villagization program has relocated
hundreds of thousands of people into new villages from hillside farms. 22 0 These
people were not a community during genocide and may not feel connected to each
other.22! While a central goal of traditional gacaca was to restore communities to
their condition before the conflict, it is impossible for modem gacaca to do this
because many of these communities never existed.
210. Maureen E. Laflin, Gacaca Courts: The Hope For Reconciliation in the Aftermath of the
Rwandan Genocide, 46 ADVOC. (IDAHO) 19, 20 (2003).
211. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 24.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 25.
214. See Waldorf, supra note 83, at 68 (explaining that methods the State has employed to coerce
participation in gacaca include threatening fines and imprisonment to people who were absent from
gacaca, closing up shops and rounding people up for gacaca, and preventing people from leaving once a
session begins).
215. Leah Werchick, Prospects for Justice in Rwanda's Citizen Tribunals, 8 No. 3 HUM. RTS.
BRIEF 15, 17 (2001).
216. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 25.
217. Fierens, supra note 153, at 913.
218. See Donald L. Hafner Elizabeth B.L. King, Beyond Traditional Notions of Transitional
Justice: How Trials, Truth Commissions, and Other Tools for Accountability Could and Should Work
Together, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 91,105-06 (2007).
219. Daly, supra note 4, at 379-80.
220. Id. at 378.
221. Id.
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IV. THE NEED FOR CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PROTECTIONS FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS IN GACACA COURTS
Several scholars have shied away from using the word court to refer to gacaca
because it lacks many of the due process protections that courts provide, and
because traditional gacaca was solely an arbitration system. However, the
Rwandan government refers to "Gacaca Courts, 222 and the law implementing
gacaca confirms that "Gacaca Courts have competences similar to those of
ordinary courts.... ,,223 Like court systems, gacaca's organization is hierarchical; it
has the power to summon witnesses, issue search warrants, confiscate goods,
pronounce prison sentences, and consider appeals.224
The Rwandan government labels gacaca a court, it functions like a court, and
most importantly, it possesses the power of a court to imprison individuals.
22
Therefore, if the government wants gacaca to operate as a court, it should follow
the due process requirements of a court, as enumerated in domestic law and the
international and regional treaties to which Rwanda subscribes. Failure to do so
weakens gacaca in the eyes of the local populace and the international community.
The Rwandan government agrees, and has stated, "[w]e acknowledge that Gacaca
jurisdictions are tribunals to which the international human rights instruments, to
which Rwanda is a party, apply., 226 Despite this recognition by the government,
gacaca violates several fair trial procedures provided for by international and
domestic law.
Rwanda joined the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) in 1975, the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and People's Rights
(African Charter) in 1983, and signed the Arusha Peace Accord in 1993, which
incorporated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) into domestic
law.227 Domestically, Rwanda provides for fair trial standards in the Rwandan
Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP). The ICCPR, African Charter, UDHR and
CCP all recognize an accused's right to defense counsel. 228 However, in gacaca,
the accused are not entitled to counsel. Additionally, the ICCPR and the CCP
guarantee defendants the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses and call
witnesses in their own defense, neither of which is provided for in gacaca.229 The
222. Historical Background, supra note 99.
223. Organic Law No. 16/2004, supra notel07, at art. 39.
224. Id. at arts. 39, 41-43.
225. Id. at art. 39; Historical Background, supra note 99.
226. The Republic of Rwanda, Reply, supra note 72, at § X, E.
227. Werchick, supra note 215, at 16 (summarizing from the Arusha Peace Accord, Art. 17 which
states, "the principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the 10 th of December
1948 shall take precedence over corresponding principles enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic
of Rwanda, especially when the latter are contrary to the former.").
228. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), G.A. Res 2200A (XXI), art.
14(3)(b, d), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); African [Banjul] Charter on Human and People's
Rights, June 26, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58, art. 7; Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), G.A. Res.
217A (III), art. 11(1), U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); Werchick, supra note 215, at 16 (citing the
Rwandan Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) art. 75(1)).
229. See ICCPR, supra note 228, at art. 14(3)(e); Werchick, supra note 215, at 16 (citing CCP art.
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government allows the prosecutor access to witnesses in developing the
evidentiary record before a hearing, but defendants do not have access to witnesses
or their files prior to hearings. 230 This appears to violate the ICCPR provision that
a defendant is entitled "to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of
his defense."23'
Key to the UDHR, ICCPR, and African Charter is the guarantee of an
impartial and independent tribunal.232  Gacaca law requires judges to be
"Rwandans of integrity" with "high morals and conduct," who have not
participated in genocide or crimes for which they received a sentence of over six
months.233 Despite these requirements, judicial impartiality and independence
remain questionable because judges are members of the community, they
experienced genocide themselves, and some have very strong biases. Gacaca
judges receive only six days of training
234 and no compensation for their work.
235
Large numbers of poorly trained, unpaid judges threaten impartiality because
judges are ripe for corruption 236 and manipulation. Moreover, judicial impartiality
clearly does not exist in all gacaca locations because 14,885 gacaca judges have
been charged with genocide. 237
Furthermore, the ICCPR and the African Charter guarantee a right to appeal
to a higher tribunal. 238 However, in gacaca all appeals are handled within the
gacaca courts and under no circumstances reach the criminal courts. As a result of
gacaca's violations of fair trial standards, enumerated in the ICCPR and African
Charter, the appeal system is inadequate.239
To counter accusations of international law violations, Rwanda claims that it
is complying with international treaties, and points to Article 4 of the ICCPR,
which states:
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and
the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the State Parties to the
present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations
under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the
76(6)).
230. Werchick, supra note 215, at 17.
231. ICCPR, supra note 228, at art. 14(3)(b).
232. UDHR, supra note 228, at art. 10; ICCPR, supra note 228, at art. 14(1); African [Banjul]
Charter on Human and People's Rights, supra note 228, at art. 7 & 26.
233. Organic Law No. 16/2004, supra note 107, at art. 14..
234. BEIGBEDER, supra note 6, at 115.
235. Bolocan, supra note 78, at 387.
236. Id. at 388.
237. Hirondelle News Agency, Rwandan/Gacaca- Over 14,000 Gacaca Judges Charged with
Genocide, HIRONDELLE PRESS AGENCY, Sept. 13, 2005,
http://www.hirondelleorg/arusha.nsf/English?OpenFrameSet.
238. ICCPR, supra note 228, at art. 14(5); African [Banjul] Charter on Human and People's Rights,
supra note 228, at art. 7(1)(a).
239. Ironside, supra note 201, at 54.
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exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with their obligations under international law....240
While the categorization of this situation as an "emergency" is debatable,
Article 4 explicitly prevents derogation of responsibilities that are inconsistent with
Rwanda's other international legal obligations. Despite the Rwandan
government's acceptance that Article 4 applies to Rwanda, the country still does
not provide the fair trial guarantees provided by international and domestic law.
Since gacaca functions as a court, and adjudicates cases with criminal sanctions,
the rules Rwandans agreed to internationally and domestically should apply.
V. LOOKING FORWARD: REVISING GACACA AND RWANDA'S GOALS FOR THE
FUTURE
At the outset of gacaca many scholars supported the system because they
believed it was better than the alternatives. The ICTR was limited to only a select
few Rwandans; those identified as the masterminds of the genocide. The criminal
justice system, which originally intended to prosecute all genocide suspects (not
tried by the ICTR), was incapable of timely prosecution. Scholars supported
gacaca, even though it was rife with due process violations, because they believed
in its potential to promote reconciliation.24 1 Unfortunately, the past seven years,
since gacaca's inception, demonstrate that gacaca is a failure because of several
flaws in the system's design and because of its failure to address the economic
struggles of Rwandans. There is a need for new solutions that address both the
prosecution of genocidaires and the re-growth of the economy.
A. Fundamental Flaws of Gacaca and Proposals for a New System of Justice
There are several problems with the current gacaca system. One problem is
that the government promotes gacaca as both a traditional dispute resolution
system and a court; it simultaneously attempts to provide criminal retribution and
reconciliation.242 However, it achieves neither of these goals successfully. The
uncomfortable blend of reconciliation and retribution has alienated many
Rwandans from the process.
Since its inception, the government has failed to critically examine gacaca.
Instead of acknowledging the many signs in 2006 that gacaca was not successfully
leading to truth finding and reconciliation, the government decided in 2007 to
radically speed up the adjudication process in an effort to complete gacaca by the
end of that year. When gacaca could not be completed in 2007, the government
agreed to extend the process into 2008.
In addition to its goal of concluding all Category 2 and Category 3 cases in
2008, the government is entertaining the idea of creating a National Gacaca Court
to handle Category 1 suspects.243 The government has continuously ignored the
240. The Republic of Rwanda, Reply, supra note 72.
241. See Raper, supra note 16, at 48-49.
242. See id. at 31.
243. Genocide/Gacaca- Gacaca Trials Could Also Try First Category Defendants, supra note 169.
The government discussed gacaca trying Category I suspects as early as 2005. See Edwin Musoni,
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due process problems inherent in gacaca. These due process violations are the
most worrisome aspect of the government's plan to incorporate Category 1
suspects into gacaca because Category 1 suspects are the individuals who
committed the most serious high-profile crimes, including mass murder, rape, and
torture, 244 and face the highest risks if they are not provided with criminal
procedure protections.
Despite the due process concerns, the most disturbing aspect of gacaca
remains its failure to relieve ethnic tensions or provide a truthful account of the
past. Although the majority of gacaca suspects have now been tried, it is
questionable whether they have received a fair and adequate hearing. Rather than
continuing on its rushed path toward completion of gacaca by the end of 2008, the
government should focus on establishing an appellate process within gacaca and
within the criminal court system that enables people who do not feel they received
a fair hearing to challenge their conviction. A proper appellate process may lead to
many new community hearings where the factual record has been inadequately
established or presented in a biased manner. Additionally, rather than continuing
to artificially boost a system that many Rwandans view as antithetical to
reconciliation, the Rwandan government should alter gacaca to restore community
trust in the system.
A new decentralized gacaca system should be established that more closely
resembles traditional gacaca. Unlike the current system, which relies on
government-generated lists of suspects,245 local community members should be
responsible for bringing cases forward and should be encouraged to name both
Hum and Tutsi suspects who engaged in Category 2 and Category 3 offenses
leading up to genocide, during the genocide, and in the months following the
genocide, when the RPF took control. The power to imprison individuals should
be removed from gacaca in order to promote reconciliation. Rather than RPF-
mandated prison sentences, or penalties for genocide suspects, each community
should work toward creating its own system of justice for genocide suspects. The
elimination of prison sentences would significantly reduce due process concerns
and increase the chance that genocide suspects would fully disclose their role in
the genocide.
While a more localized form of gacaca is necessary to return people's
confidence in the process, abolishing government oversight poses the risk that
some communities and suspects will not take gacaca seriously. To prevent
Rwandans from feeling that this system perpetuates the culture of impunity, the
government should retain records of all Category 2 and Category 3 suspects and
these suspects should be informed that if they commit a new offense they may face
Rwanda: Gacaca Wants to Try Category One Suspects, THE NEW TIMES, Nov. 6, 2005,
http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/10791.html (stating that a plan to create a National Gacaca Court is in
the draft stage and still needs cabinet and parliament approval).
244. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, RWANDA:
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (2006), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/81364.htm [hereinafter Rwanda: Country Report].
245. Musoni, supra note 243.
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criminal prosecution for any crimes committed during genocide,246 as well as for
their current crimes. Additionally, the government should continue criminal
prosecution of Category 1 suspects, the leaders and organizers of the genocide and
those who committed acts of rape and sexual torture.247 To ensure some modicum
of impartiality, government trained gacaca judges should continue to oversee the
gacaca process in their communities. Furthermore, the government should retain
the power to prevent communities from implementing solutions that violate the
civil rights of those found guilty. The government may also want to provide
communities with suggestions on how to develop their own solutions for resolving
cases.
Since the majority of genocide suspects have already been tried in gacaca, any
changes to gacaca must be retroactively applied. For people currently serving
prison sentences, who were found guilty in gacaca, their sentences should be
converted to community service. Each individual's local gacaca should be
responsible for determining the type of service that must be performed and
overseeing that service. The release of these prisoners into society will have a
positive effect on the economy because it will reduce Rwanda's prison costs and it
will invigorate Rwanda's workforce. Additionally, the money Rwanda currently
allocates to prisons can be given to communities to implement service programs.
B. Gacaca's Failure to Address Rwandans' Economic Hardships and Proposals
for How to Include These Concerns in the Future
Rwanda is ranked 158th out of the 175 poorest countries in the world,
according to the Human Development Index.245 It is an extremely poor country in
which 90% of its citizens rely on primary agriculture to survive.249 It is one of the
world's most densely populated agrarian societies and has a population of
approximately nine million people living in a country smaller than Maryland.25 °
246. The system would function like an unsupervised pre-trial diversion program does in the
United States. Charges are re-instituted only if the defendant commits new violating conduct. See, e.g.,
Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 318 (2001) (Procedure on Charge of Violation of Conditions of Accelerated
Rehabilitative Disposition Program). Because the offenses in question were committed at least fourteen
years earlier, and suspects should have an expectation of finality at some point, like the American
counterpart, charges should be dismissed after a specified period of time with no new violating conduct.
See. e.g., Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 316(B) (2001) (period of program not to exceed two years); Pa.R.Crim.P.
Rule 319 (2001) (providing for dismissal of charges upon successful completion of the program). One
exception to this time limitation may be advisable. As is the case, generally, in the United States,
homicide charges could potentially be prosecuted at any time. Cf., e.g., 42 Pa.C.S. § 5551 (1990)
(generally no time limit for prosecution of homicide cases).
247. Rwanda: Country Report, supra note 244. Community groups and international donors should
pressure the government to expand Category 1 suspects to include military members and Tutsis who
participated in the killing of civilians in the months following the genocide.
248. Branch Office Kigali for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Country
Operations Plan 2007: Rwanda, UNHCR, Mar. 31, 2006, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/44f546c72.pdf [hereinafter Country Operations Plan].
249. Id.
250. Background Note: Rwanda, supra note 172; Timberg, supra note 189.
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The main socio-economic problem is the large population and lack of access to
land. 1 Most genocide survivors are extremely poor. 2
Although the 1996 Genocide Law and the 2001 Gacaca Law called for
reparations for victims of genocide, these reparations have never been realized. 3
In 2004, the revised gacaca law deferred the issue of reparations. 4 For survivors
there are few options for receiving compensation for their losses. While some
criminal courts have awarded compensation to victims from convicted
genocidaires, most of these genocidaires are indigent and unable to pay.
2 55
Moreover, the Rwandan government has immunized itself from civil liability for
its role in the genocide.256 The only government fund for survivors is the Fonds
d'Assistance aux Rescapes du Genocide (FARG), which provides the neediest
survivors assistance with healthcare and education costs. 257 However, this is not a
compensation fund and cannot be accessed by the gacaca or criminal courts to
award survivors reparations.258
A major impediment to gacaca has been the government's failure to address
survivor's financial needs. It is impossible for this small country with limited
financial resources to prosecute every individual who participated in genocide.
Rather than helping Rwandans to reconcile, gacaca has further divided
communities by draining the crucial financial resources 25 9 necessary for rebuilding
Rwanda and for providing reparations to genocide victims. Without economic
incentives, many survivors are less inclined to participate in gacaca.26 °
Additionally, many Rwandans are reluctant to participate in gacaca as witnesses or
judges because it means time away from their economic livelihood.26'
If the government revises gacaca as suggested, it has the potential to reduce
the economic suffering of survivors, which thus far has been ignored. Coerced
community participation in gacaca should be eliminated and replaced with
incentives created by the community to encourage local participation. Rather than
mandatory weekly meetings, in which all members of the community must attend,
each community should devise its own schedule for meetings and requirements for
community participation. Each village should create an individualized gacaca plan
that possesses the power to consider the economic strains particular to its area and
251. Country Operations Plan, supra note 248.
252. Waldorf, supra note 83, at 56.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 56-57.
256. Id. at 57.
257. Id. at 57-58. FARG was created by the government in 1998. The government finances the
program with 5% of the yearly tax revenues. FARG has experienced scandals involving corruption. In
2002, a draft reparations law was proposed by the Council of Ministers that would increase government
funding to 8% of tax revenues and replace FARG, but it has been shelved since then.
258. Id. at 57.
259. Waldorf, supra note 83, at 85. The government and international donors have spent millions
on the incarceration and trials of genocide suspects.
260. Id. at 59.
261. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 100-02.
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to develop community specific solutions. One method of relieving economic stress
may be found in communities' creation of penalties for people who have been
found responsible for property offenses. Some possible solutions that communities
may develop for people found liable for property offenses include community
service projects, return of property to its rightful owner, repair of property
damaged during genocide, and reparations. These punishments possess the
potential to spark economic growth.
Regardless of the possibilities gacaca possesses for empowering Rwandans to
change their future and their economy, changing Rwanda's system for adjudicating
genocide suspects is only one step in the process of reconciliation. Resources that
are no longer needed to detain and prosecute Category 2 and Category 3 suspects
should be diverted toward rebuilding the economy, creating support groups for
survivors, opening spaces for dialogue between Hutus and Tutsis, and designing
education programs that advance reconciliation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The present gacaca system is not succeeding. Rather than bringing Rwandans
together, gacaca has proven divisive. Moreover, gacaca violates several fair trial
standards established by Rwanda through domestic and international law. In order
to successfully reunite and rebuild the nation, major revisions to gacaca are
necessary. However, gacaca alone will never solve Rwanda's problems.
Reconciliation is a slow process that may take decades or generations.
Whether Rwanda chooses to use national courts, gacaca, amnesty, or some
combination of these to tackle the problems associated with the genocide,
reconciliation requires more than addressing the question of what to do with the
perpetrators. As posed by one genocide survivor, "[h]ow can I forgive, when my
livelihood was destroyed and I cannot even pay for schooling for my children?,
262
Reconciliation is not possible without addressing the economic hardship suffered
as a result of genocide. Rwandans cannot move forward unless their government
addresses the physical, psychological, and social traumas that they suffered.
Genocide has not only affected the victims emotionally, it has also affected the
entire Rwandan population by causing massive economic upheaval. For too long,
the government has focused on the criminal prosecution of genocide suspects. The
end of criminal prosecution of Category 2 and Category 3 suspects will greatly
increase the resources available for poverty alleviation, job creation, and
education. It is now time for the government to place its primary focus on
rebuilding the nation.
262. Zorbas, supra note 18, at 37.
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BEYOND UNCITRAL: ALTERNATIVES TO UNIVERSALITY IN
TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY
ALEXANDER M. KIPNIS 1
The rapid growth of international economic activity in the recent decades has
brought forth a unique and formidable policy challenge. The challenge consists of
reconciling two goals which sometimes compete directly with one another:
creating a regime that allows economic interaction between private actors to occur
with the highest possible degree of efficiency, and allowing sovereigns to ensure
that the regime does not thwart their public policy to induce those sovereigns'
cooperation.
The tension between these competing goals is patently evident in
transnational bankruptcies. On one hand, considerations of efficiency call for three
things: ex ante predictability, elimination of wasteful duplication of work by the
courts, and incentives for optimal ex ante allocation of resources. On the other
hand, any proposed regime must be sufficiently attractive to sovereign actors for
adoption, and actually become widely adopted, if it is to become a genuine
international regime. To that end, it must allow sovereign actors to satisfy the
needs of their own domestic public policy if they are to cooperate.
This paper discusses the need for a comprehensive system for the resolution
of transnational bankruptcies. It then examines the various bankruptcy systems
that are discussed in the scholarship or implemented in practice in the present day,
including the various flavors of territoriality, universality, and contractualism,
along with a solution predicated on the establishment of an international body for
administering transnational insolvency proceedings. It further addresses the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Transnational Bankruptcy and its implementation, in
particular, in the United States. It discusses the advantages and disadvantages of
each regime and offers thoughts on how each may be improved or tailored to suit
various economic needs. The paper concludes by advocating a modified form of
cooperative territoriality as an imperfect but most workable framework for an
international bankruptcy regime.
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the law firm of Shearman & Sterling LLP, and may be reached at alexander.kipnis@shearman.com.
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I. OVERVIEW OF CROSS-BORDER BANKRUPTCY: THE NEED, THE EXPECTATIONS,
AND THE REALITY OF TRANSNATIONAL REGIMES
A. Why a Transnational Bankruptcy System?
Transnational bankruptcy regimes have been the subject of a lively debate in
recent literature.2 But the need for such a regime is not necessarily obvious; after
all, every country that has economic activity of any global significance already has
its own domestic bankruptcy laws.3 These laws already purport to govern
situations where the bankruptcy has an international dimension; that is, when the
debtor's assets or creditors are located outside the borders of the country in which
the bankruptcy occurs.4 Why then is a global regime needed?
A global framework for bankruptcy law is necessary for largely the same
reasons that domestic bankruptcy law is needed. In a world without bankruptcy
law, considerable and unnecessary social costs would be imposed every time a
troubled company is unable to pay its debts in full. In such a world, each creditor
would have an incentive to be the first to file suit against the debtor, the first to
reduce its claim to judgment, and the first to execute that judgment by seizing the
debtor's assets. This race to the debtor's assets imposes two forms of social cost.
First, the dismemberment of the debtor's estate may prevent the debtor's assets
from being put to their highest value use. It is not uncommon that the debtor itself
will already be the highest value user of the asset because the going-concern value
of the debtor's business will frequently exceed the value of all the debtor's assets if
sold piecemeal. Second, the "first-in-time" rule with respect to the creditors'
ability to receive and execute a judgment is an inefficient way to ensure the
optimal distribution of the debtor's assets.5 Bankruptcy law solves both problems
by (1) eliminating the forced liquidation of the debtor's assets (by giving the
debtor the opportunity to reorganize, at least under certain circumstances); and, (2)
when liquidation is indeed warranted, by imposing a system of priority on the
competing claims that is deemed more socially optimal than a simple "first-in-
time" rule.
Bankruptcy on a transnational level works in a similar way. Without a
comprehensive international regime, a similar problem would occur. When a
debtor encounters trouble, its creditors6 would first look to the debtor's assets in
their own country to satisfy their claims.7 This course of action is rational because
the creditors' cost of seizing the debtor's domestic8 assets will be significantly
2. See discussion infra Part II.
3. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 101-1532 (2008).
4. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1532 (2008).
5. See, e.g. Paulette J. Delk, Payments by Check as Voidable Preferences: The Impact of Barnhill
v. Johnson, 45 ME. L. REv. 53, 56 (1993).
6. At least those who choose to declare a default, instead of pursuing an alternative resolution.
7. Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1,
7-9 (1997).
8. For the purposes of this discussion, I assume a multinational debtor and multiple single-nation
creditors. Accordingly, for the purposes of this section, I use terms such as "foreign," "domestic," and
"abroad" in reference to the country of the creditor, not the country of the debtor.
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lower than their cost of pursuing assets abroad. 9 If domestic bankruptcy law
operated without regard to an international regime, these creditors would then be
able to force the debtor into bankruptcy in their own country (either by means of
an involuntary petition or by a coercive placement into voluntary bankruptcy, such
as by exercise of default and acceleration clauses) and then use the debtor's assets
in that country to satisfy their claim. This is particularly true if the creditors
believe that it is not worthwhile for them to participate in bankruptcy proceedings
involving that debtor in foreign countries at all. Just as in the case of a domestic
bankruptcy, creditors in various countries would then have an incentive to race to
the assets in their home countries. This time, the incentive to rush to the assets is
strengthened by the fact that the debtor's going-concern value (and its likelihood of
repaying domestic debts) becomes increasingly threatened by foreign creditors'
efforts to seize the debtor's assets elsewhere. This imposes the familiar social
costs of unnecessary dismemberment of a going concern, which may already be
putting its assets to their highest value use, and of poor ordering of distribution
priorities among the competing creditors, this time on a worldwide scale.
An international bankruptcy regime would minimize those costs. It would
provide a means for preserving the debtor's going concern value by instituting a
mechanism that would authorize reorganization where it would maximize social
benefit. It would also remove the incentives for creditors to rush to the debtor's
assets in their own country by instituting a proceeding (or a set of concurrent
proceedings) to authorize an orderly way for the debtor to reorganize or liquidate.
It would finally provide for a distribution priority that maximizes social value, yet
is mindful of disparate and, at times, mutually exclusive national policies that
value certain kinds of creditors and claims over others.
B. Brief Overview of Bankruptcy Systems in Scholarship and Practice
Significant differences exist today between the substantive bankruptcy laws
of various countries. Professor LoPuckil ° cites a wide array of differences in
priority systems alone: for example, some countries allow tort creditors to share
pro rata with contract creditors; others subordinate tort claims to contract claims;
and still others do not allow any tort claims which have not yet been reduced to
judgment. " Additionally, some countries treat creditors with setoff rights as
secured (and therefore entitled to higher priority, at least in a reified sense), and
others do not.1 2 Also, some countries allow employees to assert high-priority
claims for wages, others do not. 13
9. Costs of pursuing assets abroad are numerous and may vary from case to case, but will usually
include three similarities: the cost of unfamiliarity with the laws of the jurisdiction where the assets are
located; the often-disfavored substantive status that such creditors may get as foreign creditors; and the
increased cost of hiring foreign counsel, conducting foreign discovery, and collecting foreign assets.
10. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 98
MICH. L. REv. 2216 (2000).
11. Id. at 2224 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(b), 726(a) (2008)).
12. Id.
13. Id.
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Beyond the differences in substantive bankruptcy laws, there are, more
importantly, differences in the way that each country's bankruptcy regime
approaches situations when some of the debtor's assets or debtors are located
beyond its borders, and when a debtor that has assets within the country's borders
seeks protection elsewhere. The differences between these regimes lie in two
principal areas: the degree of cooperation that the country is willing to extend to
another country when the debtor with assets in the first country has filed for
bankruptcy in the second; and, the degree of access that the country allows to
foreign creditors when a multinational debtor files domestically. 14  Five broad
types of regimes of international bankruptcy are generally discussed in the
literature today: territoriality, universality, contractualism, international
organization, and secondary bankruptcy. Each is discussed in turn.
Under territoriality, each country in which the debtor's assets are located has
jurisdiction over the distribution of only the portion of the estate that consists of
the assets located in that country. 15  Accordingly, in a typical multinational
bankruptcy, a multitude of concurrent proceedings in the various countries in
which the debtor has assets is necessary for the resolution of the case.16
The second regime is universality. Under universality, only one country
would have jurisdiction over the entire bankruptcy.' 7 The courts of that country
would apply that country's substantive bankruptcy law, such as rules governing
automatic stay, avoiding powers, and distribution preferences. l  All other
countries in which the debtor has assets would then cooperate with the forum
country, for example, by surrendering the control over the debtor's assets to the
forun country. 19 In such a bankruptcy, there would only be one main proceeding,
complemented as necessary by ancillary proceedings in countries in which the
debtor owns assets.2 °
The third regime is that of corporate-charter contractualism, which is actually
a form of universality. In that regime, each firm is free to choose the bankruptcy
forum country and laws to which it wishes to be subject. 21 The choice would be
made when the entity is incorporated.22 The selection would be specified in the
corporation's charter, which would in turn provide public notice of the
corporation's choice.23 Prospective creditors would thus receive information about
the firm's bankruptcy options ex ante. Once made, the corporation's choice of
14. See M. Cameron Gilreath, Overview and Analysis of How the United Nations Model Law on
Insolvency Would Affect United States Corporations Doing Business Abroad, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 399,
403-04 (2000).
15. Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach,
84 CORNELL L. REv. 696, 701 (1999).
16. LoPucki, supra note 10, at 2219.
17. LoPucki, supra note 15, at 704.
18. Id. at 705; see also Gilreath, supra note 14, at 407.
19. LoPucki, supra note 15, at 705-06.
20. LoPucki, supra note 10, at 2220-2 1.
21. LoPucki, supra note 15, at 737.
22. Id. at 738.
23. Id. at 737-38.
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bankruptcy regime cannot be revoked without overwhelming consensus of the
creditors.24  Proposals that advocate such systems sometimes exempt
nonconsensual creditors from the debtor's ex ante forum choice. The exemption
exists to discourage firms from choosing countries with the most unfavorable tort
liability laws for their bankruptcy regimes.26
Yet another proposal suggests that an international system be used for the
adjudication of transnational bankruptcy cases.27 Such a regime can be created by
treaty.28 The treaty can either provide for substantive law itself, or it can have
choice-of-law provisions that would determine which country's substantive law
applies to a given case. In such a system, a central adjudicative body - a world
bankruptcy court - would apply the appropriate law and have jurisdiction over the
debtor's assets everywhere.
The fifth proposal is the system of secondary bankruptcy, which is somewhat
of a hybrid between territoriality and universality. 29 Under secondary bankruptcy,
parallel proceedings would be instituted in each country in which the debtor has
assets, in a manner similar to territoriality. The proceeding in the debtor's home
country would be deemed to be the main proceeding, while all other proceedings
would be secondary. Courts administering secondary proceedings would have the
authority to distribute all of the debtor's estate in that court's country. However,
each secondary court would be required to cooperate with the home country's
court. In practice, that would mean that each secondary court would distribute
only so much of the estate within its jurisdiction as is necessary for that court to
preserve the law and public policy of its country. For example, if Country A's
laws give priority to employees' back wages in bankruptcy, and Country B, which
is the debtor's "home country," does not have such protections for employees, then
Country A's court would distribute so much of the estate as necessary to satisfy the
employees' claim, and transfer the rest to the home country. In other words, the
secondary courts would only distribute the domestic portion of the estate to the
minimum extent necessary to allow for the transfer of the case to the home
country's court under the principles of comity.
The final proposal is cooperative territoriality, advanced primarily by Lynn
LoPucki.30 Cooperative territoriality is very similar to classic territoriality in that
it provides for separate proceedings to occur in each country in which the debtor
has assets. Unlike classic territoriality, however, it requires a greater degree of
cooperation among the countries administering the proceeding. It is this system,
with certain modifications, that I argue is the most workable of all approaches to
cross-border insolvency systems.
24. There is some disagreement in the literature whether the creditors' consent should be
unanimous. Whether the system requires unanimity or supermajority, the outcome is largely the same
for the comparative purposes of this paper.
25. LoPucki, supra note 15, at 737-41.
26. See id. at 739.
27. Gilreath, supra note 14, at 408.
28. Id. at 409.
29. LoPucki, supra note 15, at 732-33.
30. See LoPucki, supra note 15, at 742-59.
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C UNCITRAL Model Law and Existing Transnational Bankruptcy Law
In 1997, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL") adopted the final draft of its Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency. 31  In 2005, the UNCITRAL Model Law was enacted (or its model
substantially followed) in the United States,32 Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
Eritrea, Mexico, Montenegro, and South Africa.33 The UNCITRAL Model Law
outlines several crucial mechanisms for international cooperation.34 For example,
it requires the adopting country to issue an automatic stay35 once it recognizes a
foreign proceeding. 36 It further empowers the adopting country's court to enjoin
actions, transfers, and encumbrances of the debtor's property.37
The recent adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law in the United States has
resulted in a number of changes in the American approach to transnational
bankruptcy. 38 Even prior to the law's passage, bankruptcy law in the United
States was recognized as going "further than the law of any other industrialized
nation in authorizing cooperation with foreign insolvency regimes.,, 3 9 But there
were substantial limits.
Under prior law, when a debtor filed for bankruptcy protection in another
country, it also had to file in the United States.40 The filing was accomplished by
the foreign estate's representative ("foreign representative") filing of a petition
with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court. 4 1  That case was then deemed an "ancillary
case." 42 The foreign representative could ask the U.S. Bankruptcy Court to enjoin
any action or the enforcement of any judgment against the debtor, to turn over the
31. U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade [UNCITRAL], Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 5-20,
U.N. Doc. A/52/649 (Nov. 25, 1997) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law].
32. While this paper was being prepared, the UNICTRAL Model Law was formally enacted by
the United States as part of a broader bankruptcy reform that largely focused on domestic matters of
consumer bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-8, § 1501, 119 Stat. 23, 135 (2005).
33. Sprecher, Grier & Halberstam, LLP, Insolvency and Corporate Recovery: Articles,
http://www.sghlaw.com/insolvency/articles/cross-border-insolvency.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2008);
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Status: 1997 - Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency, http://www.uncitra.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/insolvency/1997Model-status.htmi.
34. See generally UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 31 (containing provisions for recognition
of a foreign proceeding and relief in Chapter III and provisions for cooperation with foreign courts and
foreign representatives in Chapter IV).
35. Similar to the automatic stay issued in U.S. bankruptcy cases pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)
(2008).
36. UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 31, at art. 20(1). The desirability of an automatic stay
actually represents a significant substantive policy judgment by the UNCITRAL because the automatic
stay is required to be imposed upon recognition of a foreign proceeding even when the implementing
country's domestic law does not provide for an automatic stay in its domestic bankruptcy cases.
37. Id. at art. 21(1)(c).
38. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §
801(a), 119 Stat. 23, 134 (2005).
39. Douglass G. Boshkoff, Some Gloomy Thoughts Concerning Cross-Border Insolvencies, 72
WASH U. L.Q. 931, 932 (1994).
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debtor's U.S. property to the foreign representative, and to order any other
appropriate relief.
3
Despite the apparent latitude in the relief afforded to foreign representatives'
petitions, there were significant practical obstacles to their success. American
creditors were given plenty of grounds to oppose the foreign representatives'
ancillary petitions under Section 304. In evaluating the creditors' opposition,
courts were to be guided by a list of factors that include, inter alia, "protection of
claim holders in the United States against prejudice and inconvenience" and
"distribution of proceeds.., substantially in accordance with the order prescribed
by" American law. These protections were squarely aimed at protecting U.S.
creditors who (1) likely preferred the American forum, (2) have extended credit in
reliance, in part, on the distribution of assets in accordance with American
bankruptcy law, and (3) were also "claim holders in the United States" whose
interests were required to be considered by statute.
4 5
Under prior law, American courts have used two conflicting approaches in
evaluating domestic creditors' opposition to §304 petitions by foreign
representatives. The first emphasized comity over all other factors presented in
§304(c), or, alternatively, weighed all of the §304(c) factors in light of comity.
Such courts would generally deny the foreign representatives' §304 petitions only
if allowing the foreign court to handle the debtor's U.S. assets would have violated
"the law and public policy of the forum state [the United States].... ,,46 Denials of
the foreign representatives' §304 petitions were rare under this approach.
The other approach was to simply weigh comity alongside the other §304(c)
factors. Bebchuk and Guzmdn cite In re Papeleras Reunidas as an example of a
case in which this approach was applied.47 Predictably, it resulted in the denial of
the foreign representative's §304 petition.48 Considerations of comity were
likewise jettisoned in favor of concerns than an American creditor might be treated
as an unsecured creditor, rather than a lien creditor under Canadian law, despite the
absence of finding that Canadian law in any way violated American public policy
in In re Toga.49  Bebchuk and Guzmdn further argue that extra-statutory
considerations likewise guided some American courts away from the universalist
approach embraced by §304. They cite favoritism by the courts as an important
concern, and specifically cite In re Lineas Areas de Nicaragua as a particularly
43. 11 U.S.C. § 304(b) (repealed 2005).
44. Id. at § 304(c) (emphasis added) (listing other factors such as just treatment of all holders of
claims, prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property, comity, and provision of a
fresh start); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of
Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J.L. & EcON. 775, 783 (1999).
45. Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 44, at 783.
46. In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
47. Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 44 at 784; see also In re Papeleras Reunidas, S.A., 92 B.R.
584 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988).
48. In re Papeleras, 92 B.R. at 594-95.
49. In re Toga Mfg. Ltd., 28 B.R. 165, 170-71 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983); see also Bebchuk &
Guzman, supra note 44, at 785.
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egregious example of such favoritism. 50 In Lineas, the court turned the assets over
to the Nicaraguan bankruptcy court only on the condition that all claims of U.S.
creditors were satisfied first.51 A milder example of such favoritism is the
expansive reading of the "prejudice to U.S. claim holders" factor of the §304
analysis by the Second Circuit in In re Cunard.52  Regardless of whether one
considers Lineas and Cunard as examples of extra-statutory favoritism, as
Bebchuk and Guzmdn do, these cases clearly do not consider comity to be the
trumping factor in §304. This interpretation largely knocked the wind out of
§304's universalist sails in that it allowed cooperation with a foreign court only if
American claim holders' interests were not impaired. Because, by definition, no
self-interested creditor would oppose a §304 petition unless the opposition is in its
interest, the consequence of this view was essentially that the court's role should
be limited to rubber-stamping the creditor's choice of law.
It should be noted that even under prior law, the United States was generally
considered among the countries to afford the highest degree of solicitude to foreign
bankruptcy regimes even in the absence of a specific bilateral treaty. 53 Bebchuk
and Guzmdn cite the examples of Great Britain and Japan to illustrate the point.54
In Great Britain, cooperation with most foreign regimes (other than those
designated by executive order) is on an ad hoc basis-to the extent such
cooperation occurs at all. 55 In Japan, until the turn of the twenty-first century, such
cooperation was essentially forbidden altogether. Japanese law expressly
exempted a debtor's Japanese assets from the operation of foreign bankruptcy
adjudications, and limited the effects of domestic bankruptcy adjudications only to
Japanese property.56 Current Japanese law is based in part on the UNCITRAL
Model Law,57 but its approach is still decidedly more territorial.58 While it now
50. Bebchuk & Guzmdn, supra note 44, at 783; see also In re Lineas Areas de Nicaragua, 10 BR.
790 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
51. In re Lineas, 10B.R. at791.
52. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Serv. AB, 773 F. 2d 452, 459 (2d Cir. 1985).
53. Bebchuk & Guzmin, supra note 44, at 781.
54. Id. at 786-87.
55. Id. at 786.
56. Id. (citing Shoichi Tagashira, Intraterritorial Effects of Foreign Insolvency Proceedings: An
Analysis of "Ancillary"Proceedings in the United States and Japan, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 7 (1994));see
also Kazuhiko Yamamoto, New Japanese Legislation on Cross-Border Insolvency as Compared with
the UNCITRAL Model Law, available at http://www.iiiglobal.org/country/apan/legislation.pdf.
57. Id.
58. Yamamoto argues that the difference between the new Japanese bankruptcy law and the
UNCITRAL Model Law is largely rooted in the fact that the UNCITRAL Model Law operates on the
common-law model and gives judges a significant amount of discretion, and that Japan's modification
of the law was largely limited to the extent of adopting it for the civil law model. But in reality,
Japanese law makes substantive departures from the UNCITRAL Model Law that have nothing to do
with the civil-versus-common law issue. For example, Japan imposes far more onerous requirements
on the recognition of foreign proceedings, which include that no prejudice to local creditors must occur.
Additionally, the foreign proceeding must correspond to one of the five types of bankruptcy
proceedings allowed under Japanese law for recognition. Id. These differences are probably less likely
to be due to Japan's desire to limit the discretion of judges in its civil-law tradition (indeed, Japanese
judges appear to have more discretion at the recognition stage than their American counterparts) than to
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allows for some recognition of foreign bankruptcy proceedings, it imposes
conditions that are similar to the old United States approach under the Papeleras
line of cases.
The changes instituted by America's adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law
were profound. The old Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code was eliminated
entirely. 59 Its provisions on foreign representatives' access to U.S. Courts were
replaced with the far more expansive provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
60
First, the requirement of comity as an overriding consideration, one in light of
which all other factors must be considered, was incorporated into the text of the
statute.61 The requirement applies not only to the decision about whether to accept
the foreign representative's petition at all,62 but also to its treatment of the petition
once it is accepted, and to the treatment of the foreign representative in other U.S.
proceedings that may be pending before different, non-bankruptcy courts. 63 The
new statute also expressly requires that courts consider its international origin and
the need to promote its application in a manner consistent with that of other
adopting countries. 64 The sole hurdle for the foreign representative is obtaining
recognition, and the burden imposed thereby is far from onerous. The
requirements are limited to the following: there must exist a foreign main
proceeding, the foreign representative is a person or body, and the petition is
accompanied with some form of official verification of the existence of the
proceeding and of the foreign representative's authority.65 The statute still retains
the option for the United States Courts to refuse a case if it would be "manifestly
contrary to the public policy of the United States,, 66 but the grounds for the refusal
are written much more narrowly than previous case law allowed.
In sum, the statute places the United States farther along the path toward
universality. It eliminates any ambiguity that was caused by the conflicting
interpretations of the old Section 304 in the Culmer and Papeleras lines of cases.
It drastically lowers the barriers to the acceptance of foreign representatives'
petitions in United States courts. Finally, the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model
Law places a renewed emphasis on comity that is accorded to foreign bankruptcy
proceedings.
D. Requirements for a Desirable Transnational Bankruptcy Regime
A successful transnational bankruptcy regime must meet two primary (and
occasionally competing) criteria. First, the regime must be efficient. That is, the
regime must minimize the costs it imposes on the debtors, creditors, sovereigns,
and society. Second, the regime must be attractive for adoption by a significant
Japan's substantive preference for territoriality.
59. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Title I, § 101, 92 Stat. 2560, repealed by Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Title VIII, § 802(d)(3), 119 Stat. 146 (2005).
60. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1509-1514.
61. Id. at § 1507.
62. Id.
63. Id. at § 1509(b)(3).
64. Id. at § 1508.
65. Id. at §§ 1515(b), 1516(a).
66. Id. at § 1506.
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number of sovereigns. In other words, the widespread acceptance of the
bankruptcy regime - like almost any other regime - is a prerequisite for its success
in becoming a true international economic regime. I address each criterion in turn,
setting forth some of the features that a bankruptcy regime should have to succeed
on those criteria.
Efficiency requires that the bankruptcy process be achieved with the lowest
possible cost imposed on all parties.67 The parties involved include the debtors
themselves, 68 ordinary creditors, 69 special-situation creditors, 70 and the public 71.
A number of factors may contribute to the minimization of costs on these actors. I
discuss three such factors here: (1) the degree to which the bankruptcy system
ensures that the parties can predict the set of substantive rules to which they will be
subject in the event of a bankruptcy; (2) the elimination of duplicative efforts by
courts of multiple countries if concurrent proceedings are present; and (3) the
provision of ex ante incentives for the optimal allocation of capital.
The first factor is the predictability of the system. By predictability I mean
the ability to determine the exact nature of bankruptcy rules (and the nature of the
forum) that will govern a particular debtors' bankruptcy in advance of such
bankruptcy. The more predictable a system is, the more likely that prospective
67. Different countries, of course, may provide different protections to the same type of person
who suffers the same cost. For example, an American employee's claim for wages may be partially
protected by offering the employee a high priority in the distribution process. The same claim for
wages, if made by a Mexican employee in a Mexican bankruptcy proceeding, receives a lower priority,
but is not subject to a limitation on its amount as it is in the United States, even though the costs
imposed on the two employees is identical. The efficiency criterion is not concerned with such
differences in public policy among those countries. I do not treat these public valuations of the
employee's claim as true differences in the costs suffered by the two respective parties. I instead
address this issue when I discuss the importance of allowing sovereigns to participate in the process to
the extent necessary to protect their own domestic public policy. I assume throughout this paper that
the value judgments inherent in the sovereigns' public policies accurately reflect the public preferences
of the society represented by that sovereign. To the extent that this is not always true - for example, in
case of dictatorships or regimes that disenfranchise particular classes of constituents - the difference
between public policy and that society's value preferences will distort the efficiency of the application
of the bankruptcy regime, and impose nontrivial costs that this paper acknowledges but does not include
in the scope of its discussion.
68. Including the debtors' equity holders.
69. Including both secured and unsecured contract creditors. I treat contract creditors as a distinct
class of interests because such creditors ostensibly had the opportunity to bargain for credit terms. This
class also includes domestic sovereign creditors (e.g. taxing entities) because, although they did not
have an opportunity to bargain directly with the debtor, they are in a unique position to make rules that
govern the terms of the debtor's obligation to them and are therefore on par with (or even better off
than) contract creditors in this respect.
70. Creditors who did not have an adequate opportunity to bargain for their terms of credit. The
class includes not only tort victims (who are the quintessential non-consenting creditors), but also
employees (as contract creditors whose bargaining power in comparison with the debtor is very weak).
71. Including the victims of any negative externalities created by the bankruptcy process. I use
the term "public" to also include the sovereigns themselves in their non-creditor capacity. In particular,
sovereigns' concern about the consumption of their resources - such as judicial resources or other
resources expended in the course of bankruptcy adjudication - must be given weight in any efficiency
determination.
VOL. 36:2
2008 ALTERNATIVES TO UNIVERSALITY IN TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY 165
creditors will be able to accurately assess their risk. In other words, prospective
creditors' ex ante knowledge of the exact set of rules that will govern their
prospective debtor's insolvency will help such creditors to assess their exposure
and will accordingly help them price credit more accurately. Conversely, ex ante
predictability will also allow the debtor to insist on lower interest rates in some
circumstances. In sum, ex ante information about bankruptcy rules will lead to a
more efficient determination of the price of credit. The main beneficiaries of a
predictable system are ordinary creditors (who can then compete effectively
against other creditors by pricing credit accurately) and debtors (who can enjoy
interest rates that are not artificially inflated by the lenders' risk-averseness in an
unpredictable system). It is important to note that, for the purposes of
predictability, it is not critical to decide the precise substantive rules of the
bankruptcy system. Efficiency gains from a predictable system are realized when
the rules, whatever they are, are known in advance.
The second consideration useful to the determination of efficiency concerns
the elimination of duplication of effort in the proceeding itself. To the extent that
multiple sovereigns' courts will be simultaneously involved in the proceeding, the
system must ensure, as much as possible, that duplication of effort among those
courts does not occur. This consideration is important for two reasons. First,
judicial resources will be wasted if multiple courts are called upon to review the
same issue, claim, or argument. Second, duplication of effort among different
courts will increase the likelihood of inconsistent findings of law and fact by those
courts. That can leave parties in the unenviable situation where compliance with
one court's order may mean the disobedience of the other, and thus also greatly
compromise ex ante predictability of the system.
The last consideration concerns incentives for the optimal ex ante allocation
of capital. Inefficiencies can result in a number of ways, not the least important of
which is described by Bebchuk and Guzmdn. 72 In a system where disparate
treatment of creditors in different countries in bankruptcy will cause those
creditors to price credit differently, the debtor will, ceteris paribus, be inclined to
borrow in a more creditor-friendly country 73 because creditors from that country
will be able to offer lower interest rates. To the extent that the debtor is more
likely to invest in the same country as the one in which it borrows (which it may
want to do for a number of reasons unrelated to bankruptcy considerations),74 this
low interest rate may cause the debtor to invest in a country that offers a lower rate
of return on the investment than is otherwise available. At first blush, the system
appears unproblematic: if the debtor can obtain credit at a lower cost, and if this
72. See generally Bebchuk & Guzmdn, supra note 44 (examining how territoriality generates
distortions in investment patterns that can lead to inefficient allocation of capital).
73. The country may be more creditor-friendly; alternatively, it may be friendly to domestic
creditors and hostile to foreign creditors. The model holds true for any bankruptcy system which
enables one country's creditors to offer better interest rates than others based solely on the fact that such
creditors would be in a better predicament in a bankruptcy proceeding.
74. Among such reasons are the costs of compliance with various regulations concerning foreign
investment, currency conversion, currency market fluctuations, cost of doing business over a long
distance, and others.
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reduction in cost provides the debtor with the best possible overall investment
opportunity, then Adam Smith's invisible hand has done its job. That, however, is
not the case, for this low cost comes at a price. If the creditor that offers credit at
low cost obtains priority in the distribution of the debtor's asset in bankruptcy, all
proceeds of the estate come at the expense of other claimants who are not entitled
to the same priority. The distribution of the estate is effectively a zero-sum game:
whatever the favored creditor wins, at least one other claimant must lose. The
resultant cost, therefore, is borne largely by the non-privileged claimants (who lose
out on the debtor's assets in the distribution of the estate) and by the debtor itself
(who, in reliance on the low interest rate, decided to forego other investment
opportunities that may have offered a higher return).
II. THE REGIME OF TERRITORIALITY
A. Overview
The regime of territoriality is the prevailing set of rules under which
transnational bankruptcies are resolved today. 75 The basic rule of territoriality
states that the courts of each state in which the debtor has assets are responsible for
distributing those assets - and only those assets - that are located within the
territory of that state.76 For example, if a computer manufacturer has a research
laboratory in the United States, an assembly plant in Taiwan, and customer support
operations in India, the law and courts of the United States would oversee the
distribution of the laboratory assets, the law and courts of Taiwan would handle the
assembly plant, and Indian law and courts would be responsible for the customer
support assets. Each of these courts would apply the domestic law of the country
in which it is sitting.77 Each court would also handle claims from all of the
debtor's creditors, wherever such creditors may be located, and regardless of the
status of such creditors as consenting creditors (contract creditors) or non-
consenting creditors (tort victims and governments).
Under a regime of territoriality, various incentives drive each country's
decisions about the structuring of its own domestic bankruptcy laws. The most
obvious of these incentives is to adopt laws that favor domestic creditors and
disfavor foreign creditors.7 8 The benefits of such laws (such as encouragement of
domestic economic activity and the attendant political gains for the domestic
government) and their costs (such as creating inefficiencies in ex ante resource
allocation) will be explored more fully infra.
Territoriality has sometimes been derogatorily referred to as "the grab rule"
because each country has the incentive to, roughly speaking, use its laws to "'grab"
the debtor's domestic assets for the benefit of its domestic creditors, particularly if
75. Despite the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law by the United States and a few others,
these countries are still in the small minority. The erosion of territoriality as the dominant regime has
been minor at best. See, e.g. Bebchuk & Guzmin, supra note 44, at 787.
76. LoPucki, supra note 10, at 2218.
77. Including, of course, the choice-of-law rules of the forum jurisdiction. The application of
those rules may naturally result in the application of substantive law that is different from the
substantive law of the forum state.
78. Bebchuk & Guzmin, supra note 44, at 780.
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the debtor is foreign. 79 But in practice, that rule has been altered to varying
degrees by provisions in national bankruptcy laws that authorize cooperation with
foreign bankruptcy regimes. For example, substantive American bankruptcy law
takes a somewhat universalist approach in that it regards the debtor's estate, when
created by a U.S. filing, to include assets abroad,8 ° and exhibits a degree of
deference to foreign proceedings. 81 Even before the adoption of the UNCITRAL
Model Law, the Bankruptcy Code, for example, authorized a foreign representative
to file an ancillary proceeding with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court that would enjoin
any American action against any of the debtor's property if such property is
involved in the foreign proceeding. 82 It also authorized the court to turn over such
property to the foreign representative." 3 The adoption of the UNCITRAL Model
Law has expanded this cooperation even farther.
It should be noted, however, that few, if any, regimes of pure territoriality
exist today. Most domestic regimes blend at least a few non-territorialist elements
into their framework for transnational bankruptcy resolution.84 But despite these
nascent elements of universality, territoriality remains the dominant force in
transnational bankruptcy today.85 Prior to the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model
Law, the apparent strides toward universality made by the United States were
tempered by the courts' solicitousness to the interests of American creditors at the
expense of comity. It is yet to be seen how the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model
Law will affect the situation. The regime of territoriality has significant
advantages and disadvantages, some of which I explore below.
79. Id. at 777-78.
80. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2007) (defining estate to includes assets "wherever located and by
whomever held"); Bebchuk & Guzmdn, supra note 44, at 781-82 (recognizing that "wherever located"
language generally understood to encompass assets abroad). A well-publicized recent example of this
view surfaced in the case of Yukos Oil Company ("Yukos"), an energy firm in the Russian Federation.
The Russian government, apparently in retaliation for the support of public criticism of President Putin
by Yukos' CEO, claimed that Yukos was liable to the Russian for $27 billion in back taxes and
penalties. The validity of that tax bill remains disputed. Yukos, predictably, was unable to come up
with the money, whereupon the Russian government sought to seize and sell Yuganskneftegaz
("YNG"), Yukos' most valuable production asset, at a public auction. YNG is a production facility
located in Yugansk, Russia. At that time, Yukos filed for Chapter 11 in the Southern District of Texas,
seeking to use the automatic stay to enjoin the auction. While the bankruptcy court was unable to order
the Russian government not to conduct the auction, its temporary restraining order successfully
prevented various investment banks from participating in the deal. Yukos' U.S. filing therefore resulted
in a U.S. injunction that applied to purely foreign assets. Yukos was ultimately unsuccessful in
preventing the sale of YNG (which was ultimately purchased by a state-run Russian oil firm, Rosneft,
using alternate financing and a shadowy intermediary), and its Chapter 11 petition was subsequently
dismissed. But the case is nonetheless remarkable in that Yukos, a Russian company with almost no
U.S. contacts, was able to obtain an injunction from an American court that applied to its purely
Russian assets. In re Yukos Oil Co., 320 BR. 130 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004).
81. See Bebchuk & Guzmn supra note 44, at 782.
82, 11 U.S.C. § 304(b)(1) (repealed 2005).
83. Id. at § 304(b)(2).
84. Gilreath, supra note 14, at 405.
85. Bebchuk & Guzmn, supra note 44, at 787.
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B. Advantages of Territoriality
Territoriality offers three distinct advantages as a regime of international
bankruptcy. First, it is significantly more predictable and flexible than the other
regimes discussed in this paper. Second, despite the multiplicity of proceedings in
multiple countries that are necessary in a regime of territoriality, the costs of such
proceedings are contained because each country's court is dealing only with
domestic assets and applying domestic laws. Third, it allows local creditors to
litigate in a closer and more convenient forum than they would be able to under a
regime of universality. I explore each advantage in turn.
First, territoriality offers the most predictable and flexible regime of all.
Territoriality is predictable because the identity of the court that will decide the
disposition of a particular asset, and the law that the court will apply in its
decision, are both determined from knowing a single piece of information: the
location of that particular asset. That information is ascertainable at a fairly low
cost, particularly for real and tangible personal property.
There also exists international agreement on standards for determining the
location of intangible property, such as bank accounts, franchises, and leases.
86
Accordingly, whenever a creditor relies on the debtor's assets in extending credit,
the location of those assets will, ex ante, enable the creditor to know the
bankruptcy regime with which the creditor would need to contend. A universalist
regime, on the other hand, would not offer such certainty, for both the reviewing
court and the applicable law would be determined in accordance with criteria
which are hard to evaluate ex ante. Under one view of universality, the debtor
would have wide latitude of countries in which it could file. In other words, if the
debtor were to desire to avail itself of the automatic stay requirement of a
particular country, it would file in that country, whose bankruptcy regime would
then govern the entire proceeding. Such arrangement makes it impossible to
predict either the forum of the substantive law that will govern the bankruptcy.
Under a more common view of universality, the debtor would file in its
"home" country. That poses a number of problems of its own, not least of those
being that many multinational companies are formally separated into discrete
entities, each in a different "home country." In such a bankruptcy, the debtor,
having many "home countries" thanks to the geographic diversity of the debtor's
entities, would have the ability to file wherever it chose. From the standpoint of
predictability, such a regime is untenable. Alternatively, each of the debtor's
entities could file in its own "home country." This view of universality still does
not confer any advantages over territoriality. If these proceedings were to become
consolidated into one at some point after filing, the determination of the country of
forum and of applicable law is often far from clear. If the individual proceedings
were to remain in their own countries, the resulting arrangement would be little
different from territoriality, except that the jurisdictional lines would run along the
boundaries of national entities rather than purely along the location of assets.
Yet another regime - corporate-charter contractualism, similar to that
86. LoPucki, supra note 15, at 743-44.
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advocated by Robert Rasmussen8 7 - purports to kill two birds with one stone.
Corporate-charter contractualism appears predictable at the outset; after all, the
applicable bankruptcy regime is stated right in the corporation's charter. But its
application is more difficult in practice. While large creditors with experience in
multinational lending are likely to have both the knowledge and the experience
necessary to lend under regimes different from their own, the same may not be true
for smaller creditors, particularly if the debtor's bankruptcy regime choice is not a
commonly encountered one. While the identity of the overall regime to be applied
to the case is abundantly clear, the subjective intrinsic predictability of that regime
(arising from the fact that the rules of the regime are likely unknown and
practically unknowable to smaller creditors) leaves much to be desired. Such
uncertainty will raise these smaller creditors' cost and reduce competition among
creditors, resulting in a less efficient outcome. 8 The other claimed advantage of
corporate-charter contractualism is that of flexibility, in that the parties are free to
choose their own bankruptcy regime. This freedom would result in the optimal
regime for the parties, not only because they would choose the regime that is best
for them, but also because bankruptcy regimes would become a commodity and
individual countries would compete with each other to deliver the best one. But in
practice, this is highly unlikely to work to the advantage of anyone but the debtor
and the largest creditors. Smaller creditors are again left at a disadvantage. This is
necessarily so because most large international firms have only a few major
creditors (with whom they can negotiate fairly easily about their regime choice)
but a myriad of smaller ones (whose numerosity raises transaction costs for
negotiations with them to the point of impossibility). Thus, from the standpoint of
smaller creditors, such a system would be neither predictable nor flexible.
Accordingly, territoriality affords both predictability and flexibility, and does so
better than universality.
The second advantage conferred by territoriality is that individual domestic
proceedings do not tend to be overly costly in comparison to a large, consolidated
international case. First, each court is concerned only with applying its own
domestic law, and need not make time-consuming and labor-intensive inquiries
into the laws of other countries. Second, each court is concerned only with assets
and claims that arose in their domestic jurisdiction, greatly reducing the number of
parties, adversary proceedings, and evidentiary hearings that are needed to resolve
the parties' rights. Even compared to a single multinational consolidated
proceeding, the duplication of efforts - which, to some degree, is inevitable
whenever multiple proceedings exist - is not likely to impose significant additional
costs, at least to the extent that most of the hearings about individual claims and
assets would not be duplicated because each would occur in its home country.
The third advantage of territoriality is that it affords all creditors a local
forum. Unless the creditor's claim exceeds what the creditor would receive under
domestic law, the creditor never needs to assert its claim in a foreign country.
Some creditors' claims can likely be satisfied in full - or close to full - solely with
87. Rasmussen, supra note 7, at 32-35.
88. LoPucki, supra note 15, at 739.
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the domestic assets of the creditor. The remaining creditors will be fewer in
number and will incur a lower total cost in asserting their claims in foreign
countries. It is worth noting that both private and public costs would be spared in
such case. Private costs savings come from creditors who no longer need to assert
their claims in a foreign country. Public savings occur from judicial resources,
which are saved when individual courts have to conduct fewer evidentiary
hearings, deal with fewer parties, and can avoid the labor-intensive task of
analyzing foreign law.
C. Disadvantages of Territoriality
A transnational bankruptcy regime based on territoriality exhibits three
principal weaknesses. First, it results in waste caused by duplicative efforts across
multiple jurisdictions. Second, it encourages strategic ex ante behavior by debtors
and creditors that creates significant negative externalities, and is therefore
inefficient. Third, even in the absence of strategic behavior, territoriality still
provides wrong ex ante incentives for capital allocation, resulting in the debtors'
assets not being put to their highest value use. Each of these weaknesses is
discussed in turn.
The first weakness of territoriality is also its most obvious one: when
proceedings are launched in multiple jurisdictions simultaneously, each
jurisdiction - though responsible only for assets within its reach - will inevitably
be required to make findings that are duplicative of those made by other
jurisdictions in the parallel proceedings. For example, whenever a creditor asserts
a claim in more than one country, the existence of the claim - even if based on the
same transaction or occurrence - may have to be separately determined under the
laws of each country. Parallel proceedings in multiple countries are likely to result
in another and more powerful flaw in the final resolution: if each country allocates
only the domestic assets of the debtor, it will often be forced to split those assets
from the debtor's foreign assets. This can result in piecemeal liquidation of assets
that ought to be treated as integral. This piecemeal treatment will frequently
significantly lower the liquidation value of the debtor's assets.
The second disadvantage of the system of territoriality is that it creates
opportunities for strategic behavior by debtors and creditors. Here, debtors and
creditors have an ex ante incentive to choose the location of the debtor's assets to
secure the most favorable treatment to themselves. Thus, in a purely territorial
regime (such as the regime that existed in Japan until the turn of this century), if
Country X is friendly to tort creditors and Country Y is not, the debtor (and any
large unsecured lender of the debtor, which may ordinarily be forced to share in
the proceeds of the debtor's estate with the tort victims) will have an incentive to
ensure that the debtor's assets will be located in Country Y and not in Country X.
Such behavior is inefficient because Country Y may not provide the debtor with
the best return on its assets, and because tort victims in Country X will go
undercompensated for their cost. Moreover, the disparity among various
countries' systems, in the absence of cooperation between those countries,
provides opportunities for strategic behavior that is even more harmful. On the eve
of bankruptcy, the debtor (alone or in collusion with one or more creditors) may
move assets to a jurisdiction that would benefit them the most. Assets are thus
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moved beyond the reach of the domestic creditors, who are left to choose between
taking a reduced share of the debtor's estate or braving the waters of a foreign
proceeding.
The final disadvantage is explored fully in the Bebchuk and Guzm,.n model.8 9
In essence, territorialist systems will create an inefficient market interest-rate
distortion when they are present in the world economy alongside universalist
regimes. This occurs because territorialist systems tend to favor domestic creditors
over foreign ones. Such preference may occur either explicitly or implicitly. An
example of an explicit preference would be the one present in the United States
before the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law, such as one expressed in
Lineas Areas de Nicaragua, where the court insisted that the claims of American
creditors must be satisfied in full before the claims of all other creditors would be
satisfied at all. 90 Implicit preferences are generally not as egregious, but the costs
that they impose are equally real. These preferences include both the substantive
limitations on the rights afforded to the foreign representatives in the countries'
domestic law, and the simple fact that it is generally much costlier for foreign
creditors to pursue their claims. Regardless of the cause and manner of preference
of domestic creditors over foreign, the outcome is the same: ceteris paribus,
domestic creditors stand a higher chance of being paid on their debt than foreign
creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding in a territorialist system. The distortion
occurs because universalist systems do not have the same preference for domestic
creditors; indeed, universalist systems will hang their domestic creditors out to
dry91 when a foreign bankruptcy proceeding is initiated. As a result, domestic
creditors in territorialist systems are more likely to be paid back than domestic
creditors in universalist systems. Domestic creditors in territorialist systems are
consequently more likely to be able to offer lower interest rates because of their
lower risk exposure. Debtors will thus be more likely to borrow in territorialist
systems over universalist systems. Creditors in territorialist regimes will look to
the debtor's assets to satisfy their claim, generally through some combination of an
express grant of a security interest, the setting of various default triggers in the
loan agreement that relate to the state of the debtor's assets, some prohibition on
the movement of the debtor's assets abroad, or some other mechanism of
expressing the creditor's reliance on those assets. The debtor will accordingly be
limited (at least to some degree) to keeping its assets and investments in the
territorialist country. This is inefficient because the debtor's assets may be able to
be put to better use abroad. There is another inefficiency which Bebchuk and
Guzmdin overlook: over time, the territorialist country will become oversaturated
with investment capital, which will eventually further decrease the return on that
investment capital, and which will further increase the opportunity cost to the
89. See Bebchuk & Guzmin, supra note 44, at 794-98.
90. In reLineas, 10 B.R. at 791.
91. Relatively, of course. This paper acknowledges that even universalist systems generally have
a public-policy exception to their deference to foreign bankruptcy proceedings. But the contrast with
territorialist systems is illustrative, in that territorialist systems will actively protect their domestic
creditors, whether explicitly or implicitly, while universalist systems will generally assume a hands-off
approach, unless an issue of public policy is involved.
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debtor of not investing in a universalist country. It must be noted that the disparity
in the debtor's cost of capital between the territorialist and universalist regimes
cannot be attributed to territoriality winning the "competition" for investment
capital between the two types of regimes. Rather, the surplus enjoyed by debtors
and creditors in the territorial regime is actually a negative externality that comes
directly from the pockets of universalist-regime creditors who do not have a way
of recouping their investment when a territorial-regime debtor files for bankruptcy.
III. THE REGIME OF UNIVERSALITY
A. Overview
Until the recent times, universality remained a regime that was largely the
ideal advanced by academics,9 2 but unimplemented by policymakers. Even some
proponents of non-universalist systems see universality as an overarching goal,
with their proposed systems being merely an interim solution. 93 The recent times
have seen varying forms of strides toward universality, with the adoption of the
UNCITRAL Model Law by some countries, with the passage of UNCITRAL-
influenced universalist laws in others, 94 and with varying degrees of built-in
universality, unrelated to the UNCITRAL Model Law, in the domestic regimes of
still others. With these exceptions, universality still remains largely a theoretical
rather than practically-implemented system.
The central premise of universality is deceptively simple. Under universality,
one country - say, the debtor's "home country" - would be responsible for
administering the debtor's bankruptcy. 95  The home country would exercise
control over the debtor's assets located both within and outside its borders. 96 To
the extent that the home country would be unable to directly reach the debtor's
foreign assets under the traditional principles of jurisdiction, the courts of the
countries where such foreign assets are located would turn those assets over to the
home country's court to enable it to administer the bankruptcy on a global level.97
There would be a single proceeding, and all creditors, wherever located, would be
required to assert their claims in that proceeding. 98 The judgment of the home
country's court would have worldwide effect, and any assets previously located
beyond the home country's reach would be rendered under its control by the
foreign courts' cooperation. 99 Each home country would apply its own substantive
law to the adjudication of the bankruptcy, with the possible exception, under some
proposals, of establishing the parties' pre-bankruptcy rights.100 No proceedings
would occur in countries other than the home country, except to the extent
92. Rasmussen, supra note 7, at 17.
93. LoPucki, supra note 10, at 2217.
94. See also Bebchuk & Guzmdin, supra note 44, at 786-87.
95. Bebchuk & Guzmin, supra note 44, at 778.
96. LoPucki, supra note 10, at 2216.
97. Bebchuk & Guzmdn, supra note 44, at 782.
98. Gilreath, supra note 14, at 407.
99. LoPucki, supra note 10, at 2221.
100. Gilreath, supra note 14, at 407-08.
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necessary to establish the cooperation of those countries with the home country. 101
This idyllic proposal is recognized, even by its proponents, as unworkable in
the current world circumstances and incompatible with the notion of
sovereignty.102 Desire to protect sovereignty leads countries - even those with
universalist leanings - to adopt limits on their cooperation with foreign
proceedings, much like the United States did before the adoption of the
UNCITRAL Model Law, and continues to do today.
Other flavors of universality have been proposed, notably by Professor
Westbrook. Westbrook's proposals'0 3 include (1) both those based on a single
body of international substantive bankruptcy law 10 4 and those based on national
laws; 10 5 (2) both those applied by a single new international bankruptcy court0 6
and those administered by an existing national court; 10 7 and (3) both those
universally applicable to all creditors and those which would apply universality to
large, sophisticated creditors and non-universalist rules to small, unsophisticated
creditors. 108 For all their variance in the choice of substantive law and the choice
of forum, "pure" universalist proposals have one common defining trait: a single
court administers the bankruptcy, and all other courts participate only to the extent
necessary to empower the "lead" court to complete its task, or to the extent
necessary to protect their own vital national interests in a manner consistent with
comity.
B. Advantages of Universality
Advantages of universality are plentiful and oft-cited. First, a single forum
for resolving all disputes relating to the bankruptcy is cost-effective. Second, the
outcome of the bankruptcy proceeding would not be influenced by something as
fortuitous (or as manipulable) as the placement of the debtor's assets on the eve of
the bankruptcy. Third, there would be no opportunity for forum-shopping because
each debtor would file in its home country, a fact that would be known to all
potential creditors in advance and would thus promote consistency and
predictability.
Universality is cost-effective for three independent reasons. First, having a
single court and a single trustee manage all of the debtor's assets will eliminate the
transaction costs that would otherwise be incurred by having multiple courts and
multiple representatives. 1 9 Second, the coordinated management of the debtor's
estate will prevent the debtor's piecemeal liquidation, preserve its going-concern
value, and maximize the distributions to all creditors in the event of liquidation. "0
101. LoPucki, supra note 15, at 699.
102. LoPucki, supra note 15, at 734; LoPucki, supra note 10, at 2220-21.
103. LoPucki, supra note 10, at 2221-23.
104. Id. at 2221.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 2221-22.
108. Id. at 2222 (citing Donald T. Trautman, Jay Lawrence Westbrook & Emmanuel Gaillard, Four
Models for International Bankruptcy, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 573, 579 (1993)).
109. LoPucki, supra note 15, at 707-08.
110. Id. at 706-07.
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Third, universality results in an efficient choice between liquidation and
reorganization. Without universality, creditors in countries with high asset-to-
claim ratios would not have an incentive to push for reorganization, while creditors
in countries with low asset-to-claim ratios would have an incentive to encourage
those risks.1 1  The combination of a single point of estate management,
preservation of the debtor's going-concern value (when efficient), and efficient
choice of liquidation versus reorganization thus contributes to the cost savings of
universality over other regimes.
The outcome of a bankruptcy proceeding under universality, moreover, would
not be affected by the particular placement of the debtor's assets. While the
location of an asset provides an easy and predictable way to ascertain the nature of
the bankruptcy regime that will govern its liquidation, that location itself is both
fortuitous and easily manipulable. That is particularly true for intangible assets
that can be easily moved across national borders, such as bank accounts. " 2 Under
universality, the location of the asset would not matter, as its distribution would in
any case be governed by the law of the "home country."
Finally, universality also discourages other kinds of strategic behavior, such
as forum-shopping by debtors. This advantage is most pronounced when there
exists a mix of universalist and territorialist regimes around the world, and the
debtor seeks to file in a universalist regime that is different from its home country.
The recent bankruptcy of the Yukos Oil Company, where the Russian corporate
debtor forum-shopped itself into a Texas bankruptcy court (which, by statute, had
jurisdiction over all of Yukos' assets "wherever located" 113) by depositing a few
million dollars in the account of its counsel, Texas-based Fulbright & Jaworski, 114
is an illustrative example of such behavior. 15 While Yukos had good reasons to
seek bankruptcy protection in the United States, rather than its native Russian
Federation, 116 the encouragement of such forum-shopping on a global scale would
111. Id. at 707. LoPucki correctly notes that it is generally the estate representatives (such as
trustees and debtors-in-possession), not the creditors, who control the decision about whether the firm
should reorganize or liquidate, and that Westbrook incorrectly assumes it to be otherwise. Id.
However, discussion of creditors' incentives is nonetheless important here because creditors can
generally argue in a bankruptcy proceeding for either reorganization or liquidation. Creditors may
further exercise their leverage - at least in the United States - by voting to reject a reorganization plan.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (2008).
112.. This scenario would not pose a problem under United States substantive law, because of laws
governing fraudulent transfers and voidable preferences (11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 548 and the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act) and because, even if the debtor were to circumvent those laws by transferring
money to its own bank account abroad, the money would not be lost by the estate because the estate
includes all of the debtor's assets "wherever located." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2008). But in a more
territorialist country (whose domestic bankruptcy law does not purport to govern the debtor's assets
abroad, such as Japan before the recent reforms), or one whose fraudulent conveyance laws are less
robust, it is easy to imagine how assets could be moved to other countries with no recourse for domestic
debtors other than asserting their claim in the foreign country.
113. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2008).
114. In re Yukos, 320 BR. at 132.
115. For background on the Yukos bankruptcy see In re Yukos Oil Company v. Russian Federation,
320 BR. 130 (2004).
116. Such as its (probably well-founded) belief that it would not be treated fairly by a Russian
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have disastrous consequences for the predictability of bankruptcy systems. If
every debtor that perceived unfairness in its domestic system were able to file
abroad merely by transferring a few assets to a friendlier country, it would be
impossible for creditors to predict, ex ante, the nature of the regime that they
would be subject to. Universality discourages such behavior because it leaves
bankruptcy proceedings to the debtor's home country, and consequently makes
asset placement irrelevant for the choice of law that governs their distribution.
The advantages of universality, if realized, render universality a more
efficient system that cuts administration costs and discourages harmful strategic
behavior by debtors and creditors. It is precisely these advantages that have made
universality the choice system in the academia. But the practical adoption of
universality presents grave complications, which I explore below.
C. Disadvantages of Universality
For all of its theoretical superiority, the problems inherent in any practical
implementation of a regime of universality are fatal to its success. First, a
universalist regime would have to find a way to determine the "home" country of
every debtor in a consistent, predictable, and permanent way. Second, such a
regime would have to provide for fair treatment of multinational debtors that have
national subsidiaries under varying degrees of control by the debtor's "home
office," if such a home office indeed exists. Third, universality imposes grave
costs on local creditors of multinational debtors when such creditors become
forced to defend their interests in a distant court applying unfamiliar substantive
law.
Universalists concede that it is impossible to establish a system that would
determine, ex ante, the "home country" of each debtor. " 7 A "we know it when we
see it" approach, which universalists claim is sufficient for the vast majority of
cases, is unacceptable, and is at any rate insufficient for some of the best-known
transnational bankruptcy cases in recent history, including Maxwell
Communications Corporation and BCCI.118  Most universalist-leaning regimes,
including the UNCITRAL Model Law and the European Union Convention on
Insolvency Proceedings, set the default rule that the country of incorporation is the
"home country" for the purposes of insolvency proceedings. 119 But this
court, particularly in the matter of determining the existence and amount of its alleged tax
underpayment and the ability of Yukos to keep its main production facility in the face of alleged design
by Russian officials to seize it for the benefit of state-owned Rosneft oil company. See In re Yukos Oil,
320 B.R. at 135-37.
117. LoPucki, supra note 15, at 713.
118. Id. at 713-15. Both debtors were headquartered in one country: Maxwell in the UK, BCCI
(pro forma only) in Luxembourg with operational headquarters initially in the UK and moved to the
United Arab Emirates shortly before bankruptcy; the bulk of their assets was elsewhere (Maxwell's in
the United States, BCCI's worldwide). LoPucki takes particular issue with treatment of BCCI, whose
bankruptcy was administered by Luxembourg courts due to its incorporation there, despite the fact that
BCCI's ties to Luxembourg did not exceed that mere fact. Id.
119. European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings art. 3(1), Nov. 23, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1223
(1996) [hereinafter European Insolvency Convention]; UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 33, at art.
16(3).
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presumption may be overridden by a contrary showing in both regimes; 120 the end
result is an intense fact-based inquiry, which destroys any hope of predictability
that may have existed had the default rule just been left alone. A per se rule,
which would conclusively set the country of incorporation as the home country, is
hardly the solution either. First, if combined with the sort of an automatic-stay
provision encountered in the United States, a debtor's filing in one country will
prevent creditors from seeking home-country determination elsewhere, thus
essentially allowing the debtor to unilaterally choose which country will determine
its home country (and thus effectively allow the debtor to choose its own
country).12 1  Second, it would encourage debtors to choose regimes for their
incorporation that may have little to do with their actual economic activity, which
would place an enormous burden on creditors - particularly small, local creditors -
to acquire information about the regimes of far-away countries. Worse, it will
encourage debtors to change their home state on the eve of bankruptcy,
122
suddenly forcing their existing creditors to assert their claims in a brand new
system. 23 The incentives for this brand of forum-shopping are considerable, and
various countries - such as Bermuda, Luxembourg, and Cayman Islands - may
well emerge as possible international bankruptcy havens. 124  These eve-of-
bankruptcy moves are fairly common in contemporary practice, 125 and once the
venue is thus chosen, its change is highly unlikely.126  Third, it provides little
120. Model Law, supra note 31, at art. 16(3); European Insolvency Convention, supra note 119, at
art. 3(1).
121. LoPucki, supra note 15, at 723. (citing Nakash v. Zur, 190 BR. 763, 767-69 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1996)) (holding that the creditor violated the automatic stay by filing an involuntary petition against the
debtor in Israel).
122. This problem cannot be privately solved by contract alone. If the contract were to trigger an
automatic default and acceleration with the debtor's change of incorporation, such contract (and the
accelerated amount) would then simply become a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding in the new
country. It can only be solved either by law that would refuse to give effect to a change of
incorporation that is done less than a certain time before the filing, or by a requirement that would
empower the creditor to assert the claim in the old country of incorporation and that would require the
court of the new country to cooperate.
123. As already occurs with respect to different venues in the United States. LoPucki notes
"rampant forum-shopping" by U.S. debtors and that over half of all U.S. filings occur in venues other
than those that universalists would identify as the proper venue. LoPucki, supra note 15, at 720-21; see
also Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Venue
Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 968 (1999).
124. LoPucki, supra note 15, at 721 (citing also the danger that these countries will have a
disproportionate role in setting distribution priorities and other substantive rights for debtors
everywhere in the world).
125. Id. at 722 (citing examples of Amdura, Baldwin United, Continental Airlines, Evans Products,
Memorex, Michigan General, Tacoma Boatbuilding, and the Wickes Companies).
126. See GORDON BERMANT ET AL., CHAPTER 11 VENUE CHOICE BY LARGE PUBLIC COMPANIES:
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY
SYSTEM 7 (1997); Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 123, at 1000; Lynn LoPucki & William Whitford,
Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held
Companies, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 11, 24-26 (1991) (noting that these cases are said to "grow roots"
immediately upon moving to the new venue as executives make decisions and parties hire counsel,
making it "unthinkable" to move a case within mere weeks).
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guidance on the treatment of the many multinational corporations that operate not
as single units but as corporate groups whose loosely-controlled subsidiaries are
incorporated in a number of countries. 12 7  This is a larger problem with
universality, to which I now turn.
Great difficulty exists in determining the regime that should govern
international corporate groups. Alternatives include treating each legally distinct
entity in the group as having its own home country, treating the entire corporate
group as having a single home country (which may or may not be that of the
corporate parent), and treating the troubled entities as a single unit that has its own
home country (which may be determined on some basis other than the country of
incorporation). 128 Each is fraught with problems. LoPucki cites a simple yet
illustrative example of a corporate group consisting of an American parent (which
is not financially troubled) with Canadian and French subsidiaries (both troubled),
with the Canadian subsidiary conducting the bulk of its operations through a non-
troubled German subsidiary. 12 9 Under the view that treats each entity as having its
home country, the proceedings should take place in Canada and France; under the
view that treats the entire group as having a single home country, the United States
is the appropriate forum; an alternate view would disregard the Canadian entity's
state of incorporation and would instead require it to proceed in Germany due to
the fact that the bulk of its assets is located there. 130 The resulting dilemma is that
any approach that requires the proceeding to be consolidated in a single country
will risk inefficiency by also implicating the solvent members of the corporate
group that would have been better off continuing in operation without liquidation
or reorganization, and by altering wholly-domestic relationships between solvent
subsidiaries and their domestic creditors. 131 On the other hand, any approach that
allows the exclusion of solvent members from the bankruptcy proceedings by
allowing the proceeding to be commenced in multiple forums will defeat the aims
of universality, exclude important assets from the bankruptcy estate, 3 2 risk
destroying the going-concern value of the debtor, and encourage strategic asset-
shifting among corporate group members. Moreover, universality allows corporate
groups to further manipulate their bankruptcy regime by means of a staggered
filing; that is, having some of the group's entities file before others. The
proceeding, if consolidated at all, will be consolidated in the home country of the
first-filing subsidiary, not in the parent's country because the subsidiary's
127. See, e.g., Heinrich Kronstein, The Nationality ofInternational Enterprises, 52 COLuM. L. REV.
983, 993-98 (1952).
128. LoPucki, supra at note 15, at 724.
129. Id.
130. Id at 717-718.
131. Id. at 718-20 (citing the bankruptcy of Bramalea Limited, whose Canadian bankruptcy filing
had precisely this effect on the relationship of its solvent American subsidiaries with their domestic
creditors); see generally R. GORDON MARANTZ, The Reorganization of a Complex Corporate Entity:
The Bramalea Story, in CASE STUDIES IN RECENT CANADIAN INSOLVENCY REORGANIZATIONS 1, 30
(Jacob Ziegel ed., 1997) (detailing the Bramalea story).
132. See LoPucki, supra note 15, at 720.
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country's court will already be on the way in resolving the case. 1
33
Third, universality imposes grave costs on local creditors. Under universality,
a debtor is required to file in its "home country" which, as we have seen, may be
quite different from the country in which the bulk of its economic activity takes
place. For example, a small British company that sells auto parts on credit to the
British automaker Jaguar, may suddenly find itself having to defend its interests in
Delaware, and assert its priority under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, if the Ford
Motor Company, the current corporate parent of Jaguar, were to file for bankruptcy
there. Different substantive priorities and different treatment of similar claims in
different countries makes the ex ante pricing of credit impossible without accurate
information about substantive foreign law. In many cases, the mere fact that the
debtor actually has a foreign "home country" is not immediately apparent to
creditors. Even in cases where it is apparent, smaller creditors will still be
disadvantaged because they cannot accurately evaluate their risks and exposure
under foreign bankruptcy law, and thus cannot price their credit accurately.
The combination of these practical problems is fatal to the ability of
universality to realize its potential. While a universalist world would, in theory, be
more predictable, no universalist system proposed to date has been able to
overcome the hurdle of resolving the threshold questions about the home country
of the debtor or about the prejudice that occurs to domestic creditors. As a
consequence, universality remains an unworkable system.
D. Corporate-Charter Universality
A more promising universalist proposal is advanced by Rasmussen. 13 4 Under
his proposal, each debtor would have the ability to choose its bankruptcy country -
that is, both the forum and the law, with the sole requirement that the forum apply
lex fori (law of the forum) - to which its bankruptcy would be subject. 135 The
country would then function as the "home country," and administer the proceeding
in accordance with the principles of universality. 136 The debtor's choice would be
made at incorporation, changeable only with the consent of the creditors, and
publicly available to any prospective creditor ex ante.137  This approach, in
essence, bypasses the most dangerous component of universality, which is the
determination of the debtor's home country for bankruptcy purposes. As a result,
it would eliminate strategic behavior by debtors, eve-of-bankruptcy
reincorporation, and other tactics that undermine the integrity of universality.
Moreover, it would abandon traditional choice-of-law principles and give the
debtor and its creditors more flexibility in choosing the debtor's bankruptcy
regime, unhampered by considerations of country of incorporation, country of
headquarters, and country of the majority of assets.
133. Id. at 723.
134. Rasmussen, supra note 7, at 32-35.
135. Id. at 32.
136. Id. at 27.
137. Id. at 5.
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Rasmussen's regime is less objectionable than traditional universality for
those reasons. Nonetheless, its flaws are considerable. In addition to problems
already enumerated, the system will impose extreme costs on nonconsensual
creditors of the debtor, such as tort victims. Debtors - particularly those prone to
tort liability - will have an incentive to choose the country that is as hostile to
plaintiffs as possible for their bankruptcy home. 138 As a result, tort victims will be
systematically undercompensated and will, as a class, effectively bear the cost of
any efficiency gains that may be passed on to the debtor and other creditors. A
possible solution is proposed by Rasmussen himself: have each country that has
tort creditors conduct "fairness hearings" before requiring its domestic tort
creditors to go to the debtor's home country. 139 But the cure is just as bad as the
disease. While tort victims will benefit, the overall predictability of the system
would suffer. A German creditor, for example, would have to adjust the terms of
its credit to a debtor that elected France as its bankruptcy regime based on the
debtor's potential tort liability in the United States. Moreover, the solution will not
work if the country where the debtor faces tort exposure is also a country where it
does not have many assets, because in the absence of foreign courts' cooperation,
the seizure of the debtor's assets is essentially the only leverage that the tort
country's court has against the debtor.
IV. AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME?
A minority of commentators - notably Westbrook- advocate the use of an
international body to resolve transnational bankruptcies. 140 In such a system, an
international court would have exclusive jurisdiction over all transnational
bankruptcy cases.14 1 Under various versions of the proposal, the international
bankruptcy court would apply either the domestic law of the debtor, or a new body
of substantive international bankruptcy law. 142 Both the international bankruptcy
court and any possible substantive law would be created by convention or treaty.
Domestic courts of individual countries would participate in the process only to the
extent necessary to enforce the judgment of the international bankruptcy court (for
example, ordering that assets be seized and turned over to the international
bankruptcy court).
Proponents of such an international system claim two overriding advantages.
First, a purely international system would be the model of predictability and
uniformity. There would never be any guesswork about the forum that would take
control of the proceedings because only one such forum would exist. Moreover,
under the version of the proposal that favors creating a single body of substantive
138. See LoPucki, supra note 15, at 739-40 (citing Goldberg v. Lee Express Cab Corp., 634 N.Y.S.
2d 337, 338 (Sup. Ct. 1995) as an example of the length to which some debtors go, ex ante, to limit
their tort liability). In Goldberg, the court noted the common practice of taxicab companies to create a
separate corporation for each taxicab, thus making the rest of the taxi fleet immune from any possible
tort judgment against an individual single-cab subsidiary. Id.
139. Rasmussen, supra note 7, at 35.
140. Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REv. 2276, 2292-98
(2000).
141. Id. at 2292-93.
142. See id. at 2292-93.
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law, every creditor, large or small, would know exactly its prospects in a potential
bankruptcy proceeding, and would thus price its credit accurately. Instead of being
forced to learn dozens of foreign regimes, as under universality, creditors would
only need to know one.
The second claimed advantage is that the international nature of the regime
would be fair to all creditors and debtors, regardless of their national origin. No
court would have to decide the allocation of costs between "domestic" and
"foreign" creditors because all creditors would, in a sense, be equally "foreign" to
an international body. Similarly, substantive law would eliminate any built-in bias
in favor of "domestic" and against "foreign" creditors. Composition of the court
can easily be set in such a manner as to minimize or eliminate any possibility for
favoritism.
The international organization regime, however, is even less of a workable
solution than universality. If the regime administered by an international
organization is to be any more predictable than universality, there must exist a
single body of substantive law that the international organization would apply. To
allow domestic laws to remain applicable to transnational bankruptcies under such
a scenario is to invite the same uncertainty and manipulation as universality would
allow (minus, of course, the choice of the forum itself). Even if the international
bankruptcy court were to have its own criteria for determining the identity of the
debtor's "home country," debtors can still re-incorporate, move their headquarters,
or shift assets as easily as they can under universality. Accordingly, we are left
with a system that would create both a forum and a body of substantive law to
resolve transnational insolvencies.
Regrettably, the very reason why an international solution to transnational
bankruptcy is needed is also the reason why an international body of substantive
bankruptcy law cannot work: nations have vastly differing economic priorities.
National decisions about economic priorities are influenced by a host of factors,
ranging from development objectives, to attraction of foreign capital, to moral
judgments. These unique economic priorities become expressed in national
bankruptcy systems. In the present day, these systems exhibit a dizzying array of
diverse choices about the scope of the estate, claim recognition, class treatment,
creditor priority, available remedies, and just about all other aspects of bankruptcy
proceedings. 143 It is this rich diversity of policy choices on the global scale that
makes transnational bankruptcy so unpredictable and a uniform regime desirable.
It is also this diversity that will prevent any consensus with respect to substantive
law. Consensus has been elusive even in fairly closely-knit geopolitical units such
as the European Union, whose members - save perhaps for the recent arrivals from
the former Eastern Bloc - are largely well-established, industrialized, powerful
economic players in a similar stage of development. 144 If substantive consensus
143. See LoPucki, supra note 10, at 2224-25.
144. See European Insolvency Convention, supra note 119, at art. 4(2) (explicitly leaving questions
of substantive law - such as scope of estate, treatment of assets, powers of debtor and liquidator, effects
of bankruptcy on debtor's current obligations, recognition of claims, distribution of assets, ranking of
claims, and others - to the domestic law of the state that is administering the bankruptcy)
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cannot be achieved in Europe, there is little hope that a consensus on substantive
law can be had on a global scale. Without consensus, the regime cannot take hold
and will die in one of two ways: it can attempt to be substantively comprehensive,
but secure the ratification of only a few countries that share the same economic
priorities; or, it can attempt to secure broader participation at the expense of
substantively meaningful provisions. Either way, a comprehensive regime that
would govern substantive issues - such as scope of estate and priority of claims -
is currently impossible on a worldwide scale.
V. COOPERATIVE TERRITORIALITY AND BEYOND
A. Overview
Professor LoPucki proposes a regime that she calls cooperative territoriality to
govern transnational insolvency proceedings. 145  The system is not flawless;
however, with some adjustments, this approach is the most practically workable
paradigm of all that are presently discussed in the literature.
Cooperative territoriality is similar to classic territoriality.146 Under
cooperative territoriality, separate and coequal bankruptcy proceedings occur in
each country in which the debtor has assets. 147  The court of each of those
countries would administer those assets, and only those assets, that are located
within that country. 148 Lex fori would govern the substantive issues in each
proceeding. 149 Two critical differences would distinguish the regime from
classical territoriality, however. First, cooperation among courts would reduce
administrative costs and reduce wasteful duplication without compromising the
participating countries' sovereignty. Second, disputed claims would be litigated in
a single forum with binding effect on all other countries.
The first form of cooperation that LoPucki proposes concerns the process of
filing and allowing claims. 150 Under classic territoriality, a creditor that wants to
have access to the debtor's assets worldwide would need to file its claim in each
country in which the debtor has assets. Under LoPucki's proposal, the creditor
would only file in one country. 151 The claim would be automatically deemed
allowed in each country in which the bankruptcy proceeding is pending, unless the
trustee in such other country objected to the allowability of the claim based on
local substantive law. The creditor would then have a choice of whether to press
for the allowance of the claim in that foreign court, or simply give up and focus its
attention elsewhere.
The second form of cooperation that LoPucki proposes concerns litigating
disputed claims. 152  Two alternatives exist for such process. Under the first
possibility, a creditor would litigate its disputed claim in its home country. The
145. LoPucki, supra note 15, at 750-60.
146. See id. at 742.
147. See id.
148. Id. at 742-43.
149. See id. 742.
150. See id. at 753-55.
151. See id. at 750-55.
152. See id. at 754-55.
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judgment of that court would then become binding on all other courts that are
administering the bankruptcy around the world. The second alternative would
require the litigation of disputed claims in each country in which they are disputed.
LoPucki naturally favors the first alternative, but recognizes that the courts' current
reluctance to always give effect to foreign judgments will likely impede the
chances of this approach taking hold.153  I will now explore advantages and
disadvantages of the LoPucki proposal and propose modifications that will likely
improve the system's chances for success.
B. Advantages
The LoPucki approach captures all advantages of classic territoriality. 54
First, cooperative territoriality is eminently predictable. The regime that will
govern the distribution of a particular asset is governed by the law of the place
where that asset is located. The complicated and unpredictable process of
ascertaining the debtor's home country is eliminated from the equation. Second, it
allows local creditors to litigate in a close, convenient forum, and be governed by
domestic law, rather than being illogically forced into a distant forum to litigate a
purely domestic dispute. Like classic territoriality, it is also superior in its
treatment of global corporate groups. It treats each national entity of a global
corporate group as a separate debtor, and thus conforms to the expectation of
creditors who were dealing with that particular entity.
It also adds some advantages of its own. It takes the most efficient aspect of
territoriality - the cost savings arising from each court's ability to focus solely on
domestic assets and laws - and it enhances it with the cooperation requirement. If
a large multinational debtor has thousands of claims filed against it in bankruptcy,
and the majority of those claims are uncontested, the fact that such claims will be
allowed globally represents significant cost savings in relation to the existing
regime. Even if the filing of a claim is a largely automatic process in each
individual court, the expense involved in filing such claims separately, multiplied
by thousands of creditors and hundreds of cases, can be considerable. Moreover,
the automatic allowance of such claims will not significantly increase the
expenditure of judicial resources in the allowing countries because, by hypothesis,
these claims are uncontested. The automation of the process is thus a laudable step
forward.
Cooperative territoriality also reduces (but does not eliminate) incentives for
strategic asset placement by debtors who want to avoid tort liability in a particular
country. By allowing easy cross-recognition of claims among the various national
estates created by the concurrent proceedings, no portion of the debtor's assets
would be inaccessible to the debtor's creditors. The process would be aided even
more greatly if automatic recognition of the judgments determining claim amount
could be secured in the bankruptcy context. However, even without automatic
recognition, cooperative territoriality represents an improvement over the status
quo.
153. See id. at 755-56.
154. See id. at 751-53.
VOL. 36:2
2008 ALTERNATIVES TO UNIVERSALITY IN TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY 183
Similarly, cooperative territoriality neutralizes some (but not all) incentives
that, under the model proposed by Bebchuk and Guzmdn, cause inefficient
allocation of capital.155 The model predicts that in a world with a mix of
territoriality and universality, disproportionate and socially inefficient investment
would occur in countries that have adopted territoriality. That is so because
creditors in territorialist countries stand a better chance of being repaid in
bankruptcy and will thus be able to offer more competitive interest rates, and
debtors will consequently be more likely to borrow and invest in territorialist
countries. Cooperative territoriality addresses this shortcoming in several ways.
First, as already stated, it partially erodes some of the barriers to recovery that
creditors in universalist countries will have. That is, when a creditor from a
universalist country must assert its claim, such a creditor need only file a proof of
claim in its home country's court for the claim to automatically be allowed in all
countries in which the debtor has assets. Such a creditor need not face the cost of
filing its proof of claim in dozens of countries, nor establish the allowability of the
claim in each country. Of course, when the claim is objected to, the debtor must
still choose between defending and forfeiting it. However, that process is no worse
than current practice. Secondly, if a mechanism is adopted by which the allowance
of a disputed claim by one country can be made binding on others, 156 the costs
associated with such litigation would dramatically decrease. Under current
practice, the debtor would have to file each proof of claim independently and only
then respond to objections on a country-by-country basis.
C. Disadvantages
The LoPucki proposal is not without flaws. First, some of the disadvantages
of classic territoriality, such as the high cost of multiple concurrent proceedings,
are plainly inherent in cooperative territoriality. Second, as already stated, it does
not completely eliminate the built-in incentives in territoriality that cause
inefficient allocation of capital. To be sure, cooperative territoriality is likely to
fare far better than conventional territoriality in those respects, but any regime that
allows for differing likelihoods of recovery by creditors based on their location
will, to a degree, have the same effect.
The LoPucki proposal does not so much introduce disadvantages that did not
exist in the world of classic territoriality, as it fails to resolve the questions that it
raises. LoPucki, for example, proposes the automatic allowance of claims in all
countries once they have been allowed in one country. But also, she urges that
debtors be able to prevent such automatic allowance by merely filing an objection.
Consequently, any efficiency gains that automatic allowance would bring would
become obliterated as the exception swallows the rule. In the following section, I
propose a solution to the automatic-allowance dilemma that will likely streamline
the process, save costs, and still allow each country full control over decisions that
affect its sovereignty.
Another flaw with the LoPucki system is that it recognizes that debtors will
155. See Bebchuk & Guzmin, supra note 44, at 789-90.
156. See discussion infra Part V. D.
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have an incentive to shift their assets to countries that will shield them from
various types of creditors, yet does not propose a system to address this problem
beyond a vague suggestion that the countries might cooperate with one another to
prevent this from occurring. I propose a comprehensive system to resolve this
issue, and I also discuss it in the next section.
D. Proposed Improvements
I propose several modifications to the LoPucki proposal that, if implemented,
will increase the potential of cooperative territoriality to be an efficient means to
streamline the process of transnational insolvency. These modifications may be
adopted by way of treaty or convention.
First, I propose a modification in the process of allowing claims. Claims
allowed in the creditor's domestic courts should be conclusively presumed allowed
in all other counties' courts, with only two enumerated exceptions. The first such
exception can occur if there exists an international agreement that a particular kind
of claim is not allowable. For example, suppose that there came into existence an
agreement stipulating that punitive damages are never allowable in any
transnational bankruptcy case. 157 In such a scenario, the creditor's domestic court
would disallow the creditor's claim for punitive damages in the first instance. The
second exception would occur if the allowance of the claim is against an express
law of the country that is asked to allow the claim. The second exception should
be construed extremely narrowly, and individual countries would be permitted to
disallow claims only in the existence of a specific law that prohibits such
allowance. For example, suppose there were no international punitive damage
agreement, as there was in the previous hypothesis. Suppose further that the
creditor's country allowed punitive damages. Finally, suppose that the country in
which a substantial chunk of the debtor's assets is located does not have punitive
damages in its tort law. Under my proposal, the second country would be required
to allow the creditor's claim because although it does not permit punitive damages
in tort, it does not have an explicit rule banning the inclusion of foreign punitive
tort damages in bankruptcy. If the second country decided to pass a law banning
punitive damages from other countries from being included in bankruptcy, then it
would be permitted to disallow them. This requirement goes a step past ordinary
principles of comity. Under conventional comity, the second country would be
permitted to disallow the punitive damage claim if it conflicted with a findamental
policy of the second country. This standard, although well-established, falls short
of offering predictability. The deciding court often has to determine what public
policy is, often in the absence of explicit legislative guidance. It then has to decide
whether the proposed action will violate that public policy. Under the "comity-
157. Such an agreement is not merely an academic possibility. Many countries do not allow
punitive damages at all. Even others, such as the United States - where punitive damages are jokingly
referred to as a national pastime - grant punitive damages only a very low priority in domestic
bankruptcies. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (2008) (listing punitive damages as a low priority in
liquidation); see generally Menard-Sanford v. Mabey, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that, in the
bankruptcy that followed the Dalkon Shield IUD litigation, the court had equitable power to disallow or
subordinate punitive damages).
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plus" proposal, the court's discretion would be far more limited. No court would
ever be required to make pronouncements of public policy. The allowance or
disallowance of the claim would be predictable with a simple look at the country's
statute dealing with the allowance of specific claims. If the allowance of the claim
is not expressly prohibited, then it must be allowed, even if the underlying claim
does not exist according to the country's domestic law, and even if the country's
public policy opposes such claims. Moreover, each country would have a perfectly
safe way to preserve its sovereignty by disallowing claims that it finds
inappropriate: all it would have to do is pass an explicit law to that effect. If
France, for example, decides that punitive damages are the province of les
Am&icains litigieux, it is perfectly free to outlaw the allowance of foreign punitive
damages by its domestic courts. Otherwise, it is free to continue to prohibit
punitive damages in its domestic courts but allow them when it administers a
portion of the estate of an American debtor with American liabilities.
The most obvious criticism of this proposal comes from the fact that debtors
will have a tremendous incentive to shift assets on the eve of bankruptcy to
countries that will shield them from undesirable exposure. However, this problem
can be addressed by adopting a set of international principles of fraudulent
transfers. 158 Current law relies on the creditor's domestic court to make the
determination that a fraudulent transfer has been made, and on the foreign court to
enforce it under the principles of comity. The incentive for the foreign court not to
grant comity to the fraudulent transfer judgment of the domestic court is too great,
particularly if the transfer was made to avoid liability under a law that is repugnant
to the foreign country.
I propose that an international system governing fraudulent transfers be
adopted by convention or treaty. The agreement would set uniform guidelines for
what constitutes a fraudulent transfer. It would not need to delve into whether the
fraudulent transfer ought to be permissible if it is made to avoid liability under
some repugnant law because each country would have independent ability to
disallow claims based on such liability. The agreement need not even define the
standards for intent to defraud; it could merely treat all transfers made within a
certain time before filing as fraudulent and thus avoidable. The agreement,
accordingly, would not need to make substantive determinations on subjects that
divide the international community, and would thus be likely to be widely adopted.
Suppose, as earlier, that France abhors punitive damages in tort. Suppose
further that France imposes civil fines for the display of Nazi memorabilia,15 9
while the United States opposes such fines on free-speech grounds. Under my
proposed agreement, United States and France would not need to negotiate with
each other about the substantive merits of either punitive damages or fines for Nazi
158. LoPucki suggests a system of cooperation among countries to prevent the problem of "fleeing
assets" but does not present a concrete proposal. See LoPucki, supra note 15, at 758-59. Instead of ad
hoc cooperation, which is the essence of LoPucki's treatment of the subject, I propose a system of per
se rules that would conclusively determine transfers to be avoidable.
159. See. e.g., Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisrmitisme, 145 F. Supp. 2d
1168 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
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displays. Both could agree to uniform principles under which each would render
assistance to the other under a fraudulent transfer convention - such as, for
example, treating all transfers made within six months before filing as conclusively
fraudulent. If the United States is opposed to the Nazi fines, it can then disallow
them at the local level by passing a law that prevents the allowance of, for
example, all claims based on liability for the content of commercial speech, with
the necessary exceptions such as fraud, unfair competition, trademark
infringement, or securities liability. Conversely, if France is opposed to punitive
damages, it can keep them out of its courts by passing a law that bans the
allowance of all extra-compensatory damages.
This modification to the cooperative territoriality proposal offers greater
predictability than the LoPucki proposal, which permits for the disallowance of
claims on ordinary "public policy" grounds. At first blush, the modification would
appear to be labor-intensive: each country would have to come up with a list of
claims that it would want disallowed. However, the process is effectively a one-
time commitment. Once implemented, the courts' decision about the allowance of
claims becomes as simple as determining whether the claim is expressly prohibited
from being allowed. The political branches of the government will thus be charged
with determining what, in essence, is a decision of foreign policy. The courts'
decisions will thus be both more predictable and more responsive to political
reality.
The second criticism is that the "comity-plus" requirement will simply allow
the political branches to block cooperation instead of the courts. In other words,
instead of courts refusing to extend comity, it would be the political branches of
the government that would prohibit the allowance of claims. The criticism is
partially deserved; however, my proposal still allows for far greater cooperation
than is possible in the status quo. Typically, it is the political branches that are
responsible for a country's foreign policy. They are thus in the best position to
bargain with other countries about the substantive rules governing allowance and
disallowance of claims. It will thus be far easier for political branches to permit
greater allowance of claims than it is for courts under the current principles of
comity. Courts strive to follow precedent and will not declare that public policy
has changed overnight. Political branches, on the other hand, are free to fashion
foreign policy, bargain for greater allowability of claims, and create domestic laws
in accordance with the country's economic needs.
In sum, my first proposed improvement consists of the following parts. First,
I propose a further automation of the claim allowance process. A claim filed in
one country would be disallowed only if it either (a) is internationally agreed to be
an impermissible claim, or (b) if its allowance is expressly against the domestic
law of the country, which is asked to allow it. Otherwise, the claim becomes
automatically allowed in all countries in which the debtor's bankruptcy is pending.
Second, I propose an international (if minimalist) system of cooperation on
fraudulent conveyances that would deter debtors from transferring assets to
countries that disallow claims that are based on the debtors' actual or potential
liabilities.
My second proposal deals with claims where the liability is not disputed but
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the amount is. For example, suppose that a United States trustee rejects an
executory contract that the debtor had with the creditor. The contract is deemed
breached and the creditor becomes entitled to money damages, whose priority is
that of a general unsecured creditor.'1 60 In the United States, the breach is deemed
to have occurred at the time that the petition is filed. 161 But suppose that in Japan
the breach is deemed to have occurred at the time that the trustee chose to reject
the executory contract. Suppose further that, under the applicable provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, the creditor is entitled to expectation damages, but
under Japanese law, the creditor is entitled only to reliance damages. Suppose that
as the result, the creditor's claim under the U.S. law is $3 million, while under
Japanese law it is only $2 million. Suppose further that the debtor is a Japanese
company with some U.S. assets and that the creditor is American. Finally, suppose
that Japanese courts have declared that it is a matter of vital public policy to only
allow reliance and not expectation damages in breach of contract cases, taking this
out of the realm of decisions where comity might be extended. LoPucki suggests
that it would be desirable to have the Japanese court enforce the full $3 million, but
that is unlikely, unless the creditor makes a showing in the Japanese court that it is
entitled to the full amount it seeks.
It is of course desirable to have a single court determine the amount of the
claim. But for Japan to allow the United States' courts to channel an extra million
dollars to an American creditor is to accept a decision which violates its vital
public policy, which is counter to its sovereignty, and which it will not do under
the principles of comity. Accordingly, alternative ways must be found to address
the problem.
I propose that the excess $1 million be treated as if it were a separate claim
that is allowed by the U.S. but disallowed by Japan. The burden would be on
Japan to pass a law that would prohibit the allowance of all contract damage claims
in excess of what is recoverable under the reliance measure. The American
creditor would then establish its claim in the United States, obtain a separate
finding on the recoverable amount under the reliance measure, and take that
reduced claim to Japan. The creditor would then have to assert its claim for $1
million in the United States alone.
The above proposal should be viewed in light of the aim of cooperative
territoriality-that no country should be required to apply the substantive law of
another country. I propose that the only exception to this principle should be to
allow the court to conform its judgment to standards that would be acceptable in
the foreign country. Such departures should be kept to an absolute minimum. For
example, domestic courts can easily decide what would be the proper amount of
damages, if the date of breach were later rather than sooner, if the measure of
damages were reliance rather than expectation, or if the award excluded punitive
damages rather than included them. Domestic courts can then decide the issue
based on domestic law, and make separate auxiliary findings that would then be
160. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2008).
161. See id.
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binding on the foreign court. The sole foreign laws that domestic courts would
then have to apply are the foreign laws governing the allowability of foreign
claims. Knowing that in advance, all countries can enact such laws in a manner
that would be most conducive to easy and predictable interpretation by foreign
courts. Moreover, foreign courts of different countries may use each other's
interpretations of such laws as precedent.
Under both of my proposals, one question remains: what priority should be
given to the residual amount of the claim that is not allowed in the foreign court?
In the first example, if the French government's claim for fines for Nazi
paraphernalia is disallowed by the United States, should France be allowed to give
it higher priority in its domestic proceeding? Conversely, should the U.S. creditor
be allowed to increase the priority of its claim for $1 million of contract damages
that it would not get under the Japanese measure of reliance? My answer to that is
that no special priority should be given in domestic proceedings to such claims. In
the simple examples that I provided, higher priority may not present an issue. But
imagine a proceeding where the debtor files in dozens of countries, some of which
allow the claim and some of which do not. How does one set the threshold about
the elevation of the claim's priority domestically? By the number of allowing
countries? By their percentage of the total? By the amount or percentage of assets
based therein? In any event, the elevation of domestic priority of such claims is
likely to cause more problems that it would solve. But if elevated priority is in fact
granted (and domestic political pressures may well end up dictating such a result),
such priority must be granted based on clear and explicit criteria and numerical
thresholds that would allow ex ante predictability of the claim's fate.
VI. CONCLUSION
Having established a need for a transnational bankruptcy system, we have
turned to a brief survey of various regimes in scholarship and practice. We
examined the regime that begins to show signs of widespread adoption - the
UNCITRAL Model Law - and concluded that, while an improvement over prior
law, it does not provide the most efficient resolution to the problem.
We then examined the various theoretical frameworks on which a
transnational bankruptcy regime may be based. We looked at classic territoriality,
and concluded that it offers a moderately predictable system, and it is fair to local
creditors who are allowed to litigate their claims in a local forum. But our praise
for the regime was tempered by three strong reservations: that it is too costly, that
it provides incentives for harmful strategic behavior, and that it causes inefficient
allocation of capital in borrowing and investment decisions. We acknowledged
that territoriality is largely the rule in the status quo, but we hesitated to embrace it
because of its drawbacks.
We then looked at universality and explored the advantages that make it so
appealing to many academics. The idea of a single proceeding in a single country
that would dispose of the entire case, without the costly duplication of effort,
seemed attractive. Equally attractive seemed the promise of universality to
eliminate forum-shopping by debtors (who would be forced to file in their home
country) and the elimination of their ability to escape justice by moving assets
around. But we were then forced to reject universality because in reality, it would
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create more insidious forms of forum-shopping than it would prevent, and collapse
into complete unpredictability with respect to the outcomes that it delivers.
Moreover, universality cannot adequately deal with a world economy dominated
by corporate groups that are compartmentalized by country, and cannot adequately
protect the interests of local creditors whose only avenue for protecting their
interests in a purely domestic dispute would be to litigate in a foreign forum.
Accordingly, universality was not the answer. Neither was corporate-charter
universality, a close cousin of classic universality, because while it addressed
many of universality's flaws, it could not provide adequate treatment for tort
creditors. Further, it was likely to reduce competition in the credit market by
imposing disproportionate costs on smaller creditors. We then briefly examined
and rejected a solution based on the creation of an international bankruptcy court
as practically unworkable.
Finally, we looked at cooperative territoriality. We concluded that
cooperative territoriality captured all of the advantages of classic territoriality and
reduced many of its drawbacks. We examined the model proposed by Lynn
LoPucki and concluded it to be workable with several modifications. Finally, we
explored those modifications - specifically a streamlining of the claim allowance
process based on a "comity plus" model, a fraudulent transfer agreement, and a
two-step process for allowing claims whose amount is disputed - and concluded
that, while far from flawless, the modified cooperative territoriality approach was
likely to work best for transnational insolvency proceedings.
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In December of 2006, thousands of Hezbollah supporters crowded the streets
of Beirut, angrily demanding that Prime Minister Siniora's government step down.
This followed several months after armed members of Hezbollah crossed the
Lebanese border into Israel and murdered three Israeli soldiers and kidnapped two
others, precipitating the July War of 2006. In Iraq, Shi'a death squads - including
members of Muqtada al-Sadr's militia - roam the streets of Baghdad, murdering
Sunni Arabs and suspected collaborators of the U.S. led coalition. They, along
with well placed Sadr supporters in the Iraqi government, seek to change the shape
of the political landscape in Iraq, guaranteeing Shi'a dominance. In the Gaza Strip
in June 2006, members of Hamas crossed underground into Israel, killed two
Israeli soldiers, and kidnapped a third. Only six months prior to this, Hamas won a
landslide victory in parliamentary elections. Each of these groups - Hezbollah,
Mahdi's Army, and Hamas - is a non-state armed group that is financially,
politically, and ideologically supported by Iran. As such, their actions may be
attributed to Iran.
Iranian support of non-state armed groups is not limited to the three groups
listed above. In fact, Iran provides support to groups all over the world in what has
become a cornerstone of its foreign policy. By supporting these groups, Iran seeks
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to accomplish multiple objectives, including: increasing Iranian influence in the
Middle East while limiting Sunni Arab influence, destroying Israel, and limiting or
eliminating U.S. influence in the region.
The level of sophistication of Iran's approach to indirect aggression is
particularly noteworthy. Rather than using their own armed forces and engaging in
open hostilities with adversaries, Iran cultivates non-state armed groups within the
territory of, or directly adjacent to, other States. These non-state armed groups
develop parallel military and political branches to rival the target State they seek to
destabilize or overthrow. Iranian-backed armed groups are not limited, as are other
State sponsored groups, to the blunt use of force to achieve its strategic objectives.
Surprisingly, Iran's use of non-state armed groups as an extension of its
foreign policy has not met significant deterrence. Many still believe that
aggression can only be committed when a State openly attacks another State with
military force, a misperception ofjus ad bellum law. This paper suggests a closer
analysis of what constitutes unlawful aggression under international law.
Specifically, the issue is whether State support of non-state armed groups as a
means of threatening the territorial integrity or political independence of another
State constitutes unlawful aggression.
Several aspects of Iran's involvement with non-state armed groups must be
discussed before reaching these determinations. The general framework of these
groups and a detailed discussion of Iran's support to Hezbollah, Iraqi insurgents,
and Hamas are found in Section II. Iran's strategic objectives as well as its
sophisticated use of armed groups are discussed in Section III. Whether Iran's use
of non-state armed groups against target States amounts to aggression is analyzed
in Section IV. The final section, Section V, provides recommendations and
conclusions for policy and law-makers interested in deterring Iran's use of armed
groups as a means of foreign policy.
II. THE UNLAWFUL NATURE OF NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS & IRANIAN SUPPORT
Iran is responsible, financially and materially, for a new Shi'a strength in the
Middle East due largely to its support of non-state armed groups.2 Jordan's King
Abdullah voiced concern over Iran's new "crescent" of influence running from
Tehran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon.3 This is a sentiment shared by many
Arab leaders, including King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak.4
Non-state armed groups can be categorized into four different groups:
insurgents, terrorists, militias, and criminal organizations.5 The emergence of the
increased capabilities of armed groups to attack States in the post-Cold War era




5. RICHARD H. SHULTZ, JR. ET AL., ARMED GROUPS: A TIER-ONE SECURITY THREAT, U.S. AIR
FORCE INST. FOR NAT'L SEC. STUD. 16, INSS Occasional Paper 57 (2004), available at
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had a powerful impact on the State system. 6 Similarly, Iran's use of these groups
introduces a new threat within that paradigm. Iran exploits four of the basic
characteristics of non-state armed groups to achieve its strategic goals. These
characteristics include: challenging the legitimacy of the State, using force as a
primary instrument, maintaining local and global capabilities, and failing to
recognize democratic principles and the rule of law.7 Iran, however, changes this
dynamic by using armed groups to undermine State legitimacy through methods
other than the open use of force.
Historically, armed groups have used force as their primary method of
threatening a State's political independence. In 1977, the United Nations (U.N.)
Security Council condemned the unlawful aggression committed by mercenaries
against the Republic of Benin. 8 While direct attacks against a State are sometimes
committed, these groups tend to employ indirect and prolonged violence to exert
their influence. This is the case in Colombia, Lebanon, and the Philippines. 9
Some non-state armed groups attempt to legitimize their efforts by
establishing a political wing and by providing public services. This can result in a
State within a State, as was the case of the Maoist Rebels in Nepal. 10 Of these
attempts at legitimacy, one expert comments:
It is true that some armed groups maintain political and paramilitary
wings and that the former may, for tactical reasons, eschew violence.
Still, the use of force is a critical instrument for these organizations,
regardless of how they may seek to mask that fact. Violence is used
instrumentally to achieve political and/or other objectives. 1
In his article, "Era of Armed Groups," Richard H. Schultz discusses six
defining aspects of armed groups. They are: leadership, rank and file membership,
organizational structure and functions, an ideology or political code of beliefs and
objectives, strategy and tactics, and links with other non-state and State actors.
12
The following Section focuses on the last of these, namely, Iran's ties to non-state
armed groups.
A. Hezbollah, Iraqi Insurgents, & Hamas
Typically, non-state armed groups are used by States to supplement regular
armed forces. Iran, however, uses non-state armed groups as a central component
of its foreign policy. 13 By providing these groups with a combination of political,
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id. at 13-17.
8. S.C. Res. 405, U.N. Doc. S/RES/405 (Apr. 14, 1977).
9. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., The Era Of Armed Groups, in THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
INTELLIGENCE 1, 1 (2005) [hereinafter Shultz, Armed Groups].
10. IRINNEWS.ORG, Nepal: Rebels accused of running parallel government, Sept. 14, 2006,
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=61695; See also BBCNEwS, Nepal Maoists Disband
Government, Jan. 18, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/sout-asia/6273535.stm.
11. Shultz, Armed Groups, supra note 9, at 10.
12. Id.
13. See James M. O'Brien, Exporting Jihad: Iran's Use of Non-State Armed Groups 3 (Mar. 29,
2006) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Tufts University) (on file with The Fletcher School, Tufts University).
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ideological, financial, and military backing, Iran exercises a unique sophistication
in threatening the political independence of States. Rather than using direct force -
and not as innocuous as winning elections - these groups undermine the legitimacy
of recognized governments through their actions. 1
4
Some of the groups that Iran supports include: the Armed Islamic Group in
Algeria, Hamas in the Palestinian territories, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Islamic
Courts in Somalia, and several insurgent groups in Iraq such as the Badr
Organization and Mahdi's Army. For the purpose of brevity, this paper will limit
its focus to Hezbollah, Mahdi's Army and the Badr Organization in Iraq, and
Hamas.
B. Hezbollah: A Threat to International Law & Politics
The most prominent non-state armed group backed by Iran is the Lebanon-
based Hezbollah organization, designated by the U.S. Department of State as a
foreign terrorist organization.' 5  But to categorize Hezbollah merely as an
organization that commits acts of terrorism is to overlook its dual threat to regional
stability - the military and political aspects of the organization. 16 Members of
Hezbollah's political wing hold seats in the Lebanese parliament and serve in
Prime Minister Siniora's cabinet. The organization also maintains social
institutions and provides basic services for southern Lebanon. In fact, it is a
parallel political and military organization to Lebanon's duly elected
government. 17
Hezbollah was Iran's first use of a non-state armed group to achieve its
strategic goals. 8 Closely following the aftermath of Iran's revolution several
years before, Hezbollah was created in 1982 as a result of Israel's invasion of
Lebanon.19 Its ideology consisted of protecting the Lebanese Shi'a population
from Israeli occupation and expanding Iran's brand of Shi'a extremism.
During the Lebanese Civil War, Hezbollah carried out attacks against Israeli,
Western, and other targets suggesting Iranian involvement. These attacks include:
the 1983 suicide bombings of French Headquarters and U.S. Marine barracks in
Beirut, killing 58 French soldiers and 241 Marines; the 1984 hijacking of an Air
France passenger jet; and the 1988 bombing near Saudi Arabian Airlines offices in
Kuwait City - likely a result of Saudi Arabia's severance of diplomatic ties with
Iran just weeks before.2 °
14. Id. at 91-95.
15. OFFICE OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, FACT SHEET: FOREIGN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS (Oct. 11, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191 .htm.
16. See O'Brien, supra note 13, at 93-95.
17. Susan Sachs, Hezbollah Offers a Helping Hand in Southern Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES, May 31,
2000, at A3.
18. O'Brien, supra note 13, at 58.
19. CNN.COM, Hezbollah: Violence mixed with social mission, July 17, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/07/13/hezbollah/index.html.
20. ELY KARMON, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR EAST POL'Y, 'FIGHT ON ALL FRONTS': HIZBALLAH,
THE WAR ON TERROR, AND THE WAR IN IRAQ 4-11, Policy Focus No. 45 (Dec. 2003).
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Following the end of Lebanon's civil war in 1989, Hezbollah was permitted
to keep its arms under the Taif Accord in order to continue fighting the Israeli
occupation of southern Lebanon. 21 During the 1990s, Hezbollah's leader, Sheikh
Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, developed the organization into a more effective
fighting force with international reach.
22 Under his leadership, Hezbollah's
network has conducted attacks or operations in Saudi Arabia, South America,
Canada, Sweden, and several Asian States. 23 These attacks are closely linked to
Iran.24
In spite of Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah
retained its militant wing.25 In fact, they stockpiled thousands of medium and long
range rockets and missiles, and continued lending operational support to the
Palestinian intifada.26 Hezbollah claims it cannot disarm since it is responsible for
preventing further attacks by Israel.
27
Today, the Lebanese government refuses to seize Hezbollah's assets or arms
despite U.S. pressure, claiming they are a legitimate resistance movement and
political party.28 This unwillingness to disarm is in direct contravention of U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1559.29
The July War of 2006, initiated by Hezbollah against Israel, demonstrated
Hezbollah's current political and military strength. First, it was evident that, while
smaller in size, Hezbollah is a formidable force against stronger adversaries,
including the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).3° Second, it showed that Lebanon does
not have the military strength or political capital to reign in Hezbollah if it truly
wanted to. 31 Finally, Hezbollah enjoys unwavering popular support from large
parts of Lebanon, particularly the Lebanese Shi'a community.32
21. ANDREW EXUM, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR EAST POL'Y, HIZBALLAH AT WAR: A MILITARY
ASSESSMENT 2, Policy Focus No. 63 (Dec. 2006) [hereinafter HIZBALLAH AT WAR].
22. See id.
23. KARMON, supra note 20, at 9-11. Hezbollah was responsible for the terror attacks in Buenos
Aires in 1992 and 1994 and the bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996, which housed
a U.S. military complex. Hezbollah's international operations also extend to the "tri-border area",
where Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay share a border. Also, Hezbollah cells in Colombia are known to
use drug trafficking and contraband networks to launder funds later used to finance terrorism. Id. at 2,
9-10. See also SHULTZ, TIER ONE, supra note 5, at 59-61.
24. Matthew Levitt, Lecture at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy: Iran and Syria: State
Sponsorship in the Age of Terror Networks (Mar. 7, 2005) (transcript available at the website of the
Wash. Inst. for Near East Policy., http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=230.).
25. HIZBALLAH AT WAR, supra note 21, at 2.
26. See KARMON, supra note 20, at 24.
27. Graham E. Fuller, The Hizballah-Iran Connection: Modelfor Sunni Resistance, 30 WASH. Q.
139, 144 (Winter 2006-2007). Hezbollah also claims that its military wing is necessary to liberate the
small territory known as Shebaa Farms, which is occupied by Israel, recognized as Syrian, but claimed
by Lebanon. Id.
28. KARMON, supra note 20, at 23.
29. S.C. Res. 1559, 1 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1559 (Sept. 2, 2004).
30. See HIZBALLAH AT WAR, supra note 21, at 5.
31. Id. at 8.
32. Hussein Dakroub, Hezbollah allies claim win in Lebanon, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 6, 2005.
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The strength of Hezbollah's political wing should not be underestimated. In
June of 2005, Hezbollah won all 23 seats available in Parliament for the southern
portion of Lebanon. 33 As a result, Hezbollah has gained some legitimacy in the
international community. While some States categorize Hezbollah as a terrorist
organization (U.S. and Australia), others, at least partially, recognize the political
wing (U.K.). 34 To date, the United Nations and the European Union have also not
designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.35
Hezbollah's political power is a direct threat to the established Lebanese
government. If it were to continue its social services in the South and limit its
actions to those of a traditional political party, there would be little concern.
However, Hezbollah's motives have never been so benign. Although peaceful, the
protests held in Beirut in December 2006 were a precursor to what could be more
coercive means to remove Prime Minister Siniora's government.36 In fact,
Hezbollah and its political allies continue to demand a greater voice in Siniora's
cabinet." 7 Some claim the political standoff is partly a remnant of sectarian
divisions unresolved since the civil war,38 and partly a result of pro-U.S. officials
(Siniora) pitted against pro-Iranian and Syrian groups (Hezbollah).
39
The recent moves by Hezbollah to seize more control in Beirut must be
viewed in light of Iranian support. Martin Kramer, adding to a quote from Richard
Armitage, stated, "If Hezbollah is the A-team [of terrorism], Iran is the team owner
and Syria is the coach."4 °  Iran offers a full range of support to Hezbollah,
including political, economic, and military assistance.4  The relationship between
the two could not be more clear. At a meeting with Iranian Supreme Leader
Khamenei in 2001, Nasrallah publicly kissed Khamenei's hand - a sign among
Shi'a Muslims that Nasrallah accepts Khamenei as his leader.42
Without Iran's financial and military assistance, Hezbollah would not be the
organization it is today. Iran provides Hezbollah with at least $100 million per
year,43 and has also provided approximately 11,000 rockets to their arsenal."
33. Id.
34. Nigel Brew, Def. and Trade Group, Foreign Affairs, Hezbollah in Profile, Parliament of
Australia, Research Note no. 42 2002-03, June 2, 2003, http://www.aph.gov.au/Library/Pubs/m/2002-
03/03m42.htm.
35. Id.
36. Anthony Shadid, Protest Crowds Surge as Beirut Braces for Next Step, WASH. POST, Dec. 11,
2006, at A13.
37. Id.
38. Tensions between Sunni and Shia in Lebanon were relatively calm until the assassination of
former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, a respected Sunni leader. Sunni's blame one of Hezbollah's key
sponsors, Syria, for the killing. See Ghosh, supra note 2.
39. Shadid, supra note 36.
40. KARMON, supra note 20, at 49 (citing Martin Kramer, Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars Conference: The Terrorism of Hizbollah: Ideology, Scope, Threat
(Jan. 16, 2003)).
41. KARMON, supra note 20, at 17.
42. Mehdi Khalaji, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR EAST POL'Y, Iran's Shadow Government in Lebanon,
PolicyWatch No. 1124 (July 19, 2006) [hereinafter Iran's Shadow Government].
43. David Makovsky, Iran's Hand in Lebanon, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., July 23, 2006, at G-1.
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Beyond merely giving arms and equipment, Iran provides the expertise of its
special forces. Since Hezbollah's founding, its members have conducted regular
training exercises with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).45
Conversely, Hezbollah's achievements have helped strengthen the hardliners
in Iran who actively engage in anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli policies.46 The 2000
Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the de facto victory of Hezbollah in
the July War of 2006 have emboldened Tehran.47 Analysts agree that Iran pushed
for Hezbollah and Hamas to instigate a confrontation with Israel in 2006 in order
to draw attention away from increased international pressure on their nuclear
ambitions. 48 Even the former Hezbollah Secretary General, Sheik Sobhi Tufeili,
claims Hezbollah has now become a pawn to Iran.49
Iran's use of Hezbollah as an extension of its foreign policy allows a great
deal of strategic flexibility. This is due, in large part, to Hezbollah's ability to
ignore international law with relative impunity. Hezbollah regularly engages in
terrorism, criminal enterprises, and violates the laws of war.5° Furthermore,
Hezbollah directly violates the mandate of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559
by maintaining its militant wing. This resolution calls for the removal of all
foreign troops from Lebanon and disarmament of all militia. 51 Resolution 1559
has had little influence over the status of Hezbollah's arms and has done nothing to
stop outside support from both Syria and Iran.
52
This unwavering support translates into political capital for Hezbollah.
Flexing its political muscle, Hezbollah influenced the Siniora government after the
Cedar Revolution of 2004, which effectively ousted Syrian troops from Lebanese
soil. Shortly after the Cedar Revolution, Hassan Nasrallah arranged for three of
his party members to be part of the Siniora cabinet, all while Hezbollah kept its
strategic relationship with Syria. 53  Over the next six months, politicians and
journalists who supported the Cedar Revolution were assassinated via car bombs.1
4
Analysts believe this was to demonstrate to the anti-Syrian politicians in Lebanon
that there would be no obstructing Iranian-Syrian assistance to Hezbollah.55 This
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. KARMON, supra note 20, at 17.
47. Posting by Walid Phares to Counterterrorism Blog, Hizbollah's Iranian War in Lebanon,
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2006/07/hizbollahsiranian-war in-leba.php (July 22, 2006, 01:50
PM).
48. Id. See also Makovsky, supra note 43.
49. Steve Schippert, Iran Fueling Hamas and Hizballah Toward Conflict, THREATSWATCH.ORG,
Dec. 8, 2006, http://inbrief.threatswatch.org/2006/12/iran-fueling-hamas-and-hizball/.
50. KARMON, supra note 20, at 17.
51. S.C. Res. 1559, 2-3, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1559 (Sept. 2, 2004). See also Adel Darwish,
Hezbullah and Israel: The Proxy War, MIDEASTNEWS, July 2006,
http://www.mideastnews.com/LebanonO6july.html.
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terror seemingly persuaded the Lebanese government to not implement the
measures in Resolution 1559.56
At least one analyst is more concerned with the political and ideological ties
between Hezbollah and Iran than with disbanding Hezbollah's military wing. 57 It
is believed that only total severance with Iran will eliminate Iran's use of
Hezbollah as a threat to the region. Severing these ties, however, will prove
difficult because, in the war of ideas, Hezbollah and Iran clearly have the initiative
in Lebanon.
Ironically, Hezbollah's and Iran's popularity in Lebanon is due more to the
public services they provide than to their collective military strength.58 This stems
from the early 1980s, when Iran first helped Hezbollah build broadcasting,
healthcare, and educational centers. Iran also founded several hospitals and
charitable organizations in southern Lebanon, which work closely with Hezbollah.
With Iran's support, Hezbollah is able to provide for the basic needs of the people
where the Lebanese government cannot.59
Iran is careful to cultivate future relationships as well. Every year hundreds
of Hezbollah affiliated Lebanese students attend political and religious training at
Iranian universities and seminaries.6 0 The faithful Shi'a in Lebanon also have
close ties to Iran. While Ali Hussein al-Sistani is respected as the most important
ayatollah in Shi'a Islam, his presence in Lebanon is limited since he is based in the
holy city of An Najaf, Iraq. In contrast, Iran receives religious taxes from
Lebanese Shiites, and it pays monthly salaries to the Shiite clerics of Lebanon,
thereby securing their loyalty.6'
In addition, Iran is responsible, financially and materially, for a new Shi'a
strength in the region.62 Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran, Syria,
and Hezbollah were able to rely on their close Shi'a ties in the region as a counter
weight to U.S. policy in the region. In fact, many Shi'a organizations in Iraq
already had financial and operational ties to Hezbollah prior to the U.S. invasion.
63
Several years later, after Hezbollah's impressive tactical and strategic successes in
the July War of 2006, many fear that other groups, particularly the Iraqi militias,
will emulate Hezbollah. 64 In fact, Muqtada al-Sadr, radical Shi'a cleric and leader
of Mahdi's Army in Iraq, publicly supported Hezbollah during this conflict, and
56. Id.





62. Ghosh, supra note 2.
63. See KARMON, supra note 20, at 33.
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members of the Mahdi Army have allegedly accepted training from Hezbollah in
Lebanon and Iraq.65
C. Iraqi Insurgent Groups: Mahdi's Army & Badr Organization
Iran's support of non-state armed groups profoundly impacts the ongoing
conflict in Iraq. Groups such as Mahdi's Army and the Badr Organization not only
enjoy public support among disenfranchised Shi'a, but also maintain strong
militant forces to combat coalition forces and Sunni insurgents. Each group holds
key positions in the current Iraqi government, led by Prime Minister Nouri al
Maliki. Similar to Iran's support of Hezbollah, these organizations operate with
relative impunity, which allows Iran to use them to pursue its strategic objectives
at a safe distance from the law.
The Iraqi insurgent groups most favored by Iran are Mahdi's Army and the
Badr Organization. Mahdi's Army was formed in the summer of 2003 and is
comprised of the armed followers of the cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.66 Currently, it is
estimated that its forces are at least several thousand strong. 67  At al-Sadr's
direction, Mahdi's Army commits acts of terrorism and targets U.S., U.K., and
Iraqi forces.68 The fiercest outright clashes between coalition forces and Mahdi's
Army came in April and August 2004.69 The Badr Brigade - later renamed the
Badr Organization - was founded in 1982 as the armed wing of the Supreme
Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which was established by Iran to
oppose Saddam Hussein's regime.70
Unquestionably, the Iraqi insurgent groups are known violators of the laws of
war. During the standoff with coalition forces in An Najaf in August 2004, al-Sadr
and Mahdi's Army took up fighting positions in and around one of Shi'a Islam's
holiest sites, the Imam Ali mosque. 71 This is a clear violation of international
humanitarian law.7 2  More recently, U.S. and Iraqi forces arrested the deputy
health minister, who is a key member of al-Sadr's Mahdi's Army. He is accused
of aiding militiamen and moving weapons in ambulances.73 Perhaps most
egregious is the ethnic cleansing committed by the "death squads" of both Mahdi's
Army and the Badr Corps. Radical Shi'a elements in the region applaud al-Sadr's
65. Id. at 2.
66. See GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, Al-Mahdi Army /Active Religious Seminary / Al-Sadr's Group,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-sadr.htm.
67. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, Mahdi Army,
http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?grouplD=4437.
68. GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, supra note 66.
69. See id.
70. KARMON, supra note 20, at 33. See also IRAN Focus, Iran is Behind Badr Brigade in Iraq,
Nov. 17, 2005, http://www.iranfocus.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=4461.
71. CNN.coM, Who is Muqtada al-Sadr?, Aug. 13, 2004,
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/O8/13/iraq.alsadr/.
72. Human Rights Watch, Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq 73,
HRW Index No. 1564322939, Dec. 2003.
73. BBCNEWS, Top Iraqi Official Held in Raid, Feb. 8, 2007,
http://news.bbe.co.uk/2ihi/middle-east/6341321.stm.
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role in the sectarian conflict in Iraq, where his militia is likely responsible for
thousands of Sunni deaths.7 4
Al-Sadr's political strength is derived from his popular support among the
poor Shi'a in Iraq. Al Sadr's family successfully portrays itself as doing the most
to redress decades of suppression by Sunni muslims under Saddam Hussein's
rule.75 Mahdi's Army wins support in places like Sadr City, a slum in northeast
Baghdad of about two million people. In addition to protection against Sunni
insurgents, they provide basic necessities such as cooking gas, and services like
fixing drains.76  Al-Sadr spends significant resources, donations from his
followers, on orphans and poor families.77 In addition, he has established a
78network of social institutions since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime.
Controlling both the Health and Transportation Ministries facilitates al-Sadr's
legitimate support for his social endeavors. 79 As a result, Sadr City has become a
State within a State, not unlike Hezbollah's influence in southern Lebanon. 0
Today, al-Sadr enjoys considerable political cover. Previous attempts by
coalition forces to target al-Sadr and his Mahdi's Army have been stifled by Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki. 81 In fact, Prime Minister Maliki owes his position to the
swing votes of al-Sadr loyalists in the parliament.
82
Politics have become the favored refuge of Mahdi's Army. It is characteristic
of its members to lie low and return to politics so as not to incur the full wrath of
the coalition. In late January 2007, following President Bush's announcement of
the coalition "surge,"" they did just that. The 30 parliamentary members of the
Sadr bloc returned to politics after a two month boycott.8 4 Many believed this was
to avoid the brunt of the U.S. "surge," while others think al-Sadr is building more
leverage in anticipation of political pressure on his movement.85 Al-Sadr himself,
74. Ghosh, supra note 2.
75. GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, supra note 66.
76. Andrew North, US Seeking Support in Sadr City, BBCNEWS, Mar. 7, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/6425171 .stm.
77. Michel Nawfal, Iran and Muqtada al-Sadr's Movement - Driving the Americans Into a
Corner in Iraq, BEIRUT AL-MUSTAQBAL, Apr. 10, 2004 (Open Source Center trans., on file with
author).
78. Id.
79. Jeffrey Bartholet, How Al-Sadr May Control U.S. Fate in Iraq, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 4, 2006,
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15898064/site/newsweek/print/l/displaymode/10 98 .
80. North, supra note 76.
81. Id.
82. Bartholet, supra note 79.
83. See President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (Jan. 10, 2007), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/O1/20070110-7.html [hereinafter President's Address].
84. CNN.com, 25 U.S. troops die on one of deadliest days in Iraq, Jan. 21, 2007,http://Www.cnn-corn/2007/WORLD/meast/01/21/lraq.main/index.html.
85. See Mike Wooldridge, New Pressure on Mehdi Army, BBCNEWS, Jan. 24, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/ 6 2 9 6 0 9 7 .stm.
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however, remains out of the political sphere so he can develop his two-front
strategy: develop his militia while his followers operate in politics.
Iran's support for Shi'a militias was clear in the early stages of the Iraq
conflict. Ayatollah Ali Hossein Khamenei declared on April 11, 2003, that Iran
would not "remain neutral between the Iraqi people and the occupiers. 
,
86
Primarily, Iranian ambitions in Iraq are to protect and promote the interests of the
Shi'a, and frustrate the efforts of the U.S.-led coalition. 87 In spite of the Persian-
Arab divide, Iranian ties to Iraqi Shi'a opposition dates back to the founding of the
SCIRI's militant wing, the Badr Organization, in 1982." 8
As early as April 2004, Iranian diplomatic sources stated that "certain Iranian
circles wish to push the United States into an Iraqi comer to avert any serious U.S.
challenge to Iran in the near future, which is a normal thing to do." 89 The same
source responded to a question about Tehran's link to al-Sadr's group: "The United
States came to Iraq [to put pressure on Iran].... For its part, Iran wishes to see the
United States driven into a comer in Iraq." 90 Al Sadr's movement is a relative
unknown to the U.S. in comparison to other groups in the Iraqi government, both
politically and militarily. It is a "hidden force." 91 Al-Sadr claimed that if Iran
were attacked by the United States, then Mahdi's Army would come to its defense.
Al-Sadr made this announcement from Tehran in 2006.92
There is little doubt that Iran supplies arms and ammunition to Shi'a militias
and is committed to seeing the United States fail in Iraq. 93  Iran provides the
Mahdi's Army and the Badr Organization with weapons, mortar shells, and rocket
propelled grenade (RPG) rounds. 94 British intelligence suggests that the Sadr-led
uprising in Najaf, Basra, and other southern Iraqi cities in 2004 was financed by
Iran.95 Iran once relied exclusively upon the Badr Organization in Iraq, but with
recent support to Mahdi's Army it is uncertain whether this has changed.
96
Nonetheless, it is clear that the Badr Organization at one point received operational
and financial support from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in the sum of $3
million per month. 97 In contrast, a Mahdi's Army commander stated that Iran's
help is given to al-Sadr's militia, not because they like them, "but because they
86. KARMON, supra note 20, at 38.
87. Robert Baer, Where's the Smoking Gun on Iran?, TIME.COM, Feb. 13, 2007,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1588810,00.html [hereinafter Where's the Smoking Gun
on Iran?].
88. KARMON, supra note 20, at 33. See also IRAN Focus, supra note 70.
89. Nawfal, supra note 77.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, 'If they pay we kill them anyway' - the Kidnapper's Story, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 27, 2007, at 1.
93. Where's the Smoking Gun on Iran?, supra note 87.
94. Abdul-Ahad, supra note 92.
95. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, Mahdi Army, supra note 67.
96. See Abdul-Ahad, supra note 92.
97. IRANFOCUS, supra note 70.
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hate the U.S." " While Iran supports both organizations, they remain rival
groups.
9 9
In early 2007, the U.S. government took a rare step and openly accused Iran
of providing highly effective roadside bombs to Iraq's militia. It was reported that
the Badr Brigade and Mahdi's Army received and used Explosively Formed
Penetrators (EFPs) and killed about 1780 coalition troops from 2005 to 2006.100
Insurgents also received training on how to implement EFPs in Iranian territory.' 0'
While Iran is generally charged with providing these weapons, the level of
Tehran's direct involvement is unclear. Former U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman General Peter Pace said that these roadside bombs are linked to Iran, but
it is unclear whether top government officials are aware or complicit. 1
02
Because it is given indirectly, Iranian support to Iraq's militia is hard to
detect. American forces arrested and have been holding five IRGC members since
January 11, 2007.103 They claim these five helped the Iraqi opposition target
Americans. However, there is no direct evidence of attacks by the IRGC, largely
because this evidence is so hard to come by. 10 4 This fits Iran's policy of indirect
engagement through non-state armed groups.
Current reports are uncertain as to how deep Iran's connection to Mahdi's
Army is, besides funding and supplying weapons.' °5 What is clear, however, is
that Al Sadr and his militia find sanctuary in Iran. After President Bush announced
the security crackdown in Baghdad 10 6 - or the "surge" - senior Mahdi Army
officials fled to either Syria or Iran.l0 7  Also, Sadr headquarters warned their
supporters to avoid confrontation with the Americans at all cost. 10 8  A senior
advisor to Prime Minister Maliki confirmed that al-Sadr was in Iran. 10 9 This
would not be the first time al-Sadr has met with the hardline Shi'a clerics in
98. Abdul-Ahad, supra note 92.
99. Bartholet, supra note 79.
100. Sharon Behn, 'Rogue' Shi 'ite Militias Using Iranian Bombs, WASH. TIMEs, Feb. 18, 2007, at
A5. See also Michael R. Gordon, Deadliest Bomb in Iraq is Made by Iran, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
10, 2007, at Al; BBCNEwS, US accuses Iran over Iraq Bombs, Feb. 11, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2hi/middle_east/6351257.stm; CNN.coM, Gates: U.S. Has Evidence of Iran
Helping Insurgents, Feb. 9, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/02/09/gates.iraq.iran.ap/index.html.
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Conflict with Americans, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2007, at A10.
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Iran. 110
Iran's support of non-state armed groups is not limited to religious affiliation.
It also supports groups that share its strategic interests. The following section
discusses one such non-Shi'a group that Iran supports - Hamas.
D. Hamas: Decades of Violence & A Political Coup
Hamas was founded in the 1960s as an outgrowth of the Muslim
Brotherhood.111 Its founder, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, started the group with non-
violent practices, but he took the group in a more radical, violent direction in the
early 1980s. 112 The Charter of Hamas, released in 1988, leaves no doubt about its
goals, including: dedication to creating an Islamic state in Palestinian territory,
which includes all of modem Israel and the Palestine territories. This necessarily
involves the destruction of Israel through violent jihad, the duty of all Muslims." 3
Hamas frequently uses suicide bombs and rocket attacks to attack civilians
and is violently opposed to a peaceful settlement with Israel. However, popular
support for Hamas is substantial. Armed with significant outside financial support,
the group provides extensive networks of social services in the Palestinian
Territories. 114
The political wing of Hamas won a significant victory in January 2006. In the
parliamentary elections, Hamas won 76 of the 132 seats. "15 In spite of the electoral
victory, Hamas continues its aggressive position toward Israel.
In the fall of 2006, Hamas was engaged in a violent power struggle with its
more moderate rival group, al-Fatah. 116 A power-sharing agreement resulted from
a conference in Mecca. Again, Hamas emerged the victor.1 7 The organization
will essentially maintain its foothold over the security force run by Hamas in Gaza,
as well as key political appointees.1 18 Therefore, both its military and political
wings remain strong.
There is ample evidence that Iran now directly supports Hamas. 119 Iran has
sponsored three conferences relating to support for the second Palestinian Intifada,
in 2001, 2002, and 2006.120 More recently, in December 2006, Prime Minister
Ismail Haniyeh (Hamas) was in Tehran meeting with President Mahmoud
110. See Rowan Scarborough, Iran, Hezbollah Support al-Sadr, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 7,2004, at Al.
111. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, Hamas, http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=49.
112. Id.
113. See The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, pmbl., intro., arts. 6-7, 11, 13, 15, 33,
Aug. 18, 1988, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/hamas.htm.
114. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, Hamas, supra note 111.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See Tim McGirk, Hamas Gets the Upper Hand, TIME.COM, Feb. 15, 2007,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1590431,00.html.
118. See id.
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Ahmadinejad. Haniyeh pledged to continue Hamas' violent jihad and refused to
recognize "the Zionist entity" in spite of international pressure to do so. 121
After Hamas won the January 2006 parliamentary elections, the West set out
to isolate the Hamas government by cutting off financial support. 122 Iran quickly
offered to step in and give financial assistance where the United States and the
European Union left off. 123 So far, Iran has given the government at least $120
million in aid since the West cut off financial ties. 124 Iran intends to invest $250
million more in order to upgrade the organization's political and military
capabilities. 125 As the primary supporter of the Hamas government, Iran now has
stronger influence over its political and operational elements.
Military aid is given to Hamas in the form of new technology, training, and
equipment. 126 Iran provides tons of explosives, small arms, and millions of rounds
of ammunition and advanced anti-tank rockets. 127  Under the recently agreed
military arrangement, Iran is also setting up a logistics system for Hamas to help
properly maintain and produce weapons. 128 The aim is to make Hamas as effective
a fighting force as Hezbollah.1
29
Training of Hamas militants occurs in both the Palestinian Territories and
Iran. According to one report, Iranian agents, including a General Officer, were
arrested in Gaza at an Islamic university known to be a Hamas stronghold. The
agents were actively training Hamas activists to make explosives in chemical
labs. 130 Groups of fighters from Gaza also receive training in Syria and Iran at
IRGC bases. 131
Hamas and Iran have reciprocal ties. In 2005, Hamas Chief Khaled Mashaal
vowed that if Iran were attacked by Israel, Hamas would step up attacks. He added
that President Ahmadinejad is courageous for dismissing the holocaust and calling
for Israel to be transplanted to Europe or North America. 132 An Israeli newspaper
121. Schippert, supra note 49.
122. BBCNEwS, Iran Offers Hamas Financial Aid, Feb. 22, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/4739900.stm.
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7.
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128. See Secret Iran-Hamas Agreement, supra note 125.
129. See id.
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2007, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3360122,00.html. During this raid a Hamas
commander responsible for orchestrating the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier near the Gaza Strip last
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reports that, "In effect, the Iran-Hamas agreement constitutes the final and decisive
phase of enlisting Hamas into the broad rejectionist front that Iran is seeking to
establish - a front that already includes Lebanon, Syria, and elements in Iraq."'
' 33
III. IRANIAN OBJECTIVES & TACTICS
Many misinterpret Iran's strategy of using non-state armed groups for erratic
behavior, or "rogue" tendencies. In reality, Iran has a very clear strategic objective
in using non-state armed groups to foment instability, politically and militarily, in
target States. 134 Iran's non-state armed groups' influence is no longer limited to
specific regions; it is now a global threat. While some groups appear to have
divergent interests, each serves Iran's overall policy objectives. 135 This section
reveals that Iran's goals may be similar to other State supporters of insurgent
groups; namely, regional influence and strategic competition, 136 but their tactics
are more sophisticated.
A. Regional Hegemony & Beyond
Iran's goals are clear: increasing Iranian influence in the Middle East while
limiting Sunni Arab influence, destroying Israel, and limiting or eliminating U.S.
influence in the region. The U.S. unwittingly played into Iran's strategic plan by
taking out its two principal rivals in the region - Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and the
Taliban in Afghanistan. Strong allies in Syria and Hezbollah also contribute to
Iran's newfound status in the region. Iran's efforts to go nuclear, if successful,
would undoubtedly send shockwaves through the regional power structure as well.
Destroying Israel and establishing one State in Palestine remains a priority,
and has been at least since the revolution in 1979.137 Iranian support of Hamas, in
spite of the Shi'a-Sunni divide, is a logical extension of this policy. President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is vocal on this point. Shortly after taking office in 2005,
he openly called for Israel to be "wiped off the map."' 138 Following the start of the
July War of 2006, the Iranian paper which most represents the supreme leader
Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Hossayni Khamenei's voice, stated:
Wiping out the Zionist regime is not only a religious and national duty
but a humane one... [P]olitical, logistical and arms support for Hamas
and Hezbollah and sending combatants to the front is the minimum cost
that the Islamic countries must pay for safeguarding their security and
independence. 1
39
http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/009426.php (Dec. 15, 2005, 6:40 AM).
133. Secret Iran-Hamas Agreement, supra note 125.
134. DANIEL L. BYMAN ET AL., RAND CORP., IRAN'S SECURITY POLICY IN THE POST-
REVOLUTIONARY ERA 8, MR-1320-OSD (2001).
135. O'Brien, supra note 13, at 59.
136. DANIEL L. BYMAN ET AL., RAND CORP., TRENDS IN OUTSIDE SUPPORT FOR INSURGENT
MOVEMENTS 23, MR-1405-OTI (2001) [hereinafter TRENDS IN OUTSIDE SUPPORT].
137. AL JAZEERA, Ahmadinejad. Wipe Israel Off Map, Oct. 28, 2005,
http://english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?Archiveld=l 5816.
138. Id.
139. Makovsky, supra note 43.
2008
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
In Iraq, support of the Shi'a majority, including SCIRI, the Badr
Organization, and Mahdi's Army, is the easiest way to cripple U.S. policy
objectives. As long as the United States is preoccupied with Iraq and Afghanistan,
there is little chance that it poses a significant military threat to Iran. Furthermore,
the Islamic Republic cannot be deaf to U.S. public opinion supporting a
withdrawal of forces from Iraq. Critics of the Iraq war are skeptical of the
administration's efforts to link Iran to the Iraqi militias, claiming it is the same
type of hype used prior to the invasion of Iraq. 1
40
Perhaps more disquieting than Iran's objectives are the methods it uses to
achieve them. By undermining existing governments, Iran does not have to fire a
single shot in order to gain regional influence, particularly in Lebanon and Iraq.
Instead, it supports armed groups and their political wings which delegitimize
target States, thereby securing Iranian interests.
B. The Sophisticated Nature of Iranian Support
The methods employed by Iranian-backed armed groups seem to reflect an
unwelcome evolution in the use of insurgents. However, State sponsorship of non-
state armed groups is not a new phenomenon. Prior to World War II, a proxy war
was fought in Spain between Germany and the Soviet Union. Germany's fascist
allies were led by General Franco, who battled the Soviet-backed Republicans in
the Spanish Civil War. 141 Since 1946 there have been at least thirty-two cases of
external participation by States in internal conflicts.142 Another report estimates
that from 1991-2000, State support played a significant role in forty-four
insurgencies. 143
Also, non-state armed groups achieved greater strategic and transnational
capabilities as a result of U.S.-Soviet proxy conflicts during the Cold War.'" In
the post-Cold War era, transitional or declining States are breeding grounds of
lawless, ungovemed areas ripe for control by armed groups. 1
45
State support is not limited to specific geographic locations or to specific
causes. Governments have supported groups in Asia, Africa, Europe and the
Middle East. 146  The reasons behind State support include gaining regional
influence, destabilizing neighbor States, payback, regime change, influencing the
opposition, internal security, prestige, supporting co-religionists, supporting co-
140. General Casts Doubt, supra note 102.
141. Adel Darwish, Hezbullah and Israel: The Proxy War, MIDEASTNEWS.COM, July 2006,
http://www.mideastnews.com/Lebanon06july.html. Darwish compares the Spanish Civil War to the
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142. Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset, 39 J. PEACE RES. 615,
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Conflict and Peace Agreements, 43 J. PEACE RES. 617, 617-31 (2006).
143. TRENDS IN OUTSIDE SUPPORT, supra note 136, at 9.
144. O'Brien, supra note 13, at 29 (citing THOMAS P.M. BARNETT, THE PENTAGON'S NEW MAP:
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ethnics, irredentism, leftist ideology, and plunder. 147
Hezbollah, the Iraqi insurgents, and Hamas all have strong militant wings, but
their primary weapon against their host State is not the use of force. Not
surprisingly, most datasets that track armed conflicts do not consider the type of
support that Iran gives these groups either because a.) an open conflict resulting in
casualties has not yet emerged, b.) Iran's military support is not direct and is
therefore not taken into account, or c.) political and social support intended to
undermine sitting governments is not considered. In fact, two separate datasets that
track State support of insurgencies, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) dataset of 2006148 and
the Rand Report of 2001149 focus on casualties and military effectiveness when
States support rebel groups. A leading expert in non-state armed groups, Richard
H. Shultz, also argues that despite political aspirations, armed groups will always
be defined by their underlying militancy. 150 Iranian support may prove to be the
exception to these standards, and it may be establishing an emerging norm.
Several aspects of Iranian-backed armed groups require closer examination to
determine whether they are indeed breaking new ground. These include the
creation of a State within a State, the non-violent infiltration of the political
system, gaining public support by providing services and financial assistance, and
training forces and maintaining an active intelligence branch. Many other State-
supported armed groups share some of these traits with the Iranian-backed groups,
but none combine them without the underlying threat of armed force to the target
State.
First, both Hezbollah and Mahdi's Army have created a State within a State in
Lebanon and Iraq, respectively. Hezbollah controls most of southern Lebanon,
while Mahdi's Army controls Sadr City in Baghdad and poor, rural areas in
southern Iraq. This aspect of their threat to the target State is not in itself unique.
In Colombia, for example, approximately half of the State's territory has been
abandoned by the government for decades and is controlled by multiple armed
groups. 151 Similarly, in Nepal, Maoist rebels effectively control and run a parallel
government from a large area of the State.
52
The distinction between Hezbollah and Mahdi's Army, and the Colombian
insurgents and Maoist Rebels is outside State support. While the Colombian
insurgents receive minor support from Venezuela and Cuba,153 this support is
147. Id. at 23-40.
148. See generally Harbom et al., supra note 142. For the dataset itself, see CENTRE FOR THE
STUDY OF CIVIL WAR, PRIO, ARMED CONFLICTS VERSION 4-2006 (2006), http://new.prio.no/CSCW-
Datasets/Data-on-Armed-Conflict/UppsalaPRIO-Armed-Conflicts-Dataset/Armed-Conflicts-Od-
Versions/Armed-Conflicts-Version-4-2006/.
149. See TRENDS IN OUTSIDE SUPPORT, supra note 136, at 31.
150. See Shultz, Armed Groups, supra note 9, at 10.
151. SHULTZ, TIER ONE, supra note 5, at 9.
152. BBCNEwS, Nepal Maoists disband government, Jan. 18, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia16273535.stm.
153. TRENDS IN OUTSIDE SUPPORT, supra note 136, at 12.
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limited and does not significantly affect the outcome of the conflict. There is no
indication that the Maoist rebels receive any form of outside State support. 1
54
Second, another key aspect of Iranian-backed armed groups is their political
achievements. Hezbollah and Mahdi's Army succeeded in creating their parallel
governments, in part, by earning seats in the sitting government's parliament.
Similarly, the electoral victory for Hamas in January 2006 means that Hamas did
not need to use force to take power in the Palestinian Territories - they won it
through popular support. While the militant wings of each of these groups remains
a large part of their operations, it is the legitimacy of their political wings and their
ascension to power that most undermines many analysts' reliance on violence as
the measuring stick for insurgent activity.
An historical analogy to a non-violent political takeover is the Anschluss of
Austria by Germany in 1938. The Nuremberg Tribunal found that Nazi-leaders
committed aggressive acts against Austria. 155  The annexation of Austria by
Germany was committed "without the use of armed force: internal subversive
actions and the immediate threat of extreme violence assured in these cases the
'peaceful co-operation' of the governments concerned."' 156 Other insurgent groups
with outside State support have similarly entered into, or taken over, a target
State's political apparatus. Uganda and Rwanda's support of insurgents to
overthrow the Mobutu regime in the Congo is an example. 157  The distinction
between this case and Iranian-supported armed groups is that Hezbollah, Mahdi's
Army, and Hamas did not win political support by threatening their respective
governments with overwhelming force. Even though armed groups by their very
nature do not follow democratic rules, they do seek to take full advantage of their
adversaries who do.' 58 By getting involved with, or actually taking over, the
political apparatus of a State, the Iranian-backed armed groups benefit from
legitimate power, which they can exercise through State institutions that are still
intact - unlike the aftermath of a violent coup.
Third, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Mahdi's Army have all skillfully used much of
their financial resources to fund vast socioeconomic networks, increasing their
influence among the public. 159 This is perhaps the single most important aspect of
the effectiveness of these groups, and the implementation of Iran's strategy. Other
insurgent groups tend to exert their influence over local populations, raising money
by collecting taxes or engaging in illicit criminal enterprises. Examples of these
practices are groups such as Columbia's FARC, the Revolutionary United Front
154. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist,
http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?grouplD=353 1.
155. Judgment, Trial of the Major War Criminals: Before the International Military Tribunal,
Nuremberg, I I.M.T. 171, 186, 194, Nov. 14, 1945-Oct. 1, 1946.
156. DR. C.A. POMPE, AGGRESSIVE WAR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME 21 (1953).
157. TRENDS IN OUTSIDE SUPPORT, supra note 136, at 33. Other examples include Pakistan's
support of the Taliban to topple the Rabbani government in Afghanistan and Russia ousting the United
Tajik Opposition-led government in Tajikistan. Id.
158. SHULTZ, TIER ONE, supra note 5, at 13-14.
159. TRENDS IN OUTSIDE SUPPORT, supra note 136, at 87.
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(RUF) in Sierra Leone, Cambodia's Khmer Rouge, and the Turkish Kurdistan
Worker's Party (PKK). 160 By nurturing public support, the Iranian-backed groups
enlist the loyalties of the community, increasing cooperation with their efforts, and
providing a ready supply of recruits for their cause. They are also ensured a
territorial base of operations.
Fourth, the Iranian-backed armed groups benefit from the training and
intelligence capabilities of the IRGC's Quds force. In particular, Tehran's forces
turned Hezbollah into a formidable armed force with expert intelligence-gathering
capabilities. 161  Hamas and Mahdi's Army will similarly benefit from recent
cooperation with Iran's trainers. The Quds force was created in the early 1980s
with the intent of carrying out Iran's foreign policy - which, at the time, included
training the Badr Organization to carry out attacks against Iraq.,
62 Today they
continue to assist Iraqi insurgent groups gather and manipulate 
intelligence. 163
While other States certainly provide training to insurgents - Pakistan is a standout
example 164 - it is uncertain whether the assistance, especially the intelligence
aspect, is as widespread or effective as that offered by the IRGC. In fact, many
insurgent groups act as sources of intelligence for their sponsor States.' 
65 Iran, on
the other hand, provides specialized training to its sponsor groups in order to
gather and manipulate intelligence for their independent operations. 
166
These four aspects of Iranian support highlight the sophisticated nature of its
strategy. Even though these groups started as militant organizations, their militant
wings do not play the dominant role in undermining their host State as in most
insurgencies. A primary example of a force-based insurgency is the RUF in Sierra
Leone, sponsored by Charles Taylor's former government in Liberia. The RUF
was no more than an armed militia, plundering and pillaging at will, even though
they tried to have a veneer of respect. 167 While not all state-sponsored insurgent
groups are as rudimentary as this, none reach the same level of sophistication as
Iranian-backed groups. This strategy allows Iran to avoid public scrutiny and,
therefore, accountability for violations of international law.
IV. INDIRECT AGGRESSION, IRANIAN RESPONSIBILITY, & POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Iranian support of non-state armed groups should be considered an act of
aggression in violation of international law. In order to make this determination, it
160. Id.
161. Id. at 92. Hezbollah effectively established espionage rings to operate inside Israel after the
withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon in 2000. SHAUL SHAY, THE AXIS OF EVIL: IRAN, HIZBALLAH,
AND PALESTINIAN TERROR 141-42 (2005).
162. RADIO FREE EUROPE, Iran: Expert Discusses Iran's Quds Force and U.S. Charges
Concerning Iraq, Feb. 16, 2007, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2007/02/iraq-
070216-rferl0l.htm. In fact, the Iranian Quds force was active in Afghanistan in the 1980s, Iraq
throughout the 1980s and '90s to undermine Saddam Hussein's regime, Bosnia in the early 1990s, and
Sudan in the early 1990s. Id.
163. Id.
164. TRENDS IN OUTSIDE SUPPORT, supra note 136, at 92.
165. Id. at 98.
166. RADIO FREE EUROPE, supra note 162.
167. SHULTz, TIER ONE, supra note 5, at 24.
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is necessary to briefly discuss the history and modem legal norms governing the
jus ad bellum.
A. Jus Ad Bellum & State Aggression Generally
The laws governing the initiation of armed conflict are considered thejus ad
bellum. 168 This area of law has a rich history dating back to the early Christian and
Islamic teachings, which became known as the "just war" theory. 169 During the
twentieth century, jus ad bellum began to take shape through resolutions passed by
the League of Nations 170 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 171 These treaties sought to
prohibit the aggressive use of force between States in order to promote peace and
security. 172
Today, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits member States from using
aggressive force as an extension of foreign policy. This provision states:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations. 1
73
The Security Council declared, for the first and only time, that a member
committed aggression, or "a breach of the peace" as it were, when North Korea
invaded South Korea in 1950.174 Non-state armed groups can also commit
aggression, as indicated in U.N. Security Council Resolution 405 of 1977.'5
Under Resolution 405, the Security Council used the term "aggression" with
regard to mercenaries who attacked Benin in 1977, but did not name the State that
sponsored the attack. '76
168. See Steven R. Ratner, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello after September 11, 96 AM. J. INT'L L.
905, 905 (2002). In contrast, the jus in bello, also known as international humanitarian law or the law
of war, governs the methods used to conduct armed conflict. See BRIAN OREND, MICHAEL WALZER ON
WAR AND JUSTICE 110-11 (2000).
169. ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE:
BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM 11-16 (1993). See also IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 5 (1963); Charles Clinch, Jihad: How it can save Just War
Doctrine, UCLA INT'L INST., http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=35780.
170. See BROWNLIE, supra note 169, at 71-72, for a discussion of League Assembly resolutions
relating to aggression.
171. Treaty Between the United States and Other Powers Providing for the Renunciation of War as
an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Kellogg-
Briand Pact]. For an in depth discussion of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, see generally BROWNLIE, supra
note 169, at 74-95. See also Steven R. Ratner, Crimes Against Peace, in CRIMES OF WAR BOOK 109
(Roy Gutman et al. eds. 1999), available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/crimes-against-
peace.html.
172. Quincy Wright, The Outlawry of War and the Law of War, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 365, 367-68
(1953).
173. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
174. S.C. Res. 82, U.N. Doc. S/RES/82 (June 25, 1950).
175. S.C. Res. 405, supra note 8.
176. Mohammed M. Gomaa, The Definition of the Crime of Aggression and the ICC Jurisdiction
over that Crime, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 55,65 n.
32 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2004).
VOL. 36:2
IRAN'S USE OF NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS
The General Assembly adopted Resolution 3314 (GA Res. 3314) in 1974 in
order to assist the Security Council in determining when aggression is committed
by States.1 77  Aggression is defined in article 3 of GA Res. 3314 to include:
invasion or attack of armed forces of a State into another State's territory,
bombardment of another State's territory, blockades, an attack on the armed forces
of another State, violating the terms of an agreement between two States when one
State has agreed to allow the other's armed forces on its territory, and one State
allowing another State to use its territory to launch an attack against a third
State. 178  Most relevant to this discussion is article 3(g), which states that
aggression is committed by:
The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups,
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against
another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its
substantial involvement therein. 1
79
While Iranian support of armed groups likely falls within this article, it is
important to recognize the two distinct acts of "indirect aggression" seen in article
3(g).
First, there is the sending of irregular troops, or non-state armed groups, to
another State.' 80 The actions of these groups can be directly attributed to the State
that sent them. This is a "form of direct aggression, in that the State is responsible
for the hostile act, performed by its de facto military corps."' 18' However, the
armed group must commit acts comparable to the "direct use" of force by a State -
both in terms of political independence and territorial integrity - in order for it to
be considered aggression. 1
82
Second, there is "substantial involvement," which includes: training,
equipping, supplying weapons or other equipment, granting economic or financial
aid, and making available or tolerating the use of a State's territory for operational
or supply activities for the armed group.'83
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) appears to identify with the first type
of "indirect aggression." In the 1986 Nicaragua v. United States case, the ICJ
stated that sending by a State of armed bands or groups is to be considered an
armed attack by that State when these attacks are equivalent to a true armed attack
performed by regular forces; the ICJ adds that mere supply of logistical support
would not be considered an act of aggression justifying an armed response.' 84
There must be "effective control" of the armed group for its actions to be




181. Umberto Leanza, The Historical Background, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND
THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 3, 7 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2004).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 7-8.
184. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 65 (June 27). For
additional commentary, see also Leanza, supra note 181, at 8.
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imputable to a State. 185  The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) also considered State responsibility for
non-state actors in the Tadic decision. The Tadic court required "overall control
going beyond the mere financing and equipping of military operations," for there
to be State responsibility. 186
In addition to the "control" requirement, the ICJ accepted an
"acknowledgment" basis for State responsibility in the 1980 case, United States v.
Iran. In that case, the conduct of non-state actors, who took the American consular
staff in Tehran hostage, was attributable to Iran because of the adoption of this
conduct by the Khomeini government.187  Both the "control" and
"acknowledgement" basis for State responsibility have been adopted by the
International Law Commission as customary international law. 1
88
B. Does Iranian Support of Non-State Armed Groups Constitute Aggression?
Iran should be accountable for the unlawful acts of the armed groups it
sponsors. It is unlikely, however, that the actions of these armed groups - with the
exception of Hezbollah - are tantamount to State aggression. Under article 2(4) of
the U.N. Charter and GA Res. 3314 it would seem that groups such as Hezbollah,
Mahdi's Army, and Hamas threaten either the territorial integrity or the political
independence of their host State or their neighbors with the direct and substantial
support of Iran. 189 The fact that these actions are done in a manner that is not
recognized as an unlawful action vis-A-vis a sovereign State is testament to Iran's
exploitation of the rule of law.
Iran's use of Hezbollah and Hamas against Israel fulfills the definition of
aggression under GA Res. 3314. Hezbollah in particular uses direct force against
Israel that is equivalent to the direct use of force by a State. This was evident in
the organization's acts during the July War of 2006.'90 Hezbollah and Hamas each
committed raids that involved the murder and kidnapping of Israeli Soldiers to start
the conflict. 191 This occurred with Iranian backing.' 92 Iran may, therefore, be
responsible for violating the territorial integrity of Israel by killing and kidnapping
IDF Soldiers on Israeli territory and through Hezbollah's launching of Iranian-
supplied rockets into Israel. 193 Hezbollah, while somewhat autonomous, would
not be the military and political force it is today without Iran's support. Moreover,
Iran may be responsible for Hezbollah and Hamas's aggressive acts toward Israel
185. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 65.
186. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94- 1-A, Judgement, 145 (July 15, 1999).
187. U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, at 35 (May 24).
188. G.A. Res. 56/83, 8, 11, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83/Annex (Dec. 12, 2001).
189. U.N. Charter, supra note 174; G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), supra note 177, 3(g).
190. Phares, supra note 47.
191. Id.
192. Id. See also Makovsky, supra note 43.
193. There are two separate groups of rocket attacks to consider. First, those that came before the
murder and kidnapping of IDF soldiers and can be interpreted as part of the initial armed aggression.
Launching the rockets into civilian centers, particularly Haifa, entails a different form of responsibility
than actually initiating the conflict. These would be analyzed under thejus in bello.
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by acknowledging its efforts and reaffirming the goal of "elimination of the Zionist
regime."'94
Iran may also be committing aggression against Lebanon by threatening its
political independence. It is alleged that Hezbollah assassinated political
supporters of the Cedars Revolution with car bombs. 195 If true, this can only be
interpreted as a direct use of force intended to threaten the Lebanese
government. 19 6  Prime Minister Siniora has since refused to force Hezbollah to
disarm under the provisions of Security Council Resolution 1559. This leaves
Hezbollah's militant wing as the de facto armed force in Lebanon - the strength of
which is a result of Iranian weapons supplies. With twenty-six seats in Parliament
and total control over the public services and social structures in southern
Lebanon, it is not surprising that Hezbollah could stage massive protests in
December of 2006 that nearly toppled the current leadership. 197 Beirut has no
option but to allow Hezbollah to maintain its State within a State in southern
Lebanon.
The issue is whether there is an "effective control" or "acknowledgement"
basis for imputing Hezbollah's actions to Iran as required by the Nicaragua and
Hostage cases. 198 At least one analyst argues that Hezbollah is not fully reliant on
Iran. While there is no doubt that the organization originated and grew as a result
of Iranian support and that they share strategic goals, Hezbollah now seems to be
operating more independently. 199 Hezbollah certainly poses a threat to Lebanon's
political independence, but Iran may escape responsibility as long as it does not
acknowledge supporting Hezbollah's aggressive behavior.
The Iraqi insurgent groups, similarly, pose a threat in Iraq. Much like
Hezbollah, however, they have never openly committed attacks against their host
State. Their political aspirations are not per se illegal, nor are their open
denouncements of any U.S.-supported government in Iraq. While they are repeat
offenders of international humanitarian law, which could very well be attributable
to Iran, they are not likely candidates for current interpretations of aggressive
conduct toward a State. Iran, therefore, is able to act through its surrogates with
impunity.
C. Policy Considerations Relating to "Indirect Aggression"
Aggression must be considered in terms of modem day realities. Large scale
traditional wars are quickly becoming the exception rather than the norm. Threats
posed by "internal" or "indirect aggression," recognized in the early years after
194. Sean Yoong, Ahmadinejad: Destroy Israel, End Crisis, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Aug. 3,
2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/03/AR2006080300629.html.
195. Phares, supra note 47.
196. Id.
197. Shadid, supra note 36.
198. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 65 (June 27); U.S.
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, at 35 (May 24).
199. Fuller, supra note 27, at 143.
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WWII, should be considered a national security priority. 200 When determining
which acts constitute aggression, or what deterrence measures need implementing,
the primary objective must always be to protect "the State's independence as
such.,
20 1
In 1953, Dr. C.A. Pompe concluded that, "When statesmen to-day speak of
aggression they include in that concept every method, every action that can lead to
the destruction of the liberty or the loss of territory of a State. 20 2 He adds that the
territorial integrity and political independence of a State "must be seriously
endangered by the use of force if this is to deserve the qualification
'aggression.' 20 3
Under Pompe's definition, Iran's use of armed groups to target the political
independence of weaker States does not fit the classic model of aggression, and
could not be considered armed aggression warranting coercive self-defense
measures. He argues that "States cannot be allowed to answer with military
measures every kind of foreign support or influence on internal attacks against the
established political order and the legitimate government. 20 4 In contrast, others
contend that a causus belli to attack Iran already exists based on its use of armed
groups.20 5  This position is supported by GA Res. 3314 and subsequent
international case law which define State support of armed groups as aggression.20 6
Regardless of whether Iran's support to these groups can be classified as
"aggression," the use of force in this situation is short-sighted. While this paper
argues for a more expansive definition of aggression, particularly in relation to
threats against the political independence of States, the blunt use of force would be
a strategic mistake, highlighting the effectiveness of Iran's more sophisticated
methods. Irrespective of the legality of coercive self-defense measures, the
following section discusses a range of options available to target States of Iranian
aggression, as well as a deterrence framework to be employed by the international
community.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
DETERRENCE
It is uncertain whether Iran's support of non-state armed groups is tantamount
to aggression vis-A-vis these groups' host States. The need to deter Iran's conduct,
however, is clear. While coercive measures have been considered, these are
unlikely to be effective. For one, the use of force seems disproportionate to Iran's
more sophisticated, clandestine operations within the target States. As mentioned
200. POMPE, supra note 156, at 93.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 106.
204. Id. at 111.
205. Michael T. Klare, Three US Reasons to Attack Iran, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Feb. 27, 2007,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/MiddleEast/IB27AkO1 .html.
206. See G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), supra note 177; Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 65 (June 27).
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above, outright armed force has not been Iran's policy. Rather, an equally
sophisticated and multi-faceted approach is required to deter Iran's foreign policy
objectives.
A. Applying the Incentive Theory
In analyzing the causes of war and drafting a deterrence framework, Professor
John Norton Moore applies his "incentive theory.
' 207 This approach, put simply,
balances the incentives affecting decision makers on whether or not to engage in
the aggressive use of force. It looks at three different levels, or "images," of
incentives: the individual, the form of government, and the international system of
deterrence. Even though the focus of this paper is not war as such, the incentive
theory is adaptable to Iran's lower-level aggression: support of non-state armed
groups.
The first image in the incentive theory is the individual. This encompasses
the regime elites in Iran, the leaders of the non-state armed groups it supports, and
the individual citizens that follow these groups.
The regime elites in Iran and the leaders of its non-state armed groups
currently have little incentive to cease their unlawful conduct in Lebanon, Iraq, and
the Palestinian Territories. For its part, Iran is able to externalize the cost of
subverting these governments onto the armed groups themselves. Furthermore,
Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad are enjoying a newfound sense of
regional power, particularly when Hezbollah is extremely popular after the July
War of 2006 against Israel, and the U.S.-led coalition is struggling to bring security
to Iraq.
208
Similarly, the leaders of Iranian-backed insurgent groups have little to fear as
long as they receive top-cover from the Islamic Republic. Nasrallah in Lebanon,
al-Sadr in Iraq, and Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh in the Palestinian Territories all
enjoy popular support in their host States, as well as the cover of political
legitimacy.
An effective way to curb the unlawful and subversive activities of these
groups is through international criminal law. Each of these groups has committed
war crimes and crimes against humanity; for example: Hezbollah's murdering and
kidnapping IDF Soldiers and launching rockets into civilian populations, 20
9 the
murder of civilians through Mahdi's Army death squads, 210 and Hamas' suicide
bombings of Israeli civilians.2 ' Iran is a major sponsor of each of these groups'
criminal endeavors. In fact, Human Rights Watch cited Iran for giving substantial
financial and logistical support to Hamas' suicide bombing campaign. 21 2 For these
207. See generally JOHN NORTON MOORE, SOLVING THE WAR PUZZLE (2004).
208. Barry Rubin, Iran: The Rise of a Regional Power, 10 THE MIDDLE EAST R. INT'L AFF., Sept.
2006, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue3/jvl0no3al 0.html.
209. Phares, supra note 47. See also Makovsky, supra note 43.
210. Ghosh, supra note 2. See also Top Iraqi Official Held in Raid, supra note 74.
211. Human Rights Watch, Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians
64, HRW Index No. 2807, Oct. 2002.
212. Id. at 96.
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actions, the leaders of Iran and the insurgent groups should be held individually
responsible. Effective punishment for blatant violations of international law would
serve as a strong disincentive to continue their unlawful practices.
The individuals who follow Iranian-backed armed groups equally need
disincentives. Hezbollah and Mahdi's Army, in particular, receive unwavering
public support from the local population primarily because they provide social and
financial assistance that the State cannot. This, and their appeal to disenfranchised
Shi'a groups through the idea of armed resistance, has effectively won over the
"hearts and minds" of their people. 213  In regard to the war on terror, some
commentators argue that the international community, especially the United States,
has done little to wage a "war of ideas" in the region.214 Unfortunately, the United
States has little credibility in the Islamic world.215
The Iranian population, similarly, has not been effectively engaged in the
"war of ideas." This is unfortunate, since many Iranian reformists do not, in fact,
support Hezbollah's attempts to provoke Israel or the use of suicide bombings to
kill civilians. 216 It is worth noting that the relationship between Tehran and
Hezbollah cooled - albeit slightly - during the presidency of reformist Muhammad
Khatami. 217  Similarly, in the Palestinian territories, there is at least some
indication that the Palestinian people will not suffer a radical, militant government.
At least one commentator noted that, "The Palestinians did not vote for Hamas so
that it could destroy Israel, but so that it could deal with security, corruption, the
schools, and the water supply.
218
In an effort to win the ideological struggle, the United States and the Western
world need to stay behind the scenes. They must, however, cultivate the moderate
population by discretely offering support to writers, scholars, journalists, and other
intellectuals in the region who also advocate a non-violent, more moderate
approach.21 9
The second image in the incentive theory is the form of government. In terms
of waging major wars, empirical evidence proves that democracies are far less
likely to be the aggressor. 220 Further evidence reveals that non-democracies are
more likely to have slower economic growth, commit crimes against humanity
(including genocide), suffer famines, support terrorism, be corrupt, be involved
with narcotics trafficking, have higher levels of refugee flows, have higher infant
213. O'Brien, supra note 13, at 4.
214. William Rosenau, Waging the "War ofIdeas, " in THE MCGRAw-HILL HOMELAND SECURITY
HANDBOOK 1131, 1138-39 (2006).
215. Id. at 1141. Although Rosenau focuses his analysis on the al Qaeda organization, the lack of
an effective ideological campaign is felt in the broader region.
216. KARMON, supra note 20, at 19.
217. Id. at 18-19.
218. Olivier Roy, The Shock Wave of the Hamas Victory, LE FIGARO (Paris), Jan. 31, 2006, at 16
(Open Source Center trans.).
219. Rosenau, supra note 214, at 1142.
220. MOORE, supra note 207, at 14.
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mortality rates, and have fewer women's rights.221
Many of these problems are seen in Iran's non-democratic theocracy. For
example, in 2004 Iran received a score of 6.1 out of 10 on the economic freedom
index, ranking 80 out of 130 countries surveyed.222 These results are in spite of
Iran's wealth of natural resources. Furthermore, the Islamic Republic has a history
of discrimination towards groups such as the Turkic communities2 23 and
women. 224 The State also employs extreme censorship measures, particularly the
state filtering system regulating the internet, rivaling that found in China.
225
Lebanon, Iraq, and the Palestinian Territories are all fertile ground for Iran's
policy objectives.226 Weak states are chronically prone to insurgent groups that
challenge their authority.227 This plays into the larger struggle in the Middle East
between an attempt at democratization and a new, re-energized resistance front.
The main players are the United States and Iran on either side. It is hoped that,
"Political integration of the Islamist parties is aimed at moving them away from
violence and at preventing terrorism from drawing justification from the political
frustrations of the populations of the Middle East., 228 With their popular support
and abundant resources, the Iranian-backed insurgent groups must be encouraged
to end their violent, extremist methods and move toward legitimate political and
social endeavors. The State governments, meanwhile, must be given the means to
prosecute and dismantle any unlawful militant groups in their territory.229
The third image in the incentive theory is the international system of
deterrence. Effective deterrence can be defined as "a state of mind of the potential
aggressor based on perceptions of an aggregation of external incentives. 23 °
In order to deter the unlawful actions of the Iranian-backed armed groups, the
international community must act cooperatively to supply the sitting governments
with tools necessary to eliminate the militant wings of these groups through
stringent law enforcement. Simultaneously, heavy diplomatic and economic
pressure must be put on Iran, the sponsor of these groups. This can be done in
several ways.
First, the United Nations must follow through on the sanctions regime
imposed on Iran. In March 2007, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted
Resolution 1747, which provides for Iranian cooperation with the International
221. Id. at 60.
222. JAMvES GWARTNEY & ROBERT LAWSON, ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD: 2006 ANNUAL
REPORT 102, available at http://www.freetheworld.com/2006/3aEFW2006ch3A-K.pdf.
223. O'Brien, supra note 13, at 46.
224. On March 4, 2007, women protesters were arrested in front of a courthouse in Tehran. They
were protesting discriminatory policies of the State against women. See BBCNEws, Iran Women
Arrested Over Protest, Mar. 4, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/6416789.stm.
225. O'Brien, supra note 13, at 52-53.
226. See generally GWARTNEY & LAWSON, supra note 222.
227. See SHULTZ, TIER ONE, supra note 5, at 13-14.
228. Roy, supra note 218.
229. This approach presents a particular problem in the Hamas-governed Palestinian Territories.
230. MOORE, supra note 207, at 28.
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Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), bans arms exports from Iran, calls for an end to
new loans, and freezes the assets of key Iranian leaders. 23' The sanctions imposed
in December 2006 in Security Council Resolution 1737 were followed by 150
members of the 290 strong Iranian Majlis (parliament) signing a letter blaming
Iran's current fiscal woes on President Ahmadinejad.232 This is an indication that
external pressure is having an effect.
Second, individual States should put pressure on Iran. For example, the U.S.
Treasury Department banned Bank Saderat from the U.S. financial system in
September 2006.233 Pressure from the international community, such as the joint
statement issued by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice in conjunction with
Egypt, Jordan and six other gulf States warning Iran, has impacted internal politics
of the Islamic Republic.234 Similarly, the recent designation of the IRGC as a
terrorist organization by the United States will put financial pressure on Iran's elite
military unit and primary trainer and intelligence provider to outside armed
groups.
235
Third, pressure must be put on the groups Iran supports. A success story is
the U.S. Treasury designation of Jihad al-Bina - Hezbollah's construction
company in Lebanon.236 This shut the firm out of the international financial
system. Consequently, lenders and donors will not run the risk of rebuilding
Lebanon through Hezbollah, rather than through the legitimate Lebanese
government. 2 37  According to the Treasury Department, "Jihad al-Bina receives
direct funding from Iran, is run by Hizbullah members, and is overseen by
Hizbullah's Shura Council, at the head of which sits Hizballah Secretary General
Hassan Nasrallah.
' 238
Finally, the United States should not be too quick to leave Iraq. Quite
frankly, an unstable Iraq without the presence of coalition forces will be wide open
to Iranian influence. Iran has already stated that the U.S. presence in the region is
their biggest security concern.239 As long as Iran is aware that there is a deterrent
231. S.C. Res. 1747, 1-2, 4, 5, 7, Annex I, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007).
232. Mehdi Khalaji, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR EAST POL'Y, Iran Feels the Heat. International
Pressure Emboldens Tehran's Domestic Critics, PolicyWatch No. 1185, Jan. 18, 2007 [hereinafter Iran
Feels the Heat].
233. Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Treasury, Treasury Cuts Iran's Bank Saderat Off From U.S.
Financial System, HP-87 (Sept. 8, 2006) (on file with the U.S. Dep't of Treasury,
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp87.htm).
234. Iran Feels the Heat, supra note 232.
235. Robin Wright, Iranian Unit to Be Labeled 'Terrorist', U.S. Moving Against Revolutionary
Guard, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2007, at Al.
236. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Treasury Designates Hizballah's Construction Arm
(Feb. 20, 2007) (on file with U.S. Dep't of Treasury, available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp271.htm). See also Gregory S. McNeal, Cyber Embargo:
Countering the Internet Jihad, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LAw 811-816 (2008) (discussing the Treasury
designation process and its use in fighting terrorists and rogue states).
237. See Matthew Levitt, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR EAST POL'Y, Shutting Hizballah 's 'Construction
Jihad', Feb. 20, 2007, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/print.php?template=CO5&CID=2571.
238. Id.
239. O'Brien, supra note 13, at 49.
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force in the region it will be less likely to commit even more heinous crimes.
B. Conclusion
Iran's support of non-state armed groups is an effective method to achieve its
foreign policy objectives. By subverting governments in the region through the
cultivation of these dual political and militant organizations, Iran is able spread its
particular form of Shi'a influence.
Compared to other State supporters, Iran's use of insurgent groups is more
sophisticated and less likely to draw the rebuke of the international community.
Drawing upon public support, Hezbollah, the Iraqi insurgents, and Hamas have
effectively established parallel governments to their host States, gained a foothold
within the legitimate political apparatus, ingratiated themselves with the local
populations with an attractive revolutionary ideology and extensive social services,
and utilized the expertise of the IRGC's Quds force intelligence and training
capabilities.
These actions alone are not enough to meet the standards of unlawful
aggression under accepted interpretations of jus ad bellum law. Other conduct,
such as the attacks against Israel by Hezbollah and Hamas, could very well be
imputed to Iran as aggression, but the political and social subversion of the sitting
governments in Lebanon, Iraq, and the Palestinian Territories does not in itself
warrant coercive self-defense measures. This does not mean, however, that Iran is
not violating international law or that the international community is helpless to
effectuate change.
Incorporating the incentive theory to Iran's unlawful activity is an effective,
multifaceted approach to dealing with a cunning threat. There is a large moderate
population in the region that needs cultivating and support so that the ideologies of
violence and hate do not continue to hold sway. The leaders that support the
undermining of legitimate governments must be held accountable. Encouraging
democratic reform, while maintaining economic pressure, is certain to have a
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INTRODUCTION
The September 11 terrorist attacks ignited global interest in the Muslim
world;' hence the region has become a primary concern for the international
community, with national security bolted to the forefront of the American foreign
policy and that of the rest of the world as well.2 Six years after the attacks on New
York, Pennsylvania and Washington DC, the American perspective has been the
prevailing one in most of the writings about International law and terrorism.
However, the Middle Eastern approach toward international terrorism needs to be
explored carefully in light of the globalization that is taking place everywhere.
The Muslim world - in the post-September 11 era - has been the scene for
major American operations whether in Afghanistan or Iraq. 3 Consequently,
Muslims consider the U.S. to be the major threat to them.4 The populace in the
Middle East contemplates the invasion of Iraq, Afghanistan and the current tension
between Iran and U.S. as major reasons to root in rather than uproot terrorism in
the Middle East. After almost four years of the war on Iraq, international terrorism
has proven to be a pervasive and unconventional enemy, making it evident that the
use of force is no longer the most effective tool in combating it. Free trade,
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economic development, strengthening international law and engaging the Muslim
world could equally solve the problem. These tools have to be considered in the
American portfolio of combating international terrorism.
America, as a global power, has to realize that engaging other parts of the
world, including the Muslim world, in the war on terror is a must. International
terrorism has two sides; 5 Shibley Telhami described the terrorism phenomena as
having two sides, the first is the demand side, where international trade law could
be relevant.6 As free trade agreements are more than liberalizing certain markets,
they have a lot of economic and political ramifications that may defuse the causes
of terrorism in the Middle East. However, this paper does not propose that free
trade is the ultimate solution for terrorism in the Middle East, but rather suggests
that free trade is one of the tools that may provide a way out of the problems that
besiege the region. But it would be meaningless or even harmful if it is not
accompanied with political reform in the region.7 The strengthening of
international treaty law, the law of armed conflict, and engaging the Muslim world
in the fight against terrorism can also help combat the supply side of terrorism.
This paper presents a Middle Eastern perspective for what may be the best
course in the global war on terrorism. Part one illustrates the reasons why terrorism
is more prevalent in Middle East now and the stance of Islam on terrorism. The
second part explores the role of free trade in the development of the Middle East,
applying the case-study of the Middle East Free Trade initiative (MEFTA) and
highlighting the major developments of this initiative and the current challenges
and opportunities awaiting countries in this region. Part three is devoted to
exploring the norms embodied in international law which relate to international
terrorism, and how the U.S. and the Muslim world could jointly work toward
improving the stance of international law norms on terrorism.
I. TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Two polarized approaches compete in the debate on the causes of terrorism in
the Middle East.8 The first one focuses on the root causes, which are simply:
poverty, ignorance, and lack of political expression, which create a breeding
ground for terrorist groups. Consequently this approach calls for a certain set of
priorities in dealing with terrorism, which are political, social and economic
development in the Islamic world. This theory is called the demand side of
terrorism. 9 The second approach denies any economic-socio reasons for terrorist
attacks; it rather presents the threat as a mere security issue, and dealing with this
5. Shibley Telhami, Conflicting Views of Terrorism, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 581, 586-87 (2002).
6. Id. The demand-side of terrorism means terrorist organizations, regardless of their aims, that
need to recruit willing members, raise funds, and appeal to public opinion in pursuit of their political
objectives. The supply-side of terrorism is the product of organized groups that could be confronted and
destroyed, without regard to their aims or to the reasons that they succeed in recruiting many willing
members.
7. John L. Esposito, Political Islam and U.S. Foreign Policy, 20 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 119,
126, 130, 132 (1996).
8. SINGER, supra note 4, at 4.
9. Telhami, supra note 5, at 586-87.
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would invoke intelligence, protection and coercive action. " This is the supply
side." Proponents of the first approach argue that the U.S. is trying to combat an
ideology -created in intense poverty and in a desperate environment- by using
military force. Ideology can only be defeated by a similar or stronger ideology and
by eliminating all the conditions where violent ideology grows. Proponents of the
second approach explain that September 11 hailed primarily from an either upper
or middle/well connected class in their countries.
In this article, I propose that terrorism with its two sides (demand and supply)
should be tackled in international law. The first part will uncover the political and
economic situations in the Middle East, and how the U.S. and Muslim World
perceive each other. It will provide an analysis of how Islamic law could be useful
in the war on terrorism.
A. Politico-Economic Conditions in the Middle East
A complete understanding of why terrorism has a fertile environment in the
Middle East cannot take place without taking into account the political and
economic framework of the countries in this region. The cultural and the historical
development of the Middle East should be highlighted as well. In his article,
Origins of Terrorism, Herbert Kitschelt described The Middle East as a region
which "appears to be trapped in a vicious circle of low growth, bad institutions of
governance, and resistance to economic globalization."' 2 President Bush in the 2 0th
anniversary of the National Endowment of Democracy, announced that "[i]n many
Middle Eastern countries, poverty is deep and it is spreading, women lack rights
and are denied schooling. Whole societies remain stagnant while the world moves
ahead. These are not the failures of a culture or a religion. These are the failures of
political and economic doctrines."1
3
Countries in the Middle East are suffering from daunting challenges; the
ability to absorb the labor force, creating jobs and the increasingly competitive
nature of the global economy, particularly China, India and the Philippines,14 low
levels of foreign direct investment (FDI), lack of technology, industrial
incompetence, high levels of government investment and ownership, and the high
costs of doing business.' 5 After the oil boom in the 1970s, the Middle East
economies shifted from diverse agricultural and textile markets to single
commodity exporters. Great optimism marked the economies of the Middle East in
10. SINGER, supra note 4, at 4.
11. Telhami, supra note 5, at 586-87.
12. Herbert Kitschelt, Origins of International Terrorism in the Middle East, INTERNATIONALE
POLITIK UND GESELLSCHAFT [INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND SOCIETY], Vol. 1 2004, at 159, 163.
13. George W. Bush, U.S. President, Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the
National Endowment for Democracy (Nov. 6, 2003),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html.
14. MARCUS NOLAND & HOWARD PACK, THE ARAB ECONOMIES IN A CHANGING WORLD 19, 46,
48, 102-103 (2007).
15. Id. at 175, 177, 179, 181; Paul G. Johnson, Shoring U.S. National Security and Encouraging
Economic Reform in the Middle East: Advocating Free Trade with Egypt, 15 MINN. J. INT'L L. 457, 459
(2006); Yousef, supra note 1, at 11, 20, 21, 23.
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the early 1990s because gulf war ended, the Madrid conference brought Israelis
and Palestinians together for the first time, and countries in the region started to
adopt IMF and World Bank recommendations. 16 Tarek Yousef reasoned why
political leaders in the region have been reluctant reformers despite the region's
potential. It was obvious to the elite that pursuing economic and political reforms
simultaneously threatened the existing political order. 17 He argued that as a result,
top down management of economic reform replaced earlier efforts to generate
support for economic reform by opening the political arena.' 8 Jonathan Macey and
Ian Ayres argued that the true stumbling block to economic reform in the Middle
East is a divergence between the incentives of rulers and entrenched elites and the
interests of potential entrepreneurs. Economic liberalization will have a
democratizing effect, thus threatening the political and economic insiders. 19
On the political scene, highly undemocratic and stable regimes exist at the
same time. 20 For instance, the Arab world is unique in the prevalence of long lived,
undemocratic regimes consisting largely of monarchies.2' Islam with its principles
of Tauheed, consultations, Ijma and Ijtehad,' possesses a strong pluralistic
tradition. However, leaders in the Muslim world are disinclined to embody these
ideas and principles in their political structure. 22On the ground, authoritarian
governments predominate in the Muslim world; moreover, most regimes in the
region are apt to corruption, patronage, and clientalism. 23 There is no
accountability of public authorities and they remain, in large part, unresponsive if
not incompetent to meet public needs.24 Governments in the region have used and
will continue to use their talent for the co-optation of potential political opposition
to consolidate their authority.25 Consistently ranked among the worst regimes in
the world in their refusal to uphold their citizens' political freedoms, human rights,
and civil liberties, the authoritarians in this region are quite effective at clamping
down on both secular and liberal opposition and Islamist groups.2 6 Most
governments in the Middle East believe in risk free democracy; 27 they organize
16. Yousef, supra note 1, at 2.
17. Id. at 29.
18. Id.
19. Ian Ayres & Jonathan R. Macey, Institutional and Evolutionary Failure and Economic
Development in the Middle East, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 397, 411, 413 (2005).
20. MARCUS NOLAND, EXPLAINING MIDDLE EASTERN AUTHORITARIANiSM 2 (Peterson Inst. for
Int'l Econ. Working Paper No. WP 05-5, 2005), available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=523.
21. NOLAND & PACK, supra note 14, at 273.
22. Tassaduq Hussain Jillani, Democracy and Islam: An Odyssey in Braving the Twenty-First
Century, 2006 BYU L. Rev. 727, 744-45 (2006).
23. See NOLAND, supra note 20, at 5.
24. SINGER, supra note 4, at 8.
25. DAVID M. MEDNICOFF, LEGALISM SANS FRONTItRES? U.S. RULE-OF-LAW AID IN THE ARAB
WORLD 12 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Rule of Law Series No. 61, 2005), available at
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CP61 .Mednicoff.FINAL.pdf.
26. See Ayres & Macey, supra note 19, at 416-17; Esposito, supra note 7, at 124, 125, 127;
SINGER, supra note 4, at 8.
27. Esposito, supra note 7, at 124.
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elections that they are not going to lose. In terms of rule of law, governments are
reluctant to facilitate rule of law projects that foster real political liberalization.28
When it comes to economic development, the ruling elites rationally oppose
economic development because it would lead to social changes that may threaten
their hold on power. Unlike developed countries, slow economic growth is
compatible with the rational self interest of the leaders in the region; growth would
alter the balance of power between the rulers and potential rival coalitions and
increase the probability of political change.2 9 Muslims' influence was increasingly
diminished in the sixteenth century. Continuous defeats at the hands of Christian
Spanish isolated Muslims from society or turned them into slaves to Christians. As
the eighteenth century came to a close, Islamic civilization eclipsed.3°
The breakdown of the Othman Empire brought about independent Muslim
states administered by corrupt and inefficient national regimes, which were
frequently subservient to the prior colonial powers or to the new neo-imperial
power, the U.S. Muslim masses were oppressed by foreign powers, and continue to
suffer at the hands of their own leaders, which has worsened their grievances.31
In a speech before leaving office, Bill Clinton mentioned: "we have seen how
abject poverty accelerates conflict, how it creates recruits for terrorists and those
who incite ethnic and religious hatred, [and] how it fuels a violent rejection of the
economic and social order on which our future depends." 32 His words are more
significant now than at any other time.33
Peter Singer,34 a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, mentioned that
"[the] combination of human development gaps and broken regimes goes a long
way in explaining both the failing environment in which radicals thrive and the
pool of simmering anger they are able to tap into."35 As an Egyptian who grew up
in the Middle East, I believe that strong economic and political reform would also
go a long way in uprooting the causes of terrorism in this region. Free trade
agreements, with their overreaching coverage, could be one of the tools used to
reform the Middle East. Suggesting that economic opportunity is part and parcel of
the war on terrorism, Kevin Fandl of George Mason proposes a comprehensive
development program3 6 that addresses legal, social, and economic concerns, which
some scholars believe are more needed than military operations.
37
28, See MEDNICOFF, supra note 25, at 15.
29. Ayres & Macey, supra note 19, at 417, 422.
30. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Evolving Approaches to Jihad: From Self-Defense to Revolutionary and
Regime-Change Political Violence, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L., 119, 142 (2007).
31. Id.
32. Kevin J. Fandl, Critical Essay, Terrorism, Development & Trade: Winning the War on Terror
Without the War, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 587, 597 (2004).
33. See id.
34. Peter Singer is Senior Fellow and Director of the 21st Century Initiative at the Brookings
Institute; between 2001-2006, he was the founding director of the Project on U.S. Relations with the
Islamic World. SINGER, supra note 4, at v.
35. Id. at 8.
36. Fandl, supra note 32, at 593.
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B. How Middle Easterners Perceive the U.S.?
In the aftermath of September 11, in response to a question about why people
in the Middle East hate America, President Bush said, "they hate what see right
here in this chamber, a democratically elected government.., they hate our
freedoms, our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and
assemble and disagree with each other. 38 Bush's analysis leads us to the
conclusion that cultural dissonance is the driving force behind the attacks on
America.39 John Quigley wrote an excellent comment to this effect. In his article,
he argued that the current administration failed to analyze the reasons of this
attack. Moreover, he suggested U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East is the "but
for" cause of these attacks. 40 Arunabha Bhoumik also criticized U.S. policy of
employing war mentality to combat terrorism. He suggested that the U.S.
government look into the root causes of terrorism. 41 The miscalculations in U.S.
policies are reciprocated by:
[A] seemingly endless supply of recruits to Anti-American causes,
unsurprisingly these miscalculations include 1) support for repressive
regimes in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco
and Jordan. 2) unconditional U.S. support for Israel, and 3) indifference
to the plight of Muslims in Chechnya, Kashmir, and the Balkans. The
war on terror, including the invasion of Iraq in spring 2003, has given
more grounds to the anti-American cause.
42
As a Middle Easterner, Americans would find it surprising to hear that
antipathy toward the U.S. and the west in general, does not flow from cultural
dissonance. It is based not on who Americans are perceived to be but on what
Americans are perceived to do. Muslims in the Middle East have a favorable view
of the American educational system, form of government, U.S. freedom and
democracy. Yet when it comes to U.S. policy in the region, the same people have a
very negative opinion. Consequently, antipathy towards western norms and
civilization does not emanate from religious or cultural reasons but rather a
response to perceptions and judgments regarding U.S. policy in the Middle East. 43
The West, in general, is perceived by the people of the Middle East as
colonizers who want to exercise dominance over other developing countries.44
38. President George W. Bush, Address on Terrorism before a joint meeting of congress,
(September 21, 2001) available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9405EEDC IE3BF932A1575ACOA9679C8B63&sec=
&spon=&pagewanted=2.
39. See e.g., John Quigley, International law violations by the United States in the Middle East as
afactor behind Anti-American Terrorism, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 815, 817 (2002).
40. Id. at 816.
41. Arunabha Bhoumik, Democratic Responses To Terrorism: A Comparative Study of the United
States, Israel, and India, 33 DENV. J.INT'L L. & POL'Y 285, 286 (2005).
42. Id. at 344.
43. Mark Tessler, Arab and Muslim Political Attitudes: Stereotypes and Evidence from Survey
Research, 4 INT'L STUDIES PERSPECTIVES 175, 180 (2003).
44. Fandl, supra note 32, at 630.
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Dropping an arsenal of bombs on these countries will only exacerbate the situation
and reinforce the stereotype, which has been drawn by the people in this region
during the imperialism era. The continuing war in Iraq has given more grounds to
terrorist organizations. Huge majorities in the Muslim world are aware of the
abuses at Abu Gharib and Guantanamo Bay.45 Moreover, every student coming
from the Muslim world to study in the United States has a nightmare that he/she
may be held over in Guantanamo if the intelligence in the United States confuses
him/her with a terrorist. The U.S. faces a difficult path in repairing its standing in
the Muslim world.
Radicalization of a substantial part of Middle Eastern policy is attributed to
stagnated economic and social programs coupled with a lack of political liberties,
"including antipathy toward U.S. policies - which are widely perceived as the main
source of support for the oppressive regimes in the region., 46 Five years into the
war in Iraq, by and large, the U.S. has failed in this cold war of ideology: a
growing number of Muslims embrace extremist views that could ultimately lead to
increased terrorism. U.S. foreign policy is in a dilemma. For decades stability was
the top priority in the United States' agenda towards the Middle East; however, the
support for stability in the region came at greater costs to the U.S. Stability was not
a cost free strategy, the cost was paid by un-free Middle Eastern people and bad
47democratic governance.
Intellectuals remain at best very skeptical of U.S. intentions in the region,
Mohamed Selim Elawa,45 a well known Egyptian lawyer and columnist, harshly
criticized the U.S. initiative in the Middle East and attributed all the mischief in the
region to two things: the penetration of Americans in the region and the brutal and
dictatorship regimes that continue to control the middle east. 49 In terms of the
general populace, the most popular movie in Egypt, the largest country in the
region, was "The night Baghdad fell," a black comedy that describes an American
invasion of Egypt. 50 And in Turkey, a strong ally to the U.S., the movie "Valley of
the Wolves," which fantasizes about Turkish troops inflicting revenge upon evil
American troops after they bombed a mosque and shot up a wedding, was well
received by the Turkish public.5'
As America continues its policies of supporting corrupt and inefficient
regimes in the Muslim world, blindly supporting Israel, even against the
Palestinians' most elementary rights, popular anger and frustration boils over
throughout the Muslim world.52 To some among the downtrodden masses,
45. Singer, supra note 4, at 18.
46. Khairi Abaza, Political Islam and Regime survival in Egypt, Policy Focus No. 51
(Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Affairs, January 2006).
47. Id. at 7.
48. Mohamed Selim El-Awa, a highly regarded Egyptian lawyer, called to be one of the founders
of new Islamist movement which seeks a new reform in Islamic thoughts.
49. Available at http://www.masrawy.com/new/ (Arabic language source on file with author).
50. Singer, supra note 4, at 2.
51. Id.
52. Bassiouni, supra note 30, at 142.
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America is perceived as the source of the contemporary evils that befall upon
Muslims. 53 Hence many Muslims consider violence as the only means of
expression left to them, and leaders who claim that violent jihad is a justified
course of conduct against the western invasion become popular. Many Muslims
will seek violent jihad as an answer to the dilemma they are having.54 Their
legitimacy of purpose trumps all else-the end justifying the means. Over time,
proponents of the strategy of terror-violence against the U.S. and the West have
acquired credibility, not to say legitimacy, even though their strategy includes
resorting to indiscriminate violence against innocent civilians, which is in violation
of the very Islamic precepts. Unjustifiable as these tactics are, their proponents see
them as the only way to balance the asymmetry of the forces they face in an un-just
world where no other remedies are available in hand.
55
Muslims have pride in their glorious history as they were -from Samarkand to
Cordoba- producing intellectuals, scientists, thinkers, artists, enlightened rulers and
societies that evidenced religious tolerance and economic progress at a time when
Europe was still debating whether women have souls. 56 Muslims attribute the
deterioration of their civilization to repression, backwardness, and losing our way,
rather than to Islam. We strongly reject any link between Islam and the
deterioration of our civilization because Islam itself was our guide in the early days
to building one of the most regarded civilizations in humankind's history.
Nonetheless, the values upon which the West built its progress are fundamentally
universal; moreover these values have been in the fabric of the Islamic religion
since its early days.
Violence, degradation and hypocrisy are three concepts that, by and large,
shape how Muslims perceive the West. Violence is evident in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Palestine, Chechnya, as well as in the ugly war of the summer of 2006 against
Lebanon and in threats against Iran. Hypocrisy becomes evident when Tony Blair
(former British PM) preaches to Arabs about democratic principles, and then visits
Libya to meet Colonel Gaddafi to negotiate his re-entering the international
community.57 Hypocrisy is inherent in Condoleezza Rice's revision of American
strategy in the aftermath of Hamas' victory in fair elections in Palestine, the
Muslim brotherhood's in Egypt and Ahmedinejad's in Iran after she preached to
the Egyptians about democracy in the Middle East in her speech in front of the
American University in Cairo. Degradation is conspicuous in debating pulling
away American troops because of losing 4000 but not thinking of the causalities of
Iraqis, in equating deaths of thousands in Lebanon with the inconvenience of
relocating some northern Israeli settlers for less than three weeks, and when
Hezbollah captured three Israeli soldiers, Lebanon has to pay billions of dollars to
53. Id.
54. Id. at 143.
55. Id.
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repair what Israeli air strikes damaged. 59
C. How Americans Perceive the Middle East?
In the post September 1 ith legal and political environment, anti-American
sentiment in the Middle East is reciprocated by a growing anti-Arab and anti-Islam
sentiment in America. 60 As manifestations of violence by Muslims increase in
different parts of the world, so do anti-Islam sentiments, particularly in the
Western world. Reciprocal negative perceptions between the Western and Muslim
worlds continue to escalate, threatening peace and security in Muslim countries
and elsewhere in the world. Americans understand Islam as a religion which
condones killing of other people in the name of Allah (the Arabic word means
God). It is too easy to equate Islam with the poverty and material backwardness of
most Islamic countries.61 Islam appears to be an aggressive religion to the Western
writers and critics. Muslim civilization has been castigated as being backward,
insular, stagnant, and unable to deal with the demands of modernization. Muslims
are stereotyped as fanatics, intolerants, violent and thirsty for wars of aggression.
62
The average westerner thinks of Islam as fanatical, xenophobic, and a destructive
force. 63 In his 1996 article, John Esposito warned Americans that in the post-cold
war period, Islam will be seen as the next global threat, both ideologically and
politically, in order to fill the threat vacuum.64
If Americans are seen as the rapists, bullies, and mindless killers in the culture
of the Muslim world, Muslims are seen no better by the American mainstream
media.65 Villains in Hollywood movies or TV shows invariably have terrorism link
back to a Muslim terrorist group or cause. William Fisher, a former U.S. diplomat,
warned of an "uninformed and unreasoning Islamophobia that is rapidly become
implanted in our national genetics. 66 News and people from the Middle East are
received with themes of hurt, fear and suspicion. The conceptualization of the
threat has many fronts. In general, while the government would consider the threat
from a certain organization, most Americans would consider it from a region or
ideology or both. Fox News Network host Bill O'Reilly commented about writing
a book about Islam, and he denounced the idea by saying it is "our enemy's
religion., 67 In his famous book "Clash of Civilization", Professor Samuel
Huntington of Harvard asserts that "some westerners have argued that the West
does not have problems with Islam but only with violent Islamic extremists.., but
evidence is lacking... the underlying problem for the west is not Islamic
59. Id.
60. Singer, supra note 4, at 2.
61. John Carroll, Intellectual Property Rights in the Middle East: A Cultural Perspective, 11
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 555, 583 (2001).
62. Shaheen Sardar Ali & Javaid Rehman, The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International law, 10
J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 321 (2005).
63. Carroll, supra note 61, at 583.
64. Esposito, supra note 7, at 131.
65. Singer, supra note 4, at 2.
66. William Fisher, Bush's Mixed Signals, COUNTER-CURRENTS, April 21, 2006, available at
http://www.countercurrents.org/fisher05O406.htm.
67. Tessler, supra note 43, at 175.
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fundamentalism. It is Islam., 6 8 He goes on to describe Islam as a religion of the
sword... glorifying military virtues. In his perception, the Quran (Holy Book of
Muslims) "and other statements of Muslim beliefs contain few prohibitions on
violence and a concept of non-violence is absent from Muslim doctrine and
practice. '69
Today, intellectual westerners misconstrue Islamic principles and tenets as
terrorism and fundamentalism. The media has reinforced a false stereotype of
Muslims and Islam.7 0 A researcher in the American Enterprise Institute has argued
that Bin Laden is applying what he has learnt from Quran. He is fully justified to
kill thousands of civilians because God in Islam asked him to do so.
71
D. Islamic Stance on Terrorism
The overarching principle in Islam concerning violence is the famous verse in
the Quran: "the taking of one life is like the killing of all humankind., 72 Islam
strongly renounces the killing of innocent civilians, children and women even in
war times.73 Principles and tenets of Islam encourage and promote coexistence and
cooperation, not confrontation and hate. From the early days of Islam, Prophet
Mohamed hosted the Jewish in the first Muslim city ever in history.
Islamic law is one of the world's major non-western legal systems. Sharia (the
right path in Arabic) includes a conglomeration of Islamic law principles.74 As
long as a substantial number of terrorist acts are perpetrated by or upon Muslims,
or within Islamic lands, the proper legal focus must not be limited to an
exclusively western sense of legality, Islamic legal theory has to be explored to
fully understand and ultimately control international terrorism. Islam claims 20%
or more of the world's population as its adherents. 75 A complete understanding of
the stance of Sharia on international terrorism will be helpful. A brief orientation
of the hierarchy of Islamic law is critical; Sharia includes two types of sources,
primary and secondary sources.
The primary source of Islamic law (Sharia) is the Quran. Muslims believe that
the Quran is the word of God, which Mohamed, the last prophet, relayed through
revelations from 610 A.D. until 632 A.D. The Quran contains 114 suras, it is the
constitution of all Muslims, a source which trumps all other sources and is
regarded by Muslims as the highest authority in all facets of life, including legal,
68. Id.
69. Ali & Rehman, supra note 62, at 329.
70. John H. Donboli and Famaz Kashefi, Doing Business in the Middle East: A Primer for U.S.
Companies, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 413, 418 (2005).
71. Ali Alfoneh, American Enterprise Institute, October 2007 (on file with author).
72. U.S. Inst. of Peace, Special Report: Islamic Perspectives on Peace and Violence, Jan. 24,
2002, at 3, available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr82.pdf.
73. Quintan Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner, Killing in the name of Islam: A1-Qaeda's Justification
for September 11, 10 Middle East Policy Council 2 (2003), available at
http://www.mepc.org/joumal-voll 0/0306_wiktorowiczkaltner.asp.
74. Donboli and Kashefi, supra note 70 at 418.
75. David Aaron Schwartz, Note: International Terrorism and Islamic Law, 29 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 629, 634 (1991).
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social, political and economic matters.76 The second source of Islamic Law is the
Sunna or traditions of the prophet Muhammad. Sunna (Tradition) is the Prophet
Mohamed's reported sayings, deeds, and approval of practices. Where the Quran is
silent or ambiguous, Sunna is considered to be a supplementary or interpretative
source. 77
Secondary sources of Islamic law consist of Ijma, or agreement of
jurists among the followers of the Prophet Muhammad in a particular
age on a question of law.... Ijma, as a source of law, is supported by
the Quran and Sunna, [and]... qiyas, translated as analogical deduction.
Analogy can only be employed if no guidance is available on the point
under discussion in any of the other three sources of law. Another
source of law is ijtihad, which literally means striving [or] exerting.
78
Sharia is a driving force in the Middle East, where most people are religious
or reluctant to challenge religious beliefs. Sharia is the highest source of legal
reference in Saudi Arabia's, Iran's and Egypt's constitutions, which are the main
source of legislation. 79 Sharia is a complete legal system which has its own distinct
characteristics and is recognized by international law.8 ° I will examine three
different doctrines of Islamic jurisprudence which bear directly on international
terrorism: the role of international covenants, Jihad (a particular emphasis on this
word), and forbidden acts to show that Islamic treaty law is rich with principles
that renounce terrorism.
1. International Covenants
Muslim countries have to honor their obligations under international
treaties. 8 ' This sense of legal obligation does not stem only from the sanctions
which would be imposed if there is a violation of any of the treaties' provisions.
Rather, a simple verse in the Quran also obliges Muslims to honor their contractual
obligations: "0 Believers, you have to honor your contractual agreements."8 2 This
means that every Islamic country that has entered into an anti-terrorist compact is
committed under Islamic law to honor that agreement. Moreover, Muslim jurists
have ruled that international covenants acceded to by Islamic countries have
become a part of Islamic law. 83
Multilateral covenants, compacts and agreements have long been the legal
method of choice for combating terror violence. Sharia sanctions violations of
these agreements; every Islamic country that has entered into an anti-terrorist
compact is committed under Islamic law to honor that agreement. 84 Many Islamic
76. Ali & Rehman, supra note 62 at 324-25.
77. Id. at 325.
78. Id.
79. Schwartz, supra note 75, at 636.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 637-38.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 637.
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countries have signed most of the multilateral covenants that explicitly address acts
of international terrorism. Schwartz found a double effect for Sharia in respect to
terror violence. First, Islamic countries are authorized to enter into agreements that
punish and extradite terrorists located within their jurisdiction. Second, a global
agreement addressing terror violence would be welcomed by Islamic countries.85
Since the inception of the UN and the prohibition of the use of force, Islamic
countries have fully complied with the UN charter, renouncing terrorism,
aggression and violence, in addition to maintaining their Islamic credentials, which
is consistent with As-siyar. Moreover, the preamble of the charter of the
Organization of Islamic conference affirms the commitment of Islamic countries to
adhere to the principles found in United Nations charter.86
2. "Jihad"
"[T]he classical fihad ideology is often deployed to cast doubts on the
compatibility of Islam with modem norms of international law as enunciated in the
United Nations charter." 87 This misunderstood word is used to embrace the
concept that Islam condones the killing of people in the name of God. On the
contrary, Jihad is a very broad Arabic word, and it "does not have a singular
meaning but can be qualified to suggest different things. 88 A literal meaning of it
is "'effort,' 'attempt;' or 'exertion'... to overcome evil., 89 Ibn Taymiyya, a
prominent Muslim scholar in the medieval centuries, explained the concept "Jihad"
as a means of defensive war to protect Dar Islam (Muslim states) against
invaders, 90 similar to the notion of self defense under international law. Islamic
scholars distinguish between greater Jihad, which means the struggle one has
against oneself, with lesser Jihad, which refers to fighting in the name of God.
[T]errorists use the Islamic historical division of the world into two
parts, Dar al Islam and Dar al harb, to set up the framework for their
offensive Jihad... However, a careful contextual reading of verses in
Quran and others rebut the terrorist's interpretation. Moreover, many
scholars argue that viewing Jihad as an offensive war is faulty and fails
to take into account the underlying religious beliefs and
responsibilities... Terrorists pick and choose certain tenets of Sharia to
justify their actions... [and] use Islam as a political tool to further their
specific agendas.
9 1
Thus it would seem that Islam, unlike Christianity, justifies killing in some
circumstances.
85. Id. at 640-41.
86. Ali & Rehman, supra note 62, at 343 (internal citations omitted).
87. Id. at 322.
88. RACHEL SALOOM, Comment: Is Beheading Permissible Under Islamic Law? Comparing
Terrorist Jihad and the Saudi Arabian Death Penalty, 10 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF., 221, 229
(2005).
89. John Alan Cohan, Formulation of a State's Response to Terrorism and State-Sponsored
Terrorism, 14 PACE INT'L L. REV. 77,98 (2002).
90. See Bassiouni, supra note 30, at 131-34.
91. SALOOM, supra note 88, at 248.
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Political violence has existed in every civilization. "Throughout its fifteen
centuries [Islam] has witnessed political turmoil and upheavals and also periods of
peace and stability, during which the sciences and the arts have made extraordinary
strides and contributed significantly to other civilizations. 9
2 The Muslim world
has, in the last two hundred years, suffered at the hands of Western imperial
powers. Recently, the Muslim world has started to selectively strike back against
the Western world, with the U.S. responding in kind, thus fueling predictions of a
"clash of civilizations." The endless circle of blood between Americans and
Muslims (in Iraq) may feed into the proposition that there is a conflict of
civilization between the Muslim world and the Jeudo-Christian western
civilization. This self fulfilling prophecy put succinctly by Cherif Bassiouni
evoked Muslims to be inclined to accept a new anti-American sentiment to
political Jihad as long as it is reciprocated by an increasing anti-Islam approach by
Neoconservatives, the protestant Christian right and other American Pro-Israel
supporters. Therefore, Bassiouni added that the modem doctrine of Jihad can only
be explained by taking account of historical, social, political and economic events
that surrounded and influenced Muslims.
93
Nonetheless, the term "jihad" is surely one of the most powerful terms in the
Muslim psyche. "It evokes the legitimate self-defense struggle of the Prophet and
his followers in the glorious days of early Islam. What can be more powerful and
more moving to the downtrodden masses in the contemporary Muslim world than
jihad?" 94 In this era of global communications, these masses can see what the
modem world has to offer them and of what then they are deprived. Cherif
Bassiouni 95 argued, "if these masses could also see how frequently, how
improvidently, and how dubiously the term jihad has been used by unqualified
political violence proponents, their reactions may well be different." 96 The resort
to force as part ofjihad in the early days of Islam was justified by self-defense and
by the fact that Muslims had no freedom to propagate Islam or to practice it freely
in non-Muslim controlled areas. However, it must also be said that the history of
Islam is characterized by recurring violence claimed to be justified by jihad, even
when it was not. Indeed, Bassiouni correctly argued that "[w]hatever justifications
may have existed throughout the history of Islam, jihad in the name of the
propagation of the faith can no longer be sustained in an era where freedom of
religion, practice, thought, and speech are internationally guaranteed human
rights."97 He added,
Thus, conflicts such as those between Palestinians and Israelis and
between Chechnyans and Russians cannot be characterized as jihad,
since they do not involve the religion of Islam. These conflicts are
92. Bassiouni, supra note 30, at 141.
93. Id. at 142.
94. Id. at 143
95. Distinguished Research Professor of Law and President Emeritus, International Human Rights
Law Institute, DePaul University College of Law.
96. Bassiouni, supra note 30, at 143.
97. Id. at 145.
2008
DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
controlled by other aspects of Islamic law, which also recognizes in
these cases the applicability of positive law, namely, international
humanitarian law. 98
A mixed record is the history of Jihad in Islam.99 Quite clearly, it is subject
to interpretation, and has been subject to manipulations as well, essentially for
political reasons or in order to achieve a political goal. Bassiouni reasoned the
existence of a contemporary doctrinal approach to Jihad because of the fact that
there was a mixed record and different interpretations. He further suggested that
Jihad is equivalent to the international law of self-defense, and hence a doctrine
subject to the same limitations on the methods and means of warfare in accordance
with contemporary international humanitarian law. 100
This verse and others evidence the universality of humankind,
notwithstanding its diversity. Other verses of the Qur'an reveal that man
was created with the spirit of the Creator. How then can a believer in
Islam engage in killing, torturing, and humiliating another human being
created by God and infused with His Divine Spirit? No political
doctrine of jihad can override this higher religious value. And yet
tragically, this higher religious and humanistic value is violated with
scant reaction from the Muslim religious establishment and from
knowledgeable secular Muslims intellectuals. Jihad, like many other
aspects of Islam, has its theoretical and practical aspects, both being
frequently quite apart from one another. In fact, both dimensions are
fragmented as they reflect a much greater diversity in Islam than its
proponents tend to reflect in their words. Perhaps all concerned should
heed to a hadith by the Prophet: "if you see a wrong: you must right it
with your hand, if you can or your words or with your stare, or in your
heart, but that is the weakest of faith." 101
The doctrine of jihad is central to Islamic international law. "[T]here are
disagreements among jurists regarding the nature of jihad in Islam. Some argue
that it is essentially defensive in nature, whereas others are inclined to consider it
as offensive or aggressive element."' 1 2 However, as Ali and Rehman presented in
their paper, "the introduction of the dar-al-sulh as a third category of states in
Islamic international law opens up the possibility of building upon options of
peaceful settlement of disputes in the Islamic tradition."' 0 3 Additionally, Islamic
law, with its principles, could enrich international law in general, and in particular,
could be very relevant to the current war on terrorism.
3. Forbidden Acts
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taking of hostages, and prohibits unnecessary destruction of an enemy's real or
personal property. "Muslim jurists hold the rights of diplomats to be inviolable.
Kidnappings or assassinations of foreign envoys have historically been prohibited
by Islam... the safety and dignity of diplomats are sacrosanct."
'1°4 Sharia has
certain rules in respect to hostages during Muslim conquests. Exchange of hostages
for Muslims is encouraged. Human life and personal property are sacred under
Islam, principles of Sharia entrenched numerous rules applicable to non-
combatants, fields and forests.1 05 In addition:
Respect for human life and personal property is a fundamental principle
of Shari'ah. No non-combatant may be killed, unless purposefully used
to shield the enemy, or unintentionally fired during a night-time or
distant catapult attack. Fields are not to be unnecessarily spoiled, and
forests may not be needlessly destroyed. Most importantly, even active
combatants themselves are afforded certain fundamental protections at
all time. 106
Islamic terrorists are no more representative of Islam than any fundamentalist
terrorists are of their broader community. The U.S. should not
[flail to make a distinction between fanatics, with a total disregard for
life, who pose threat to all of humankind-irrespective of religion,
culture or ethnicity-and those who simply have different ways of
organizing their lives or different cultural preferences, but share the
same basic goals and aspirations of all mankind: the pursuit of life,
liberty and happiness. 107
Islam itself promotes raising the standard of living of Muslims, calling for
peace and full submission to the will of the Almighty. Separating Islam from
terrorism is a must to understand the extent of the problem; Muslims should be
engaged in the war on terrorism not as enemies but as partners.
Additionally, the tenets of Islamic jurisprudence are relevant to efforts to
combat international terrorism and condemn terror violence. Terrorists invoking
Islam have acted illegally, and this is as abhorrent to an Islamic state as it is to the
west. Sharia is almost forgotten as one of the most effective instruments against
international terrorism. It provides a genuine, workable framework for countering
international terrorism. It includes a wide range of interweaving legal theories,
drawing together treaty making authority, military constraints, and an insistence
upon human rights. Westerners can no longer overlook the importance of Sharia in
combating terrorism. Up until now, international law has witnessed "little attempt
to take on broad concepts of as-siyar in discussions on the law of nations, [human
rights and laws of war].... [The] "rules of Islamic international law could be
104. Schwartz, supra note 75, at 648-49.
105. Id. at 649.
106. Id. at 650.
107, United Nations Chronicle Online Edition, An International Perspective on Global Terrorism,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, Nov. 3, 2001, available at
http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2001/issue 1/0103p7l2.
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applied to build a better and more effective international legal order."
10 8
I. FREE TRADE AS A TOOL IN COMBATING TERRORISM
The globalization of the Middle East has been confronted by much resistance
among the populace in the region, who accuse globalization of being a western
product that has to be rejected. However the people should know that globalization
already took place and that there is no way out except to be a part of this game. It
is better to be inside setting the rules of international trade than outside and forced
to play by them anyway. Globalization has to take place in the Middle East. "IT]he
increased involvement of the WTO, multinational corporations, international aid
agencies, non governmental organizations, and foreign investors focusing on the
development of non-oil industries through a process of market diversification and
stabilization will improve the lives of those living in the Middle East," thus rooting
out all the causes of terrorism. 10 9 Consequently, the frequency of terrorist attacks
will be eliminated or at least lessened.
International trade is thus a vital engine for poverty-reducing growth.
Trade liberalization is one of the few policies that virtually all
economists can agree on. It creates wealth. It reduces poverty. It is a
zero sum game. The countries.., that have intensified their links with
the global economy through trade have tended to grow more rapidly
over a sustained period .... 110
On the legal aspect, free trade and trade liberalization in general would be a
catalyst for improving the deficient legal regulatory rules and systems in the
Middle East and facilitate the legal integration of the WTO as well. The Middle
East will count on the U.S. to bring in free trade, as Americans are the pioneers of
the creation of a global framework for free and fair trade. 11 However, some
scholars have argued that globalization is increasing transnational terrorism and
that "openness is likely to increase the vulnerability of rich target economies both
directly and indirectly."' 1 2 If trade integration has a multilateral nature, terrorism
also does. For example, there has been a spillover of terrorism from the U.S. to the
UK and Spain as they joined the initial coalition against terrorism. 
1 1 3
108. Ali & Rehman, supra note 64, at 342.
109. Fandl, supra note 32, at 591.
110. Delissa A. Ridgway and Mariya A. Talib, Globalization and Development-Free Trade,
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A. Regional Agreements in the Middle East
The Middle Eastern region represents the least integrated region in the global
economy. 114 Yet there are few prospects for regional agreements. For the most part
they are still mere projects. The Maghreb Union, GCC, Euro-Mediterranean and
GAFTA are the only regional agreements currently in existence.
1. The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)
The Maghreb countries which consist of Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania
and Tunisia, established the Arab Maghreb Union in 1989.115 This union
comprises 62 million people "within a region that is rich in oil, natural gas and
minerals.""16 The Union treaty calls for strengthening economic ties between the
member states to allow for the free movement of goods, services and production
factors. 117 Although the member states announced plans for a custom union by
1995, it was never achieved. 118
2. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
GCC was established in 1981. The Council consists of 6 member states:
United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Kuwait." 9 The
aim of the establishment of the GCC can be deduced from the Charter's preamble:
"[t]o effect coordination, integration, and interconnections between them in all
fields." 120 GCC represents the most ambitious sub regional Arab agreement.
However, there are many challenges facing the GCC. "Member states should have
the necessary political will and should subordinate their systems to the
Cooperation Council to build a strong regional block."' 12 1 GCC also has a very
ambitious plan to create a custom union and a union currency within the upcoming
years. 122
3. Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)
The EMP was created on November 28, 1995 in Barcelona when the
Barcelona Declaration was signed by the EU and 12 Mediterranean Countries, also
known as the Barcelona Process, which aims at a wide framework of political,
economic and social relations between the EU and partners from the Southern
Mediterranean region. 123 "Its stated aim is to create a new political and economic
114. Andra Gdrber, The Middle East and North Africa: A Gridlocked Region at a Crossroads,
COMPASS 2020, Jan. 2007, at 5, available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/04746.pdf.
115. Robert W. McKeon, The Arab Maghreb Union: Possibilities of Maghrebine Political and
Economic Unity, and Enhanced Trade in the World Community, 10 DICK J. INT'L L. 263, 263 (1992).
116. Id. at 263-64
117. Mohamed Finaish & Eric Bell, The Arab Maghreb Union, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND:
MIDDLE EASTERN DEPARTMENT, May 1994, at 5.
118. Fandl, supra note 34, at 622.
119. Amr Daoud Marar, The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, 10 L. & Bus.
REv. AM. 475, 475 (2004).
120. Charter of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, art. 4, May 1981, available
at http://www.gcc-sg.org/eng.
121. Marar, supra note 119, at 491.
122. Id. at 482.
123. Jacqueline Klosek, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 8 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 173, 173
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force in the Mediterranean based on free trade and closer political cooperation."
124
More than ten years after the Barcelona process, it is obvious that the economic
and institutional deficits in the Arab countries are essential, and fundamental
reorganizations of the structures are necessary to achieve the Barcelona goals 125 of
increasing economic integration between industrialized European countries and
neighboring developing countries in the Middle East. Given its close proximity, it
is clear that the EU has a great interest in the Middle East region. The primary goal
of the EMP is to foster economic growth through free trade. However, the
coverage of the EMP includes "a political and security partnership aim[ing] at
creating a common area of peace and stability... [and] anticipate[s] a social,
cultural and human partnership designed to increase exchanges between the civil
societies of the countries taking part in the EMP."
' 126
4. Great Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA)
The center-piece of the Economic integration between Arab countries,'27
GAFTA derives its importance from many aspects. Six decades have witnessed
more failures than accomplishments in Arab economic integration."' However
Arab leaders have put it on the top of their political agenda for the coming Arab
summit in 2008.129 GAFTA currently enjoys more political support than ever
before. This agreement was limited to trade in goods when it was signed in 1997,
yet the third wave of the Arab economic integration signifies a movement towards
expanding the scope of the agreement to cover trade in services as well. 3° The
challenges are enormous. Most of them are of an economic nature but economic
integration remains an indispensable matter for Arab countries. Otherwise they
will fall behind.
B. U.S. and Free Trade Agreements in the Middle East
The 9-11 commission report recommended that "a comprehensive U.S.
strategy to counter terrorism should include economic policies that encourage
development, more open societies, and opportunities for people to improve the
lives of their families and to enhance prospects for their children's future."'131 U.S.
(1996), (The 12 countries are: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria,
Tunisia, Turkey and Gaza Strip/West Bank).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 176.
126. Id. at 175.
127. CATCHING UP WITH THE COMPETITION: TRADE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR ARAB
COUNTRIES 6 (Bernard Hoekman & Jamel Zarrouk eds., The Univ. of Michigan Press 2002). Decree
No. 365 called on Arab leaders to have an Arab summit to discuss the economic integration among
Arab countries.
128. See generally, ARAB ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: BETWEEN HOPE AND REALITY 13 (Ahmed
Galal & Bernard Hoekman eds., Brookings Inst. Press 2003).
129. Last Arab Summit was held in Riyadh 28/29 March, 2007, it is the 19th summit where the
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to discuss the economic, social and development issues in the Arab world.
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free trade agreements in the Middle East "pursue economic policies in a... political
cauldron," more than elsewhere in the world.132 The Middle East initiative is "a
systematic plan with well identified precursor economic relationships between the
U.S. and 14 Middle Eastern and four North African" countries.' 33 Robert Zoellick,
former U.S. Trade Representative, mentioned that the U.S. aim is to fight terrorism
"by spreading the message of prosperity and democracy throughout the 
world."' 134
The Bush Administration's 2002 National Security Strategy identifies "free trade
and free markets" as the keys to a secure America and the necessary components
of the national security strategy. 135 The U.S. National Security Strategy pointed
out that "[e]conomic growth supported by free trade and free markets creates new
jobs and higher incomes. It allows people to lift their lives out of poverty, spurs
economic and legal reforms, and the fight against corruption, and it reinforces the
habits of liberty."' 3 6 The MEFTA initiative rests on a fundamental premise:
"national security can be enhanced and terrorism can be fought with trade," jobs,
technology transfers, investment growth and modernization, which are thought to
follow from the "free flow of goods, services, knowledge and capital."1
37
The events of September 11, 2001, demonstrated that weak states, like
Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to U.S. national interests as strong states.
Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. 138 Yet poverty,
weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist
networks and drug cartels within their borders. Free trade and free markets have
proven their ability to lift whole societies out of poverty. Therefore, the United
States must work with individual nations, regions, and the entire global trading
community to build a world that trades in freedom and therefore grows in
prosperity. 139 The international community has an enormous stake in the
developments within the Middle East and has no real alternatives but to engage the
region in the hope of reaching mutually beneficial outcomes. Jennifer Moore
argues that the problems of poverty and underdevelopment in the Middle East have
been compounded by the war on terror, and that the substantial reliance on military
force as opposed to alternative means of fighting terrorism "potentially feeds
Congress, RL32638, at 5 (2006), available at http://vienna.usembassy.gov/en/download/pdf/mefta.pdf.
132. Ralph Folsom, Trading for National Security? United States Free Trade Agreement in the
Middle East and North Africa, at 1 (U. of San Diego Sch. of L., Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series No. 07-
113,2007).
133. Id. at 8. The Middle East countries are Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab of Emirates, and Yemen (Cyprus, the Gaza
Strip and West Bank are also potential MEFTA partners). The North African countries include Algeria,
Libya, Morocco and Tunisia.
134. Paul Magnusson, A Man of Many Missions, BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 31, 2003, at 94-95.
135. Daniella Markheim & Anthony B. Kin, Free Trade with the UAE Supports America's
National Security Interests, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Mar. 4, 2006, available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/TradeandForeignAid/wm106.cfr.
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137. Folsom, supra note 132, at 32.
138. Fandl, supra note 3, at 306.
139. Fandl, supra note 32, at 606.
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ongoing conflicts rather than repressing them." 140 Additionally, the poverty and
underdevelopment that existed in the Middle East prior to recent foreign
intervention may have been exacerbated by the military actions against
Afghanistan and Iraq.
In his article, Kevin Fandl mentioned that "[s]ome members of the
international community, while supportive of U.S. efforts in the war on terror in
many respects, believe that the war is actually increasing terrorism." 141 French and
German attitudes toward the war on terror were surveyed by a Research center
(PEW), which found that a majority of people "believed that the Iraq war had
undermined the struggle against terrorists and doubted the Bush Administration's
sincerity in trying to combat terror."' 142 Lakdhar Brahimi, the United Nations
Special Envoy to Iraq, stated in April 2004 that "there is no military solution to the
problems in Iraq, and that the use of force, especially the excessive use of force,
makes matters worse and does not solve the problem." 143 Daniel Benjamin and
Steven Simon of Georgetown University recently affirmed that the number of
Jihadists increased after the last war in Iraq, thereby increasing the long-term threat
of terrorism. 144 Further, "[i]t is simply no longer possible to maintain that the
United States is winning the war on terror." 145 Military intervention is often a poor
preventative measure against terrorism because the military is ill-equipped to
address the modus operandi of terrorists. The idea of democratizing the Middle
East is good, but unlikely to succeed without the social, economic, and
demographic conditions necessary for sustainability. Benjamin and Simon
conclude that broad reforms and a stronger international coalition are the most
effective solution to the current quagmire. 146 However, I find myself disagreeing
with them. Democratizing the Middle East is a very naive idea, which sounds
arrogant from the American side and does not relate to the cultural and historical
background in this area of the world.
Fandl correctly argued that "The terrorist networks are... a significant threat
to world security not only because of the suicidal methods they employ, but also
because of the status of the countries where these networks recruit new members,
engage in training exercises and where the leadership seeks refuge." 147 He
elaborated by saying that most of these countries are developing countries, lack the
resources and the political structure to take preventive measures in order to sustain
140. Jennifer Moore, Collective Security with a Human Face: an International Legal Framework
for Coordinated Action to Alleviate Violence and Poverty, 33 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 43,43 (2004).
141. Fandl, supra note 3, at 306.
142. Susan Sachs, Poll Finds Hostility Hardening Toward U.S. Policies, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 17,
2004, at A3.
143. John F. Burns, Iranians in Iraq to Help in Talks on Rebel Cleric, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 15, 2004,
at Al.
144. DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVE SIMON, THE NEXT ATTACK: THE FAILURE OF THE WAR ON
TERROR AND A STRATEGY FOR GETTING IT RIGHT xiv (Times Books 2005).
145. Id. at 126.
146. Id. at 197-208.
147. Fandl, supra note 32, at 597-98.
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peace and crackdown on these organizations. 148 Although the Bush administration
realized the link between desperate economic circumstances and terrorism, they
have chosen to counter the terrorist attacks primarily by military conquest. Four
years after the Iraqi invasion, many Americans support the view that using force
may not be the best solution to uproot terrorist organizations. Terrorists are non-
conventional actors who support their non-conventional weapons by selling
ideology to seek new fellows. Osama Bin laden's capture or even death will not
end the terrorist attacks; his ideas are still there and have an enormous impact on
the people who live in impoverished and desperate conditions in the Middle East.
The opening of markets in the Muslim world is desperately needed.
149
According to Brink Lindsey of the Cato Institute,
Trade and investment barriers are pervasive, and exports other than oil
remain puny... It is now clear that Americans live in a dangerous
world-and that the primary danger at present emanates from the
economic and political failures of the Muslim world... Those failures
breed the despair on which violent Islamic extremism feeds; no
comprehensive campaign against terrorism can leave them
unaddressed... The national security dimension of trade policy is once
again plainly visible... It's true that scrapping protectionist policies, by
itself, will not guarantee economic revitalization. But the fact is that
integration into the larger world economy has been central to every
developing country success story of recent times. Exposing the
economy to foreign competition and capital acts as a catalyst for more
systemic reforms. And over the longer term, such far-flung examples as
Chile, Mexico, Taiwan, and South Korea demonstrate the
interconnectedness of globalization, economic dynamism, and eventual
democratization. Meanwhile.... the West can do more to facilitate
Muslim countries' participation in global commerce... President Bush
has made it amply clear that fighting terrorism is the overriding priority
of his administration. To wage that fight with maximum effectiveness,
he will need to convince Congress and the nation that promoting world
trade will help to defeat the destroyers of the World Trade Center. 1
5 0
Establishing free trade in this area would increase job opportunities, economic
growth, cut poverty and enhance the rule of law in the Middle East; development
in the Middle East should be a major component of U.S. foreign policy.
151
Economic development in the Middle East is the most effective means of
maintaining peace and increasing normalization, thereby breaking the cycle of
mistrust, violence, and instability that plagues the Middle East. A positive cycle of
economic expansion would enhance the region's political stability, which would
148. Id. at 598.
149. Brink Lindsey, Free Trade and Our National Security, WASHINGTON TIMES, Dec. 5, 2001,
available at http://www.freetrade.org/node/244.
150. Id.
151. Fandl, supra note 32, at 617-21.
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then foster economic growth by bolstering investor confidence. Economic
opportunities are enormous in the Middle East. 152 Furthermore, "the Middle East is
situated in a strategic global position featuring many dynamic trade and investment
opportunities."'' 53 It has been argued that political and economic stability can be
created if the U.S. and Middle Eastern countries make certain conditions
conducive to the following economic measures: 154
(1) Increased foreign private investment
(2) Increased free trade agreements between the U.S. and Middle Eastern
countries.
For most Arab countries, trade with the EU is a multiple of trade with the U.S.
However, the U.S. is far more strategically important than trade figures alone
would indicate.'55 Moreover, the U.S. differs from the EU as the first advocates for
behind the border issues including environmental and labor rights protection.
These two issues rank prominently on the U.S. negotiating agenda for any FTA.'56
Furthermore, unlike the Euro-Med agreements that tend to be drafted in vague
language, the template for American bilateral agreements is a highly specific and
enforceable legal document. In general, any preferential trade agreement with the
U.S. would result in more consequential commitments than an EU-Med agreement
would.
C. The Rise and Fall of MEFTA
MEFTA is the first attempt to increase the scope of U.S. attention towards the
Middle East beyond the Israeli-Palestine, Palestine-Hezbollah and Iraq/Iran-U.S.
conflict. President Bush, in a speech at the University of South Carolina, proposed
creating a comprehensive free trade area between the U.S. and the Middle East
(MEFTA) within a decade. 157 In his speech, President Bush mentioned that the
"Arab world has a great cultural tradition, but is largely missing out on the
economic progress of our time. Across the globe, free markets and trade have
helped defeat poverty, and taught men and women the habits of liberty. So I
propose the establishment of a U.S.-Middle East free trade area within a decade, to
bring the Middle East into an expanding circle of opportunity, to provide hope for
the people who live in that region."'
5 8
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MEFTA negotiations will take place bilaterally with countries in the region,
which will then be combined into single overreaching arrangements between U.S.
and the region as a whole. 159 On the one side, the U.S.'s interest in this agreement
is primarily geopolitical and security. On the other side, the interest of Arab
countries is primarily economic. Robert Lawrence of Harvard summed four
primary economic advantages for this free trade. 160 The first is increased trade and
investment, second is reducing trade diversion that results from other preferential
arrangements, such as EU-Med agreements by enhancing the bargaining power of
Arab countries with other countries that wish to be accorded similar treatment to
U.S. 161 Third is deepening the regional economic integration either between all
Arab countries or a select group of Arab countries to launch a regional
integration. 162 The efforts of increasing the integration of the Middle East in the
global world would include the establishment of this area within a decade, reform
efforts to prime countries in the region for WTO membership, trade capacity
building for integration into the global trading system, reform of commercial and
judicial codes, and improved transparency to fight corruption. There are certain
prerequisites for participation in MEFTA. Countries in the region may have to join
the WTO, enter into bilateral trade and investment framework agreement and BIT
with the U.S. with an additional requirement to abandon all primary, secondary,
and tertiary economic boycotts of Israel organized by the Arab league. 1
63
Deep-integration free trade agreements are a potentially useful mechanism for
leveraging and locking in domestic reforms. 164 Informal barriers to trade such as
monopoly public sector service providers and problematic customs administration
and attendant corruption significantly hamper cross border integration, and U.S.-
style deep integration agreements may be useful in reforming these practices in a
way that the shallow integration initiative of the Euro-Med almost surely
cannot. 165 Yet preferential trade agreements cannot remake legal and educational
systems, enhance work habits, protect environments, encourage human rights and
respect for minorities, and all the other collateral benefits without shifts in how
Arab governments perceive their leadership and management functions. But they
can be helpful and may be sufficient for defining a workable template for low risk
options that move Arab regimes with more confidence to face the severe
challenges of the coming decades.' 
66
Although MEFTA, like CAFTA, NAFTA and other U.S. FTAs, is about
trade, investment and technology, some commentators have argued that MEFTA,




163. Id. Arab boycott is Primary in the sense that all trade with Israeli companies is banned.
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because of the location and national security of U.S., "is really about terrorism and
security, including oil security." 16
7
D. Recent Developments in MEFTA
Since the invasion of Iraq, in an attempt to improve the political stability in
the region, the U.S. has sought to increase trade and investment in the Middle East.
"By creating trade and investment framework agreements (TIFAs), Bilateral
investment treaties (BITs), and Free Trade Agreements, the United States has
sought to enhance its economic stake in the Middle East in order to improve long-
term diplomatic relations and stability in the region. Since the launching of the
MEFTA, the Bush administration has signed [TIFAs] with Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman. [TIFA] are intended
to protect investors and intellectual property, and promote commercial
transparency and efficiency." 168 Additionally, the U.S. has "worked to expedite
accession to the WTO with nations such as Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. The Bush
Administration hopes that such initiatives will eventually lead to the establishment
of a Middle East free trade area by 2013. The [U.S.] is attempting to create this
free trade zone by actively supporting WTO membership for countries like Saudi
Arabia and Lebanon, and helping current Middle Eastern WTO members
implement trade agreements."' 169 Commentators have noted that "increased trade
and investment in the region will facilitate growth, job creation, and a dynamic
economy that no longer depends on oil.' 170 In addition to the free trade
agreements, the U.S. has concluded Qualified Industrial Zone agreements (QIZ)
with the Palestinian Authority, Jordan and Egypt. These QIZ agreements provide
for preferential access to the U.S. market for qualifying goods by meeting local
content requirements specified in terms of U.S., Israeli, and the third country's
input content. 171
While Mary Jane Bolle of the Foreign Service, Defense and Trade division in
the State Department argues for MEFTA, adding that MEFTA is a catalyst for
economic development in the Middle East, 172 other commentators take a contrary
approach and argue against MEFTA. They confirm that the current structural
impediments to intra-regional economic cooperation will inhibit the prospects of
an integrated Middle East economic system. 173 Therefore, MEFTA will create a
hub and spoke relationship. A hub and spoke MEFTA could potentially divert
foreign investment away from the Middle East, as investors would prefer to set up
manufacturing or services facilities in the U.S. and get duty free access to all of the
167. Folsom, supra note 132, at 30-3 1.
168. Donboli & Kashefi, supra note 153, at 456-57.
169. Id. at 458.
170. Id.
171. Noland & Pack, supra note 14, at 222-23.
172. MARY JANE BOLLE, MIDDLE EAST FREE TRADE AREA: PROGRESS REPORT, CRS Report for
Congress, RL32638, at 11 (2006), available at http://vienna.usembassy.gov/en/download/pdf/mefta.pdf.
173. Bessma Momani, A Middle East Free Trade Area: Economic Interdependence and Peace
Considered, 30 WORLD ECON. 1682 (2007).
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The breakdown of FTA negotiations with the UAE signifies the strategy of
the Bush administration of picking off easy partners. Morocco, Bahrain and Oman
are not significant U.S. trade partners. The political firestorm which took place
after the state owned Dubai ports acquired a British company operating six
seaports in 2005, the Dubai ports world promised to sell the interest to an unrelated
U.S. buyer after Congress, the press and a substantial portion of the U.S. public
strongly opposed the takeover. Following this, free trade negotiations with UAE
have been put on a back burner.
So far, MEFTA includes four members. Economically speaking, it is
insignificant. Major trade partners and key players in the Middle East still fall out
of MEFTA's reach; Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are examples of this. In his
article, Folsom argued that trade has become a cover for U.S. national security
needs and goals, and termed MEFTA as an attempt act creating a law of
comparative security advantage. 1
75
The military component of the U.S. counter-terrorism approach is aggravating
the terrorism problem across the Middle East and increasing the Anti American
sentiment. Thinking of alternative options to combat terrorism will remain at large
through unorthodox means as the nature of international terrorism is itself
unconventional. The Bush Administration has to revive the MEFTA; national
security is inextricably linked to free trade and development in the Middle East.
One question is whether free trade would root in the current regimes in the Middle
East. This would defeat the whole purpose of an open market, and the elite will
continue to control the resources of the whole country, poverty will increase, and
the regimes will be more brutal in oppressing the people. However one caveat is
that U.S. administration has to add a political reform component to its free trade
package which will circulate across countries in the region. The link between
democracy/political reform and signing of free trade agreements should not be
separated. The U.S. has to support the secular opposition forces in these countries,
requiring more participation in the civil society and engaging Muslim oriented
political groups.
If MEFTA does not to proceed in the Middle East, one can say that a
significant portion of the generation in the Muslim world will face conditions that
would fulfill Al-Qaeda's dream of recruiting hundreds of thousands of poorly
educated people. These generations would be living in crowded mega cities and
will become attractive recruits for radical groups and organizations that are
alienated from the global economic, social and political system. This generation
will grow up angry and will seek someone to blame, in a political atmosphere in
which their impressions of the U.S. will be largely shaped by Abu Ghraib and
Guantanamo photos or stories. The war on terror will not be won through any
territorial conquest or individual's capture. It will only end in the realm of
perceptions, when the U.S. and the Muslim world see each other not as in conflict
174. Id.
175. Folsom, supra note 132, at 31.
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but as operating toward shared goals, mainly, development, political reform,
international peace and free trade. A mutual cooperation between the Muslim
world and the U.S. is the key to victory in the war on terrorism. The U.S. has to
reinforce local reforms, efforts and avoid being seen as meddling in the internal
affairs by supporting a certain power over another. 1
7 6
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TERRORISM
This part is divided into two sub-parts. The first will examine the widely held
view that international law does not provide a definition of terrorism, compares
this approach with the terrorism definition in the domestic legal system of the
United States and in the Middle Eastern jurisprudence, and the different
international instruments that deal with terrorism. The second part suggests that the
U.S. should engage the Muslim world in the war on terror and discusses how the
international community can be engaged in the war on terror in the Middle East.
A. Terrorism in International Law
The war on terrorism has exposed some cracks in the foundation of
international law; 17 7 a series of deficiencies in international law were demonstrated
by the attacks of September 11. These include, but are not limited to: (a) The
absence of a comprehensive international legal framework to address terrorism; (b)
The absence of adequate international criminal law infrastructure to address
massive crimes against humanity and/or acts of war, particularly by non-state
actors; (c) The absence of sufficient international legal mechanisms for regulating,
monitoring, prosecuting, and punishing non-state actors; and (d) The absence of
international policing capacities and adequate cooperative arrangements to
undertake intelligence gathering and crime prevention at the international or
multilateral level. 178 Terrorism raises a lot of questions in international law about
self-defense, the law of armed conflict, and the definition of terrorism and
reprisal. 79 However discussing all these issues is beyond the scope of this article.
Although terrorism is the most regularly used word in the world now, still
there is no consensus among the international community on the definition for this
term. Nonetheless, the defmition of terrorism in both U.S. and Middle East
jurisprudence are the most relevant in reaching an agreement between the two
worlds. The main obstacle to creating a coherent international approach for
combating terrorism is the absence of an agreed definition. 180 The first attempt to
define terrorism in the 1937 Terrorism Convention failed. Its abstract defmition
was not acceptable to states, at least partially due to the difficulty of implementing
176. Lawrence, supra note 155, at 20.
177. Tung Yin, Ending the War On Terrorism One Terrorist at a Time: A Noncriminal Detention
Model for Holding and Releasing Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 149, 152
(2005).
178. Ved P. Nanda, Foreword: Combating International Terrorism, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
vi, vii-viii (2002) (highlighting actions taken in the wake of 9-11 terrorist attacks).
179. See e.g., Laura Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military
Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1407, 1408-09 (2002).
180. BARRY E. CARTER ET AL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1020 (5th ed. 2007).
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the definition in domestic legislation. '81 Similarly, the U.S. draft in 1972, which
defined terrorism in the abstract, did not attract sufficient support to be opened for
signature. 182 Rather than continue to attempt to establish a universal jurisdiction
with respect to terrorism, the international community, through conventions and
Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, opted for a system whereby
states exercise domestic criminal jurisdiction over acts of terrorism. This
incremental criminalization has produced a list of disparate proscribed acts
reflecting those acts that most harm states' interests but upon which agreement can
be reached. Historically, there have been many international conventions and
agreements that have condemned terrorist acts, including hijacking, hostage taking,
and terrorist bombing.' 83 The UN, out of a recognition of the politics associated
with reaching an acceptable global definition for terrorism, elected to avoid the
term terrorism and have a rather piecemeal approach to terrorism. '8 4 Consequently,
the UN carefully carved out very specific acts in selected international treaties to
characterize as terrorism. The statement "one person's terrorist is another person's
freedom fighter", still blocks a global consensus on a precise definition of
terrorism. 185 For example, the suicide bombers who killed innocent civilians in
Israel are terrorists in the west but freedom fighters in the Middle East. By the
same token the use of force by Israel as a state and its killing innocent Palestinian
civilians hold Israel as a state supporting terrorism in the Middle East but it has
legitimacy in the west and is rarely criticized for its acts.
Despite the world's reaction to the events of September 11, 2001, there seems
little chance that a comprehensive convention on terrorism will emerge from the
UN in the near future. Terrorism is now used as a legal term, and thus should be
accompanied by a legal definition. There are dangers in using terrorism as a legal
term without defining it, as the widespread potential for (and some actual)
avoidance and abuse of Security Council 1373's obligations illustrates.
Countries have responded to the terrorism question by taking matters into
their own hands and fighting back with the use of armed force. These measures
have proved ineffective against terrorism. International treaties are the best avenue
to mobilize the international community towards certain issues such as terrorism;
however, the UN has not been an effective mechanism in engineering a pragmatic
solution to terrorism. 186
With that in mind, elements of terrorism have to be mentioned so that we can
181. Reuven Young, Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in
International Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation, 29 B.C. INT'L & COM. L.
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know precisely what elements spark all the differences and block every
international consensus on a global definition of terrorism. Terrorism in the Middle
East: Cherif Bassiouni, a prominent International criminal law professor in the
U.S. and originally from Egypt, defines terrorism as "individual or collective
coercive conduct employing strategies of terror violence which contain an
international element or are directed against an internationally protected person"
when:
(a) The perpetrator and victims are citizens of different states or
(b) Duly accredited diplomats and personnel of international organizations
acting within the scope of their functions
(c) International civil aviation
(d) The mail and other means of international communications and
(e) Members of nonbelligerent armed forces. 
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In the U.S., there are nineteen defimitions for terrorism; a congressional
subcommittee found out that every federal agency with a counterterrorism mission
uses a different defimition of terrorism. 188 Chapter 113B of title 18 deals with
terrorism. 18 USCA § 2331(1) defines international terrorism as activities
involving violent acts that constitute crimes in the U.S. that appear to be intended:
i. To intimidate or coerce a civilian population
ii. To influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;
or
iii. To affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping and that occur primarily outside U.S.
territorial jurisdiction or transcend boundaries in some way.1
89
Second, 18 USCA § 2332b, defines the federal crime of terrorism in (g)(5) as
a breach of listed provisions of U.S. criminal law that are calculated to influence or
affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against
government conduct. 190
Michael Reisman lays out three effects of terrorism: "an immediate effect of
killing or injuring people; an intermediate effect of intimidating a larger number of
people and influencing their political behavior of the government; and an
aggregate effect of undermining public order. 191 However, the victims of terrorism
are always innocent civilians, consequently any successful definition of this term
should "concentrate on the act and not the political, religious, or social causes
which motivate the act."'1
92
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The war on terrorism combines the elements of an international armed
conflict and international criminal investigation. The creation of the legal
framework for each of the hostilities is needed. Terrorism can either be treated as a
criminal matter or an armed attack warranting response under the law of armed
conflict. 193 Both approaches have some loopholes and do not fit the 9-11 attacks
perfectly. The law of armed conflict does not appear to have anticipated the use of
military force against non-state actors, thus the attacks are acts of war by non-state
actors to be met with military force and direct application of the laws of armed
conflict. This is the prevailing approach by President Bush and Congress.
Wedgwood highlighted that the U.S. has failed to respond to Islamic
fumdamentalists' terrorism as a criminal matter and the solution is to treat terrorism
as a matter of war and to be conducted within war rules, including humanitarian
law. 194 This approach acknowledges that terrorism poses a new challenge to
international rules relating to armed conflict, which also invokes a demand for the
development of new legal regime effectively capable of addressing the threat of
global terrorism. 195 By the same token, Mark Baker proposed rewriting article 51
of UN charter. He argues that the self-defense term has been stretched beyond any
acceptable interpretation of article 51 in order to respond to terrorism.
Consequently, he called on the UN and international community to adopt a stance
against terrorism beginning with recognizing the legitimacy of the use of self-
defense against terrorist attacks. 196 Or terrorist attacks constitute criminal acts to be
addressed through international cooperation and the criminal justice system;
however a meaningful prosecution of terrorists would have required that the U.S.
gain physical custody of them. Abi Saab argues that 9/11 is not an act of war, but a
criminal matter. 197 It should be dealt with in the framework of existing
international law, largely the realm of international criminal law, and by
addressing its root causes.
Some commentators have argued that terrorism should be included in the law
of nations. 198 "The law of nations has recently been expanded to include war
crimes. This inclusion is in response to international condemnation of the war
criminal. With war crimes, numerous international agreements condemning war
criminals exist[]."' 199 "When conduct is universally condemned, the perpetrators of
such conduct are subject to the principles of universal jurisdiction, which allows
courts to prosecute offenders regardless of the situs of the event.,
20 0
International law has traditionally limited this category of offenses to
193. Seeld. at 216, 219-20.
194. See Ruth Wedgwood, Countering Catastrophic Terrorism: An American View, in ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS AGAINST TERRORISM 103-19, (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2004).
195. Addicott, supra note 184, at 219.
196. Baker, supra note 186, at 45.
197. Georges Abi-Saab, The Proper Role of International Law in Combating Terrorism, in
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS AGAINST TERRORISM xiii, (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2004).
198. Michael Rosetti, Terrorism as a Violation of the Law of Nations after Kadic v. Karadzic, 12
ST. JoHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 565, 582-84 (1997).
199. Id. at 591.
200. Id.
2008
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
the most heinous of crimes in an effort to prevent nations from
subjecting their arbitrary rules on foreign nationals. The law of nations
is the doctrine encompassing these violations. Courts look to the scope
of the international community's condemnation and the work of jurists
on the subject in making a determination of whether an activity violates
the law of nations. Recent developments also indicate that private
individuals as well as states can violate the law of nations. 201
I believe that the UN should be energized to address the issue of reaching a
consensus on a definition for terrorism. This definition should be a compromise
between the definitions in the U.S. and Muslim world where little differences
appear. With its spreading of democracy, development and free trade in the
Middle East would be the best avenue to promote war and terrorism avoidance.
The international community has to stress one legal anti-terrorist norm, "building
through the drafting and ratification of international anti-terrorist initiatives and
human rights.... ,202 These international instruments like treaties have to be
balanced and based on justice and acknowledge and absorb different perspectives.
B. Terrorism is an International Problem, not only an American Problem
After the attacks, the U.S. was expected to go for a more multilateral
approach. Instead the U.S. felt it had to do its own work. However, terrorism
should not be a subjective epithet which allows any one country to assert an
absolute right to attack any other country or group that it dislikes. The UN remains
the best forum for an objective and universally agreed definition. In his article,
Terrorism is the World's Problem, Egyptian Ambassador Fahmy called on
Americans to consider terrorism as a global not an American problem.203 This
conclusion and its consequences implies that Americans have to understand the
global context of the war on terrorism.20 4 The United Nations should be on the
hook; international law should be used more frequently and developed by the state
players to counter terrorism. The U.S. is a global power which has global
opportunities and responsibilities and terrorists are individuals who attacked not
only America but also who attacked other countries like Egypt, Spain, the UK and
Indonesia. 205 Establishing a dialogue between the Muslim World and the U.S. is
urgent, not only for securing peace in the Middle East, but also for making cultural
adjustments and strengthening globalization. Since terrorism has taken place,
moderate Muslims have not had the chance to either renounce the terrorist attacks
or to express what they think about these attacks against innocent civilians.
Americans have to realize that they can not win this war without the full
engagement of moderate Muslims. Unilateral and one sided view of the problem
will only aggravate the situation. This has been happening so far in Iraq.
201. Id.
202. Matthew Lippman, The New Terrorism and International Law, 10 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
297, 367 (2003).
203. Nabil Fahmy, Terrorism is the World's Problem, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.157, 160
(2006).
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In the first global reaction to September 11, 2001, the UN passed Resolution
1368, which specifically recognized America's inherent individual rights and
collective self defense in accordance with the Charter and specifically called on
states to work together "to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers, and
sponsors of these terrorist attacks. 2 °6 Shortly thereafter, the Security Council
passed another resolution, invoking its authority under Chapter VII of the United
Nations charter, reaffirming the need to combat by all means terrorist acts that
threaten international peace and security, requiring states to take steps to block
terrorist finances and end any state support for terrorism, and calling on states to
increase cooperative intelligence gathering and law enforcement efforts.
20 7 The
U.S. failed to use the resources of the Security Council, thus "undermin[ing] the
view that the council and the UN as a whole should be the primary vehicle to
respond to threats to and breaches of the peace.... ,208 The invasion of Iraq created
a precedent that states may freely act outside the UN system. 20 9 Jonathan Chamay
warned the U.S. about being involved in the war on terror without seeking the
support of the Security Council. He went on to explain how the Security Council's
involvement "could help build durable and broadly supported defenses against this
threat. 210 Otherwise, the U.S. will fail to build a stable, long term coalition in
support of its stated objective of suppressing international terrorism worldwide. A
Commercial law Professor in Cairo Law School suggested the closing of Public
International Law department at the law school and said that experts in
international law should turn to other fields of law as international law no longer
exists in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq. 211 Kofi Annan announced that "we
must never lose sight of the fact that any sacrifice of freedom or rule of law within
states--or any generation of new tensions between states in the name of anti-
terrorism-is to hand the terrorists a victory that no act of theirs alone could
possibly bring.,
2 12
"Terrorists today have become more global because of freedom of movement,
free flow of information and communications, and the ability to exploit loopholes
in the spectrum of domestic laws between countries. 2 13 A lot of loopholes exist in
domestic laws; these loopholes have to be filled by escalating domestic issues like
money laundering, transfer of money on an international level. A transnational
problem that spans virtually the entire world, terrorism is an international
phenomenon which represents the downside of globalization. It requires a
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concerted, consistent and coordinated international cooperative framework to
sustain a chance of eliminating this threat.2 4 International law is the only
mechanism to provide coordinating strategies and integration across countries
rather than military collations and a binary division of states between good and
evil. The latter would run the risk of aggravating the very international divisions
that can most easily be exploited to coordinate further underground criminal and
terrorist enterprises. "'Terrorism' no longer describes state conduct. It now refers
to the acts of sub-state actors. Similarly, its function is no longer just a term
expressing moral condemnation., 2 5 Furthermore, the international community
needs to work together quickly and consistently on the world war on terrorism, a
far reaching perspective of what the international community does by way of
resolving these issues. America is the most powerful country in the world;
however, it is not powerful enough to confront the new global challenges alone -
the UN has to be more engaged. Strengthening norms that hold states accountable
for criminal acts committed by terrorists operating from its territory, passing
resolutions prohibiting the targeting of civilians, signing a treaty which will
mandate a strong collective response to attacks on civilians are among the
proposals. For the most part, the U.S. has so far been focusing on what Telhami
termed the supply side of terrorism rather than the demand side. Ambassador
Fahmy again mentioned that "terrorism is an international phenomenon that will
only be defeated by collective efforts. 216
On a related front, international law norms and principles have to be
developed in combating terrorism, strengthening multilateral treaties and
international legal instruments, engaging the Muslim world with the force of
Sharia and cementing development and free trade projects in the Middle East,
which would combine together to make headway in winning the war on terrorism.
I completely believe that defusing terrorism should be a major topic in U.S. foreign
policy. My theory is that terrorism will be eliminated only when countries deal
with both the demand and supply side of terrorism. International trade law norms
can be the most efficient tool to deal with the demand side of terrorism, while
current international law norms have to be strengthened to deal with the supply
side as well. The two sides complement each other. The U.S. along with the
international community will have to go far in dealing with the supply side, while
the current status of international trade is enough to deal with the demand side.
CONCLUSION
Winning the war on terrorism will only be feasible if the Muslim world and
the U.S. realize that they have one common enemy. The U.S. -as a super power-
strategically opted for a more unilateral approach which has proved to be a failure
in combating terrorism. Moving back towards more a multilateral approach and
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engaging the Muslim world would effectively contribute to this war. Addressing
the root causes of terrorism is equally important as fighting terrorist organizations
with military might. International law remains the mechanism which both the U.S.
and the Muslim world could work together to enrich and develop.
The U.S. is clearly failing the cold war of ideology in the Middle East. A
growing proportion of the Muslim youth embrace extremist views that could
ultimately lead to increased terrorism. Although the CRS report acknowledges this,
the report failed to highlight the best course in combating terrorism. The idea of
bringing war to the enemy has unfortunately aggravated the situation in the Middle
East. The Bush Doctrine of preemptive self defense has not appealed to the
international community in general, let alone to the Muslim world. The report
suggests that the military component is the primary tool in the nation's portfolio
for combating terrorism; public diplomacy and economic inducement have
received little attention in the report even though it is clear now that they are the
best course to deal with the terrorism problem in the Middle East. I believe that the
U.S. portfolio has to include a military component to disarm and fight terrorists;
however, I largely disagree with the set of priorities which have been put in the
report. This article is advocating for a change in the set of current priorities of the
U.S. administration. Free trade, development, dialogue with the Muslim world and
increasing globalization in the Middle East have to be the top priorities of U.S.
portfolio of combating terrorism.
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